











This thesis has been submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for a postgraduate degree 
(e.g. PhD, MPhil, DClinPsychol) at the University of Edinburgh. Please note the following 
terms and conditions of use: 
• This work is protected by copyright and other intellectual property rights, which are 
retained by the thesis author, unless otherwise stated. 
• A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, without 
prior permission or charge. 
• This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining 
permission in writing from the author. 
• The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or 
medium without the formal permission of the author. 
• When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, title, 




Reliability Assessment of Distribution 
Networks Incorporating Regulator 
Requirements, Generic Network 
Equivalents and Smart Grid 
Functionalities 
 




Doctor of Philosophy 
THE UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH 
2017 
 
  i 
Abstract 
Over the past decades, the concepts and methods for reliability assessment have 
evolved from analysing the ability of individual components to operate without faults 
and as intended during their lifetime, into the comprehensive approaches for 
evaluating various engineering strategies for system planning, operation and 
maintenance studies. The conventional reliability assessment procedures now receive 
different perspectives in different engineering applications and this thesis aims to 
improve existing approaches by incorporating in the analysis: a) a more detailed and 
accurate models of LV and MV networks and their reliability equivalents, which are 
important for the analysis of transmission and sub-transmission networks, b) the 
variations in characteristics and parameters of LV and MV networks in different 
areas, specified as “generic” UK/Scottish highly-urban, urban, sub-urban and rural 
network models, c) the relevant requirements for network reliability performance 
imposed by Regulators on network operators, d) the actual aggregate load profiles of 
supplied customers and their correlation with typical daily variations of fault 
probabilities and repair times of considered network components, and e) some of the 
expected “smart grid” functionalities, e.g., increased use of network automation and 
reconfiguration schemes, as well as the higher penetration levels of distributed 
generation/storage resources. 
The conventional reliability assessment procedures typically do not include, or only 
partially include the abovementioned important factors and aspects in the analysis. In 
order to demonstrate their importance, the analysis presented in the thesis 
implements both analytical and probabilistic reliability assessment methods in a 
number of scenarios and study cases with improved and more detailed “generic” LV 
and MV network models and their reliability equivalents. Their impact on network 
reliability performance is analysed and quantified in terms of the frequency and 
duration of long and short supply interruptions (SAIFI and SAIDI), as well as energy 
not supplied (ENS). 
 
 
  ii 
This thesis addresses another important aspect of conventional approaches, which 
often, if not always, provide separate indicators for the assessment of system-based 
reliability performance and for the assessment of customer-based reliability 
performance. The presented analysis attempts to more closely relate system 
reliability performance indicators, which generally correspond to a fictitious 
“average customer”, to the actual “best-served” and “worst-served” customers in the 
considered networks. Here, it is shown that a more complex metric than individual 
reliability indicators should be used for the analysis, as there are different best-served 
and worst-served customers in terms of the frequency and duration of supply 
interruptions, as well as amounts of not supplied energy. 
Finally, the analysis in the thesis considers some aspects of the anticipated 
transformation of existing networks into the future smart grids, which effectively 
require to re-evaluate the ways in which network reliability is approached at both 
planning and operational stages. Smart grids will feature significantly higher 
penetration levels of variable renewable-based distributed generation technologies 
(with or without energy storage), as well as the increased operational flexibility, 
automation and remote control facilities. In this context, the thesis evaluates some of 
the considered smart grid capabilities and functionalities, showing that improved 
system reliability performance might result in a deterioration of power quality 
performance. This is illustrated through the analysis of applied automation, 
reconfiguration and automatic reclosing/remote switching schemes, which are shown 
to reduce frequency and duration of long supply interruptions, but will ultimately 
result in more frequent and/or longer voltage sags and short interruptions. Similarly, 
distributed generation/storage resources might have strong positive impact on system 
reliability performance through the reduced power flows in local networks and 
provision of alternative supply points, even allowing for a fully independent off-grid 
operation in microgrids, but this may also result in the reduced power quality levels 
within the microgrids, or elsewhere in the network, e.g. due to a higher number of 
switching transfers and transients. 
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Lay Summary 
Over the past decades, the concepts and methods for reliability assessment have 
evolved from analysing the ability of individual components to operate without faults 
and as intended during their lifetime, into the comprehensive approaches for 
evaluating various engineering strategies for system planning, operation and 
maintenance studies. The conventional reliability assessment procedures now receive 
different perspectives in different engineering applications and this thesis aims to 
improve existing approaches by incorporating in the analysis: a) a more detailed and 
accurate models of electrical distribution networks, b) the variations in characteristics 
and parameters of electrical distribution networks in different areas, c) the relevant 
requirements for network reliability performance imposed by Regulators on network 
operators, d) the actual customer load profiles and their correlation with daily fault 
probabilities and repair times of considered network components, and e) some of the 
expected “smart grid” functionalities. 
The presented analysis attempts to more closely relate system reliability performance 
indicators, which generally correspond to a fictitious “average customer”, to the 
actual “best-served” and “worst-served” customers in the considered networks. Here, 
it is shown that a more complex metric than individual reliability indicators should 
be used for the analysis, as there are different best-served and worst-served 
customers in terms of the frequency and duration of supply interruptions, as well as 
amounts of not supplied energy. Finally, the analysis in the thesis considers some 
aspects of the anticipated transformation of existing networks into the future smart 
grids, which effectively require to re-evaluate the ways in which network reliability 
is approached at both planning and operational stages. Smart grids will feature 
significantly higher penetration levels of variable renewable-based distributed 
generation technologies (with or without energy storage). In this context, the thesis 
evaluates some of the considered smart grid capabilities and functionalities, showing 
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Introduction 1 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
The existing electricity supply networks and grid infrastructures are currently 
undergoing significant changes, which can be generally termed as a “smart grid” 
transformation. These changes, which will be only more pronounced in the future, 
are mainly driven by the environmental concerns, requirements for the improved 
reliability and security of supply, as well as the development of new technical and 
technology solutions. For example, one of the important aspects of that ongoing 
transformation is significant growth of the zero or low-carbon emission and 
renewable energy sources generation technologies at practically all voltage levels, 
from a few (tens of) kW micro-generation units connected in low voltage (LV) 
networks, through medium-size power farms and parks with few hundreds kW or 
tens of MW connected to medium voltage (MV) networks, to a large-scale multi 
tens/hundreds MW and power plants connected to high voltage (HV) grid.  
Particularly important is to analyse renewable-based generation units connected in 
distribution networks, i.e. distributed generation (DG), as these DG units are neither 
monitored, nor controlled by the network operators, or required to provide system 
support. The increasing penetration levels of DG, which has variable power outputs 
and is connected nearer to the points of consumption, introduces several challenges 
and technical problems for the operation, analysis and modelling of distribution 
networks. These challenges can be answered only if the developed models contain 
detailed information on the configurations and parameters of the MV and LV 
networks, correctly incorporate DG and loading profiles into the analysis and also 
reflect the (recently) updated regulations and grid codes set by distribution network 
operators (DNOs) and Energy Regulators. The other important characteristics of 
“smart grids” are increased levels of automation, remote control, monitoring and 
communication systems, which all might have a strong impact on the overall network 
performance. This thesis considers some of the abovementioned aspects of operation 
of modern electricity networks (towards their future smart grid transformation), 
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which effectively require to re-evaluate the ways in which network reliability is 
approached at both planning and operational stages. 
1.1 Background 
The climate change concerns have resulted in the development of ambitious targets 
for the reduction of CO2 emission with, for example, the European Commission 
setting a target for 20% reduction of CO2 emissions by 2020 [1], while in the UK, 
the government has set a reduction of 80% of CO2 emissions by 2050 [2]. These 
ambitious targets pose a great challenge to all energy sectors in the UK, including the 
power supply networks. This thesis concentrates on the analysis of the electricity 
networks supplying residential (or domestic) customers, which account for around 
15% of the total CO2 emission in the UK (emission associated with heat and 
electricity demands for residential use, [3]). In order for the residential load sector to 
help in meeting the above targets, there must be a reduction in the energy usage 
through, e.g., construction of more thermally efficient buildings and use of more 
efficient electrical equipment. The use of low and zero-carbon generation, i.e. DG, in 
LV and MV distribution networks is also one of the options for decarbonising 
electricity demands. 
In order to successfully cope with the current and anticipated changes in distribution 
networks, e.g. implementation of DG, energy storage (ES) and demand-side 
management (DSM), existing electrical distribution networks must be able to 
maintain, if not improve, the existing levels of reliability, quality and continuity of 
supply. This is not only a general expectation, but is also regulated in related 
standards and legislation (e.g. guaranteed standard of performance, GSP, and 
security of supply, SoS, in the UK), where certain (accepted) levels of reliability and 
continuity of supply are specified. This thesis asserts that a full and accurate analysis 
of reliability performance of modern distribution networks must include the 
regulatory framework and requirements for reliability performance, both from the 
points of view of the DNOs and served customers. Moreover, the reliability 
assessment of modern networks should present an integrated methodology for both 
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quantifying and predicting the network performance, which will integrate some 
aspects of the analysis which are typically not included in the conventional reliability 
approaches, such realistic load profiles, daily variations of probability of fault rates, 
etc. Finally, the previous approaches for the analysis of MV and, particularly, HV 
networks used oversimplified models of LV networks (represented with only peak 
active and reactive power demands), which do not allow for the assessment of the 
impact of the DG connected in LV networks and other changes in the operation of 
LV networks (e.g. implementation of automation and remote/smart controls). This 
thesis also considers more detailed and more accurate representations and models of 
reliability equivalents of LV and MV distribution networks, which is generally 
justified by one available DNO report [4], suggesting that most supply interruptions 
originate from the faults in MV and LV networks. Therefore, it is essential for an 
improved and updated reliability analysis to model in detail LV and MV network 
configurations, parameters and components that are supplying different types of 
residential customers, ranging from highly-urban and urban areas, through sub-urban 
areas, to rural areas. 
1.2 Focus of the Research in This Thesis 
This PhD research focuses on the formulation of improved methodologies for a more 
detailed reliability analysis of MV and LV distribution networks, incorporating the 
UK SoS and GSP regulatory requirements, specifying not only average/system 
reliability indices, but also the actual best-served and worst-served customers in the 
analysed “generic” network models. Furthermore, the thesis presents the elements of 
the analysis required for the assessment of the risks of penalties (or compensation 
payments) with respect to the prescribed limits for the duration of supply 
interruptions, which are of importance for the DNOs in planning their reliability 
strategies. Finally, the thesis analyses the impact of DG with or without dedicated ES 
in some of the possible operating scenarios, quantifying the benefits of the DG/ES in 
improving reliability performance of considered LV and MV distribution networks.  
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This thesis and presented analysis are continuation of the previous work in the 
system reliability area at the School of Engineering, the University of Edinburgh, 
most notably [5]. The PhD research in this thesis has put significant effort in devising 
further improvements of the previous work, where, for example, the generic 
residential LV and MV UK/Scottish network configurations and components are 
revised and a number of changes were made regarding the specification of the 
protection equipment and their operation in isolating different types of faults. 
Furthermore, the calculation of reliability equivalents is presented with more detailed 
equations, considering use of both circuit breakers and fuses in generic LV and MV 
network models. On the other hand, general information on the fault rates and repair 
times of network components from available literature and some DNO reports is 
thoroughly analysed in order to segregate the fault rates and repair times for the four 
generic networks supplying corresponding residential load sub-sectors. 
1.2.1 Representation of Distribution Networks and Customer 
Related Factors 
During the reliability performance analysis of MV and HV networks, LV networks 
are typically not represented in much detail. The most common equivalent form 
representation of LV network is by a simple aggregate (“lumped”) load, specifying 
number of supplied customers and their peak active and reactive power demands 
(and sometimes minimum, or average demands, or daily load profiles) downstream 
of the MV point of aggregation, which is typically a primary or secondary 
distribution substation or transformer. However, the contributions of the LV 
networks to the overall system reliability performance in terms of frequency and, 
particularly, duration of LIs could be significant, although permanent LV faults 
usually do not result in interruptions of a large number of customers. Therefore, in 
order to have realistic estimation of reliability results, it is essential to have accurate 
models of LV distribution networks, which are in this thesis modelled with much 
more details regarding the configurations, parameters and components of the four 
generic LV and MV network models supplying highly-urban, urban, sub-urban and 
rural residential load sub-sectors. 
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The formulation of more detailed and more accurate reliability equivalent models is 
also accompanied by the use of the actual demand patterns and load profiles of 
residential customers, which allowed to obtain more realistic results for the reliability 
performance, i.e. to correlate the time-varying demands with the specific moment of 
fault occurrence (also represented by a various daily probabilities) for determining 
whether the supply to the loads/customers will be interrupted, or not. As the typical 
load profiles depend on the seasonal demand variations over the course of the year, 
the used load profiles correspond to three typical loading conditions in the 
UK/Scottish networks, such as the average loading for typical spring/autumn 
demand, maximum for winter demand and minimum for summer demand. These 
three loading conditions are represented in terms of differences in active/reactive 
power demands and changes in load profile curves (as the daily load profile plots), 
reflecting annual changes in e.g. ambient temperature and corresponding use of 
electrical heating/cooling loads.  
1.2.2 Incorporation of Regulator Requirements 
Distribution network operators (DNOs) are generally aiming to provide the high 
levels of power supply reliability (at least within the certain targets and limits 
specified in the related standards and legislative documents), while at the same time 
reducing the capital and maintenance costs of operating their networks, as this will 
result in lower electricity bills for their customers (affordability of supply). However, 
the recent statistics show that this is not an easy task, as 14% or the UK DNOs have 
been penalized for not achieving customer interruption (CI) annual targets imposed 
by Regulator (OFGEM in the UK), while 50% of DNOs exceeded their annual target 
limit for customer minutes lost (CML), [6]. Besides maintaining their network 
performance within the annual targets, the DNOs must also satisfy additional 
requirements for the maximum restoration times and frequency of long supply 
interruptions, which protect customers from experiencing too long and too frequent 
interruptions. After these requirements have been set, the DNOs will be responsible 
to restore supply to customers within a certain period of time, as otherwise they will 
be penalised. Accordingly, this thesis critically reviewed some of the commonly used 
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input data for reliability analysis (e.g. reported repair times of network components) 
with respect to existing SoS and GSP continuity supply requirement and proposed 
not only some changes in their values, but also to include these requirements  in the 
standard reliability assessment procedures. This is important from the DNOs’ point 
of view, as it will help in deciding on the required or appropriate planning, operation 
and maintenance strategies, in order to avoid situations in which their reliability 
performance is below the specified annual targets, as well as for efficient managing 
of penalty/compensation payment risks. 
1.2.3 Differentiation Between Average, Best and Worst-
Served Customers 
In most of the existing literature, the result of the reliability analysis are commonly 
presented as system/average reliability indices, corresponding to a fictitious “average 
customer” [7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13]. The DNOs also report their network reliability 
performance in terms of system indices and average customer performance, [14, 15, 
16]. These reports and approaches do not provide any information on the actual 
customers, e.g. in terms of the best-served and worst-served customers in analysed 
networks. Additionally, evaluation of risks for frequency and duration of 
interruptions is unclear if system average customer indices are used, while evaluated 
risks are easy to interpret for best-served and worst-served customers.  
This thesis does not question the use of average/system reliability indices for the 
purpose of providing information regarding the overall network performance, but 
suggests that an improved reliability assessment methodology should also provide 
information on the actual served customers and their “experience” with the reliability 
of the networks to which they are connected. In other words, it is important to 
provide information regarding the best, the worst and the average-served customers, 
as this will allow to both compare and interpret the obtained results of the reliability 
analysis, allowing to target specific actions and measures for improving reliability 
performance and reducing penalty risks with a higher level of confidence (than when 
only system average results are used). 
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1.2.4 Inclusion of DG and ES in the Analysis 
The evolution and transformation of existing networks into the future ‘smart grids’, 
with respect to the increased numbers of both DG and ES systems, can be divided in 
the three following steps or stages: from passive network integration, via reactive 
network integration, to active network integration, [17]. Implementation of advanced 
monitoring, sensing, communication and control systems in distribution networks 
will allow DNOs to have better control and management of their networks (planning 
and operation) and to integrate DG/ES resources in safe, economic and efficient 
ways. In this thesis, two types of active DG network integration with dedicated ES 
are analysed. The first type is use of DG and ES for reducing peak demands, while 
the second type is use of DG and ES for reducing demands during the times of 
increased probability of faults. 
1.3 Research Scope and Objectives  
The first objective of this PhD was to identify missing elements, information and 
data related to the network components and network models required for the 
reliability analysis, to update the existing and available networks and network 
components, and to employ these for the analysis of the typical UK/Scottish 
residential LV and MV distribution networks. Accordingly, these typical networks 
are divided into four different generic residential load sub-sectors, from metropolitan 
and city areas, to sub-urban and remote rural areas. Detailed network configurations, 
descriptions of network components and specifications of parameters are provided 
for all considered generic LV and MV networks, including relevant loading 
conditions, types of the faults (permanent vs transient, single-, double- and three-
phase faults). The required data and information are collected from an extensive 
surveying and searching of the UK, Scottish, European (and beyond) DNO reports, 
as well as manufacturers of the network equipment. In addition to that, the reliability 
input data (e.g. fault rates and MTTR) are divided into different residential load sub-
sectors based on the location, type of the switchgear (e.g. indoor or outdoor), loading 
conditions and number of other relevant factors.  
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The second objective of this PhD was to propose improvements to the existing 
approaches for the assessment of the network reliability performance, including both 
analytical and probabilistic techniques. Accordingly, the thesis applied both 
analytical and probabilistic (e.g. Monte Carlo simulation) approaches to assess the 
frequency and duration of supply interruptions, expressed them in terms of the 
system or customer-based reliability indices and analysed them in a number of 
different scenarios. The results of the analytical and probabilistic approaches are 
often directly compared (mean values of calculated reliability indices), in order to 
both check their accuracy and allow for an additional interpretation of results from a 
single approach.  
Available reports, recording and statistics are processed to identify and select the 
most realistic input data for the assessment of network performance (mean fault rates 
and mean repair times), which is then expressed and quantified through the set of 
standard reliability indices (SAIFI, MAIFI, CAIDI, SAIDI, ENS, etc.). The particular 
focus was on the continuity of supply of LV residential customers, where the 
conventional reliability assessment procedures are extended by including actual 
loading conditions, accurate network models, empirical daily fault probability 
distribution and ratio of long to short supply interruptions, based on the analysis of 
statistics on permanent and temporary faults, applied types and settings of protection 
systems and estimated probabilities of different fault types, which are all considered 
separately for the four generic LV and MV networks.  
Finally, the third objective of this PhD was to analyse the impact of the 
implementation of “smart grid” technologies and functionalities on the network 
reliability performance, i.e. DG and energy storage installed in the LV distribution 
networks. This part of the analysis showed that the DG and ES have potential to 
improve network reliability performance, if they are properly coordinated and 
operated (e.g. in the weakest network areas, where the reliability performance is 
expressed in the lowest SAIFI/SAIDI values). As the renewable-based DG has 
variable power outputs, the analysis included combining DG with the dedicated ES, 
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in order to maximise the benefits in improving the network reliability performance. 
In order to avoid underestimation of network reliability performance, this part of the 
analysis required correct modelling of distribution networks in which DG is 
implemented, which was based on the previously developed general methodology for 
the formulation of improved reliability equivalent models of LV distribution 
networks. These equivalent reliability models were based on the aggregation of 
individual network components in specific network configurations (four generic LV 
and MV network models), helping to reduce network complexity and computational 
times, while preserving the accuracy of the reliability performance assessment 
procedures. 
In concluding this section, the scope of this PhD thesis was to improve conventional 
methodologies for reliability assessment of existing and future LV and MV 
distribution networks. This is important, as conventional reliability assessment 
procedures do not include, or only partially include a number of factors that can 
strongly impact the output results for the network reliability performance. 
Accordingly, changes, modifications and additions in this thesis can be grouped in 
the following categories: a) a more detailed and accurate models of LV and MV 
networks and their reliability equivalents, b) the variations in characteristics and 
parameters of LV and MV networks in different areas, specified as “generic” 
UK/Scottish highly-urban, urban, sub-urban and rural network models, c) the 
relevant requirements for network reliability performance imposed by Regulators on 
network operators, d) the actual aggregate load profiles of supplied customers and 
their correlation with typical daily variations of fault probabilities and repair times of 
considered network components, e) consideration of reliability performance in terms 
of not only average, but also best- and worst-served customers, and f) analysis of 
“smart grid” functionalities, i.e. increased use of network automation and 
reconfiguration schemes, as well as the higher penetration levels of distributed 
generation/storage resources. 
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1.4 Thesis Contributions to Knowledge. 
The results from this research have been presented in four international conferences 
papers and two journal papers (under preparation). In addition to that, a section of the 
results has been presented at the Durham Risk Day 2014. The contributions can be 
summarised as below: 
• Modelling of the generic residential LV and MV UK distribution networks: 
- Detailed configurations and parameters are presented. 
- Selection of network components based on the location and loading 
conditions of each residential load sub-sector, or network area. 
• Assessment of network reliability performance with influence of load model 
and “smart grid” functionalities: 
- Analysis of impact of the connected DG on reliability improvements. 
- Application of dedicated ES in typical scenarios, for maximising the 
benefits of renewable-based DG. 
• Contributions to the network reliability performance analysis: 
- Improved analytical and probabilistic procedures for the application in 
existing and future LV and MV networks. 
- Inclusion of load profiles, long interruptions to short interruptions (LI/SI) 
ratios and daily fault probability distribution in the probabilistic approach. 
• Formulation of more accurate reliability equivalents of LV distribution 
networks: 
- Implementation of the full three-phase models, instead of a single-line 
representation of LV networks. 
- Differentiation between different types of faults (resulting in LIs or SIs) 
for underground-cable or overhead-line LV and MV networks. 
- Specification of more realistic reliability input data (fault rates and repair 
times) and fault types (permanent/temporary and single/double/three-
phase) for all considered generic network models and load sub-sectors. 
• Specification of penalty risk assessment procedure in terms of durations of 
LIs affecting residential customers: 
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- Analysis of the recent changes in the UK Regulator requirements (for LI 
duration from 18 hours to 12 hours) on the increased probability of 
paying the penalty/compensation. 
- The assessment of network reliability performance not only in terms of 
average (system-based) indices, but also regarding the actual best- and 
worst-served customers (separately for frequency and duration of LIs). 
• An example of applying presented reliability assessment approaches outside 
the considered LV/MV distribution networks, for the performance assessment 
of an offshore power plant. 
1.5 Thesis Structure 
After this introductory chapter, Chapter 2 of the thesis discusses the theoretical 
background for reliability assessment and presents a short overview of literature 
relevant for this PhD research. An overview of the general power system architecture 
is presented, along with the main characteristics of the UK (and European and wider) 
electricity supply networks. The term “Distributed Generation (DG)” is clearly 
defined and a literature review of the impact and effects of integration of DG on the 
distribution network performances is presented. An overview of the most widely 
used reliability concepts, metrics and indicators is also presented, including the UK 
practices. 
Chapter 3 discusses the techniques and criteria used in this research for the reliability 
evaluation and calculation of the system and customer-based indices. This includes 
both analytical approaches (limited with average/mean input data for, e.g., loading 
conditions, mean fault rates and mean repair times) and probabilistic approaches 
(Monte Carlo Simulation, MCS, procedures modified with the inclusion of actual 
loading condition and the use of daily fault probability distributions). The uncertainty 
of the output results and convergence criteria during the MCS-based calculation of 
reliability indices is also discussed. The application of the analytical and probabilistic 
approaches is presented and an example of the reliability performance assessment of 
an offshore power plant and network is provided. 
Reliability Assessment of Distribution Networks Incorporating Regulator 
Requirements, Generic Network Equivalents and Smart Grid Functionalities 
 
Introduction 12 
Chapter 4 provides detailed information for improved analysis and modelling of MV 
and LV distribution networks. This part of the work focuses on network modelling, 
where a wide range of specifications and parameters of the network components is 
provided and discussed, including the configurations of generic LV and MV 
networks supplying residential UK customers in the four corresponding load sub-
sectors. The important criteria and conditions for modelling LV and MV distribution 
networks are also discussed, based on the network operating conditions, applied 
types and settings of protection systems and occurrence of different fault types, as 
well as a more realistic representation of seasonal changes in residential load 
profiles.  
In Chapter 5, the analysis concentrated on the formulation of more accurate 
reliability equivalents of the modelled LV distribution networks. This chapter starts 
with provision of a full and detailed documentation of mean fault rates and mean 
repair times as the main input data for reliability analysis. As the mean fault rates and 
mean repair times are provided without making distinction between different 
networks (e.g. from urban to rural areas), the corresponding values are segregated 
into sets of four values required for the analysis of the four generic LV and MV 
distribution networks. Next, an improved methodology for the calculation of the 
reliability equivalents of LV networks is presented, which simplify the analysis, 
while preserving the accuracy of the calculated reliability indices. The application of 
both analytical and MCS algorithms is discussed and obtained results are compared 
for typical scenarios related to reliability analysis of distribution network 
functionalities and equivalent network models. 
In Chapter 6, a more realistic approach for reliability assessment is presented, 
acknowledging importance of including both the functionalities and settings of the 
applied protection devices and requirements from SoS, GSP and Regulator in the 
analysis. This required a thorough review of the changes in the related security and 
reliability of supply requirements recently made by the UK Regulator (e.g. more 
stringent requirements for the maximum restoration times), which was then applied 
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for the calculation of the risks of penalty/compensation payments from the system 
and customer-based points of view. Finally, the potential improvements/benefits 
towards reducing the frequency and duration of customer interruptions due to 
implementation of DG with or without dedicated ES system are analysed using the 
MCS approach with time-sequential calculation. The results of different scenarios of 
active DG & ES network integration are presented and compared (“peak demand 
shaving” and “reliability-based demand reducing”). 
The last chapter, Chapter 7, gives a review of the main contributions and results of 
this PhD research, and discusses the application of the presented methodologies for 
the improved reliability analysis of (planning, operation and management of) existing 
and future distribution networks. This chapter also suggests some areas for the future 








Reliability Assessment of Distribution Networks Incorporating Regulator 
Requirements, Generic Network Equivalents and Smart Grid Functionalities 
 
Reliability Assessment Techniques 14 
Chapter 2 Assessment of Network Reliability 
Performance: Background and 
Metrics 
This chapter discusses the theoretical background for the assessment of network 
reliability performance in relation to some general principle of operation of power 
supply systems, i.e. the three basic segments of generation, transmission and 
distribution networks. This is followed by a brief overview of related literature, 
where reliability metrics and indices commonly used in different countries and in the 
UK are specified. This chapter also gives an initial review of distributed generation 
(DG), including its impact on traditional distribution networks. Three general levels 
of DG integration that follow ongoing evolution/transformation of the distribution 
networks with the increasing numbers of DG are also discussed, from passive DG 
network integration, through reactive DG network integration, to active DG system 
management. 
2.1 The Power Supply System 
The main aim of power supply systems is to satisfy the customers’ demands for 
electrical energy, where electricity produced from raw energy sources (e.g. hydro, 
coal, natural gas, wind, solar, etc.) is transferred through the transmission and 
distribution networks to the “end-use points of utilisation”. Some of the basic 
principles of operation of power supply systems are discussed in further text in 
relation to the assessment of network reliability performance. 
2.1.1 Conventional power system architecture 
The power supply systems are made up of three basic segments: generation, 
transmission, and distribution. These three segments differ in configurations, voltage 
levels, sizes, types and settings of applied protection systems, main principles of 
operation, functionalities and target objectives. Traditionally, the electrical power is 
generated centrally, by large power plants with capacities typically in the order of 
several hundred Megawatt (MW), or higher. The power is then transformed into high 
voltage (HV) for bulk transmission over larger distances to the main load supply 
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points, where it is converted to medium voltage (MV) for distribution and supply of 
larger customers and, finally, to low voltage (LV) for supplying customers in various 
load sectors (e.g. residential and smaller commercial). 
In the conventional power system architecture, the distribution network is viewed as 
a passive network, in which power flows are unidirectional, always from the 
transmission system to the many load points in the distribution networks. However, 
in recent years, particularly renewable-based and therefore variable generation 
sources are being connected in larger numbers at the distribution level, thus changing 
the operation of distribution networks from passive to active. This has created new 
challenges for network operators, as these modern electricity grids are increasingly 
operated under conditions which are not planned in their original design. 
2.1.2 General characteristics of the UK networks 
Larger transmission networks are managed and operated by regional transmission 
companies. In the UK, these are currently the National Grid Electricity Transmission 
PLC (NGET) for England and Wales, Scottish Power Transmission Limited for 
southern Scotland, and Scottish Hydro Electric Transmission Limited for northern 
Scotland and the Scottish islands. However, the transmission network across the UK 
as a whole is operated by a single system operator, which is currently the National 
Grid Electricity Transmission PLC (NGET). National Grid balances the system and 
manages the generation outputs to ensure matching of demands, therefore keeping 
system voltages and frequency within the acceptable limits. 
The UK transmission system operates at 400 kV, 275 kV and 132 kV voltage levels. 
In England and Wales, voltage levels below 275 kV are normally regarded as the 
distribution and sub-transmission networks, but 132 kV level is considered to be part 
of transmission system in Scotland. Electricity distribution to end-users is performed 
at lower voltages, typically 33 kV, 11 kV, 6.6 kV, and 0.4 kV. The distribution 
system is a much denser layer of networks, which ultimately connect all end-users to 
the electricity grid. The interface between the transmission and distribution systems 
occurs at the grid supply transformer substations (so called “super grid 
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transformers”, typically 275/33 kV or 132/33 kV in Scotland, and 275/132 kV or 
400/132 kV in the rest of the UK). 
Distribution network operators (DNOs) own and operate the distribution networks 
that bring electricity from the transmission network to the end-users, which are 
generally divided in industrial, commercial, residential/domestic and other load 
sectors, or customer classes. Currently, there are 14 licensed DNOs in the UK, each 
responsible for a regional distribution services area. DNOs do not sell electricity to 
the end-users, as energy retail sector/service is separated from the operation, but 
maintain and upgrade networks and all related facilities in order to provide 
continuous and high quality supply of electricity to all customers. 
2.2 Assessment of Network Reliability Performance 
Network reliability is one of the most important aspects of operation of electricity 
supply systems, which is closely monitored not only by the DNOs, but also by the 
Energy Regulators (OFGEM in the UK). Consequently, if the DNOs do not aim to 
continuously improve, or at least maintain certain levels of reliability performance of 
their networks, this will result in severe penalties by the Regulators and will 
significantly affects DNOs ability to gain new customers and keep the existing ones. 
The networks reliability performance is quantified and assessed through a number of 
indices, which generally vary from one country to another. The DNOs from the 
United States (US) and most of the European countries quantify the network 
reliability performance using indices related to long supply interruptions (LIs) from 
[18]: system average interruption frequency index, SAIFI, system average 
interruption duration index, SAIDI, momentary average interruption index, MAIFI, 
and energy not supplied index, ENS. The terms used in the UK are different, as the 
UK DNOs report to the Regulator two reliability indices, for which the Regulator 
specifies annual target values: customer interruption (CI), calculated per 100 
customers (interrupted) and customer minutes loss (CML), calculated in minutes. CI 
and CML basically correspond to SAIFI and SAIDI indices, respectively. In addition 
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to that, the UK DNOs also report number of short interruption (SIs), although 
currently there is no specified target for it. 
In terms of the distinction between long interruptions (LIs) and short interruptions 
(SIs) of supply, there is a difference in the duration limits between European 
countries and the US. The DNOs in Europe typically define LI as at least three 
minutes long interruption of supply [19], while one minute limit is used in the US, 
[18]. As the Regulators impose targets for the annual reliability performance, the 
DNOs have to strategically plan the operation of their networks, both in technical 
and economic terms, in order to achieve or perform better than the imposed 
reliability targets with only a reasonable increase of electricity costs for their 
customers. However, the recent UK statistics show that current DNOs planning and 
operation strategies for reliability performance were not always successfully 
implemented. For example, more than 14% of the UK DNOs were penalised for not 
achieving specified CI targets, while 50% of them were not able to meet their CML 
targets in one considered year [6]. Therefore, it is important for DNOs to apply as 
accurate and as comprehensive reliability assessment methods and procedures as 
reasonably possible (e.g. in computational sense, or by including currently neglected 
factors that may affect the calculated reliability performance) and this thesis 
discusses some of the possible ways for improving existing approaches for reliability 
assessment. 
The distribution of permanent and transient faults into LI or SI depend on the 
protection and/or  configuration of the network. For example, permanent faults 
(longer than 3 minutes in Europe) normally result in LIs, but can turn into SIs if the 
network can be reconfigured in less than 3 minutes and provide alternative supply to 
all customers. Another important factor in reliability assessment which is less 
researched is the occurrence of multiple simultaneous faults in the networks. These 
cases are due to cascading effect (e.g. overloading of more than one component), 
stressing the network beyond its N-1 security limits. For example, the MV urban 
network is designed with two identical parallel 33/11 kV transformers and if one of 
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the transformers is faulted, the other transformer may also trip if it is overloaded 
during that period (cascading effect). 
Another objective of DNOs is to increase the value of their business and services 
they are providing to the customers, e.g. to increase the reliability performance, but 
at the same time lower the expenses for customers. This requires to apply detailed 
design, planning and operation analyses and studies of distribution networks, where 
the dominant impact on reliability performance, as seen by the customers, originates 
from MV and LV networks. In the UK, it is reported that about 82% of CI and 85% 
of CML figures are caused by the faults and similar unplanned incidents in LV and 
MV networks, with voltage levels from 0.4 kV up to 20 kV [20]. Figure 2.1 
illustrates reported numbers for frequency and duration of supply interruptions for 
one Scottish DNO, by the voltage level at which they occurred. Typical 
nomenclature used by UK DNOs is to disaggregate the MV level, classified as 
follows: 
• Extra High Voltage (EHV) – voltage greater than 20kV, but less than 132kV; 
• High Voltage (HV) – voltage from 1 kV up to 20kV; 
• Low Voltage (LV) – voltage less than 1 kV; 
• LV services – the LV service entry line, connecting customers to the 
electricity supply network. 
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a) CI proportion by voltage level 
 
b) CML proportion by voltage level 
Figure 2.1:  Proportion of customer supply interruptions by voltage level, Scottish 
Power Distribution Report 2012/13 [20]. 
For the improved analysis and assessment of reliability performance, DNOs must 
model their networks with detailed configurations, with all required parameters and 
with accurate input data. Particularly important is to obtain accurate information on 
fault rates and mean repair times of individual network components (Fig. 2.1), as 
often parts of the networks operating at lower-voltage levels are represented by 
lumped aggregated models, providing only information on active and reactive power 
demands, in order to simplify the analysis and reduce the computational times. 
Additional important reasons for revising conventional reliability assessment 
approaches are the changes in the structure and operation of existing distribution 
networks, e.g. due to the implementation of new technologies (distributed generation, 
increased automation and remote control, etc.) and due to the further deregulation of 
the electricity market and provision of new services (e.g. demand-side management 
and time-of-use tariffs). 
2.2.1 Definition of Reliability 
Initially, the reliability concepts evolved from analysing the ability of the network 
components (individual components, or groups of components) to operate without 
faults and as intended during their lifetime. In recent years, reliability performance 
was redefined as the ability of the considered network to supply all connected 
customers, where (overall) continuity of supply is assessed in terms of the system-
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based (i.e. system average values of) reliability indices. It should be also noted that 
the concepts of availability and security have always been closely related to 
reliability analysis and since all three concepts are closely related, there should be a 
clear distinction between their actual meanings. All three concepts are generally used 
for the analysis of the power system as a whole, but when the focus is on an 
individual network component, only the concepts of reliability and availability can 
be applied (e.g. of a generator, a cable, or a transformer). Accordingly, the results of 
the reliability and availability analysis can be obtained for a larger part of the 
network, or extended to the whole network, in order to identify the influence and 
impact of a particular component on the reliability of the system in which this 
component is used. 
The flexibility in defining and implementing reliability analysis to the specific part(s) 
of the system allows to perform reliability analysis from the point of view of 
particular customers. This is demonstrated in Chapter 6, where system-average 
reliability indices, which do not necessarily relate to any actual customer in the 
considered network, are compared with the corresponding results for the actual “best 
served” and “worst served” customers. 
Based on the North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC), power system 
reliability is defined as “the degree to which the performance of the electrical system 
elements result in power being delivered to consumers within the accepted standard 
and in the amount desired”, [21]. In addition to that, NERC considers adequacy and 
security as the major factors for reliability analysis. Adequacy is defined as “the 
ability of a system to supply aggregate electric power and energy requirements of the 
consumers at all times”. Typically, the concept of adequacy is broadly used in the 
generation and transmission systems, where the energy generation resources, 
including capacity reserves, are specified so that demand during peak conditions can 
be meet and sufficient system capacity reserves are provided in cases of various 
(credible) contingencies. Similarly to the evolving concept of reliability, 
implementation of new technologies, services and functionalities in the distribution 
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networks, such as DG, energy storage (ES), demand-side management (DSM), etc., 
will also impact the changes in the traditional adequacy concepts. 
Availability, A(t), is defined as the total number of hours in a calendar year for which 
a network component, a part of the network, or the whole network/system is 
available, i.e. capable of operating as intended and in normal operating conditions. 
Unavailability, U(t), is the inverse of availability, i.e. the total number of hours in a 
calendar year for which normal operation of a network component, or a part of the 
network, or the whole network/system is interrupted, e.g. due to a fault (unplanned 
event), or a scheduled maintenance/servicing (planned event). Different formulas are 
often provided in the literature for quantifying availability. An example is [22]: 
𝐴(𝑡) = 𝑢𝑧 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒
𝑢𝑧 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒+𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒
             (2.1) 
where: uptime is the time the network component(s) or the whole system is in normal 
operation, and downtime is the time when not in operation. Unavailability is then 
expressed as: 
𝑈(𝑡) = 1 − 𝐴(𝑡)                       (2.2) 
Figure 2.2 illustrates some of the quantities used for a more detailed analysis of the 
temporal aspects of reliability assessment. 
 
Figure 2.2:  Temporal aspects of reliability assessment process [23]. 
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In Figure 2.2, [23]: 
• Mean time to fail (MTTF) – average time of normal operation of a 
component or a system, before the first failure occur. 
• Mean time to repair (MTTR) – average time required for repairing the faulted 
component or system, so it can be returned to the initial operation state. 
• Mean time between failures (MTBF) – average time between two consecutive 
failures of a repairable component or system. 
• Mean up time (MUT) – average time of a normal operation after the repair. 
• Mean down time (MDT) – average time spent in failure state: sum of times 
for detecting the failure after it occurs, repairing the failure and putting back 
repaired component into operation. 
An alternative definition of availability uses the time of normal operation (i.e. the 
time between the two consecutive faults, or time before the first fault) and the time 
for which the component or system is out of service (i.e. the time required to repair 
the faulted component/system), [24]: 
𝐴(𝑡) = 𝑀𝑇𝑀𝑀
𝑀𝑇𝑀𝑀+𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑀
              (2.3) 
The difference between (2.1) and (2.3) is that MDT includes the MTTR and periods 
of time before the faulty condition has become apparent and until the component is 
repaired and put back into service. In detailed reliability assessment applications, 
MDT is applied only when there are unplanned/forced outages, while MTTR is 
considered for planned outages, or during the maintenance and servicing periods. In 
general case, the availability calculation does not specify the difference between the 
unplanned and planned outages and is therefore possible to consider both types of 
outages in the analysis. 
Finally, security is defined as the ability of a power supply system to respond to 
disturbances and transient events without becoming unstable and/or resulting in 
faults that require disconnection of (a large number of) customers, or not satisfying 
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customers’ supply requirements [25]. The term security is therefore closely 
associated with both reliability assessment and analysis of system transfers from one 
operating state to another, typically within a relatively short period of times. 
Accordingly, security should assess ability of the system to withstand sudden 
disturbances (e.g. faults and contingencies) and minimize their impact on the system 
and supplied customers [21]. 
2.2.2 Metrics for Reliability Assessment 
In existing literature and practice, several sets of indices have been proposed for the 
assessment and evaluation of the power systems reliability. Each of the three main 
segments of the power system (i.e. generation, transmission and distribution part) has 
its own specified indices. For example, loss of load probability (LOLP) and loss of 
load expectation (LOLE) indices are used for generation, while bulk power 
interruption index (BPII) and bulk power energy curtailment index (BPECI) indices 
are used for the analysis of transmission systems. A more detailed description of the 
reliability indices of each segment related to the system and end-load assessment, is 
available in [25, 26, 27]. The various sets of indices and indicators are used for 
quantifying, benchmarking, comparing and exchanging information on network 
reliability performance, after which targets can be set or adopted for further 
improvement and analysis of the different operating and loading conditions of the 
system. 
This thesis focuses on the reliability indices related to distribution networks. Every 
year, DNOs are required to report a specified set of reliability indices to the 
Regulators, which directly quantify the number and duration of supply interruptions. 
These sets of indices are not globally uniform and vary from one Regulator in one 
country to another Regulator/country. Based on the quality of the electricity supply 
report [14], presented by the Council of European Energy Regulators (CEER), most 
countries in Europe define their own reliability indices, and this report provides a 
comprehensive list of reliability indices used by the European countries. Although 
the terms used by the DNOs in Europe are different, the computational procedures, 
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the calculation processes and formulas used are similar. For instance, in the UK, the 
calculation of the number of customers with interrupted service and the duration of 
interruption reported to the Regulator is practically identical to the computational 
procedure of a set of indices considered by the DNOs in Italy, Germany, The 
Netherlands (but also the US and Canada), which calculate the reliability indices 
according to [18]. However, the terms used are somewhat different. 
2.2.3 Reliability Indices 
The basic reliability indices for network performance assessment are usually related 
to basic reliability parameters, such as mean fault rate, λ, expressed in faults/year, 
repair time, r, or mean time to repair, MTTR, expressed in hours/fault, as well as 
annual repair time, or unavailability, U, in hours/year. Typically, these parameters 
are given as input data for network components. All of these indices are considered 
through a series-parallel combination of network components, in order to assess the 
reliability performance of the whole system, part of the system or specific customers.  
The basic calculation of reliability indices for series-connected components is based 
on the following equations [25]: 




              (2.5) 
𝑈𝑠 = 𝜆𝑠𝑟𝑠             (2.6) 
where: N is the total number of network components; 𝜆𝑖 is the mean fault rate of 
component i; 𝑟𝑖 is the MTTR of component i; 𝜆𝑠 is the total fault rate of N series-
connected components; 𝑟𝑠 is the total MTTR of N series-connected components; and 
𝑈𝑠 is the total unavailability of N series-connected components.  
The basic calculation of reliability indices for parallel-connected components is 
based on the following equations [25]: 
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𝜆𝑧 = 𝜆1 ∙ 𝜆2 ∙ … ∙ 𝜆𝑁−1 ∙ 𝜆𝑁 �
𝑟1𝑟2 + ⋯+ 𝑟1𝑟𝑁−1
+𝑟1𝑟𝑁 + ⋯+ 𝑟2𝑟𝑁−1 + 𝑟2𝑟𝑁




                     (2.8) 
𝑈𝑧 = (𝜆1 ∙ 𝜆2 ∙ … ∙ 𝜆𝑁−1 ∙ 𝜆𝑁)(𝑟1 ∙ 𝑟2 ∙ … ∙ (𝑟𝑁−1 ∙ 𝑟𝑁)                (2.9) 
where: N is the total number of network components; 𝜆1, 𝜆2 and 𝜆𝑁 are the fault 
rates of network components 1, 2 and N; 𝑟1, 𝑟2 and 𝑟𝑁 are the MTTR of network 
component 1, 2 and N; 𝜆𝑧 is the total fault rate of parallel-connected components; 𝑟𝑧 
is the total MTTR of parallel-connected components; and 𝑈𝑧 is the total 
unavailability of parallel-connected components.  
Repair process of a faulted component/system can be modelled using an up-down-up 
cycle, i.e. normal operation, fault, repair and again normal operation, Figure 2.3, 
which is closely correlated with Figure 2.2. 
 
Figure 2.3:  Two-state diagram of repairable components [28]. 
Typically, reliability performance of a distribution network is quantified using 
separate indices for estimating the frequency and duration of long and short supply 
interruptions.  
System average interruption frequency index, SAIFI, is defined as the average 
number of customer interruptions lasting longer than a specified duration (e.g. one  
minute in [18]) per customer served, which are recorded during a specified time 
period, normally a year. SAIFI is expressed in long interruption/customer/year: 
𝑆𝐴𝐼𝐹𝐼 = 𝑇𝑑𝑡𝑚𝑙 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑛𝑒𝑟 𝑑𝑓 𝑐𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑑𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑖𝑑𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑧𝑡𝑒𝑑 (𝑛𝑏 𝐿𝐿)
𝑇𝑑𝑡𝑚𝑙 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑛𝑒𝑟 𝑑𝑓 𝑐𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑑𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒𝑑
         (2.10) 
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System average interruption duration index, SAIDI, is defined as the average 
duration of interruption in hours, per customer, during a designated time period, also 
normally a year. In general, SAIDI is calculated and expressed in 
hours/customer/year, although some of European DNOs use minutes instead of 
hours: 
𝑆𝐴𝐼𝐷𝐼 = 𝑇𝑑𝑡𝑚𝑙 𝑐𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑑𝑚𝑒𝑟 𝑖𝑑𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑧𝑡𝑖𝑑𝑑 𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑚𝑡𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑠 (𝑛𝑏 𝐿𝐿)
𝑇𝑑𝑡𝑚𝑙 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑛𝑒𝑟 𝑑𝑓 𝑐𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑑𝑚𝑒𝑟 𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒𝑑
      (2.11) 
Equivalent fault rate, 𝜆, and equivalent unavailability, 𝑈, have similarities with the 
SAIFI and SAIDI indices, respectively, as long as the total number of customers 
affected by the considered interruptions is supplied from the same network 
equipment stated in the outage condition (e.g. all customers are connected with the 
same transformer). Furthermore, the SAIFI index and equivalent fault rate are 
expressed in faults or interruptions per year, while the SAIDI index and equivalent 
unavailability are expressed in hours per year.  
Customer average interruption duration index, CAIDI, is defined as the average 
duration of long supply interruptions, expressed in hours per customer interrupted: 
𝐶𝐴𝐼𝐷𝐼 = 𝑆𝑆𝐿𝑆𝐿
𝑆𝑆𝐿𝑀𝐿
= 𝑇𝑑𝑡𝑚𝑙 𝑐𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑑𝑚𝑒𝑟 𝑖𝑑𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑧𝑡𝑖𝑑𝑑 𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑚𝑡𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑠
𝑇𝑑𝑡𝑚𝑙 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑛𝑒𝑟 𝑑𝑓 𝑐𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑑𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑖𝑑𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑧𝑡𝑒𝑑
      (2.12) 
The SAIFI, SAIDI, and CAIDI indices cannot differentiate between the different 
types of customers, as they “weigh” different customers equally. For instance, one 
customer may represent a large industrial load (in the MVA region) while the others 
may contain small residential load (in a few kVA range). 
In the UK, DNOs report to the Regulator two indices, which are the customer 
interruptions (CI) and customer minutes lost (CML), where CI is calculated per 100 
customers and duration of supply interruption should be at least three minutes, in 
order to be classified as long interruption (LI) [19]. The CI index excludes repetitive 
interruptions of customers during the same incident, so these interruptions are 
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counted as re-interruptions (RI) of the supply. The CI is expressed in number of 
customers interrupted per year per 100 customers and calculated as [29]: 
𝐶𝐼 = 𝑇ℎ𝑒 𝑠𝑢𝑚 𝑑𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑛𝑒𝑟 𝑑𝑓 𝑐𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑑𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑖𝑑𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑧𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑓𝑑𝑟 𝑚𝑙𝑙 𝑖𝑑𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑑𝑡𝑠
𝑇𝑑𝑡𝑚𝑙 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑛𝑒𝑟 𝑑𝑓 𝑐𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑑𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑠
∙ 100   (2.13) 
where the total number of customers includes all customers connected to a 
considered distribution network via dedicated electricity meter. 
The CML is defined as the average duration of long interruptions (in minutes) per 
year and per customer. The CML index is equivalent with the SAIDI index (given in 
hours), and the formula is given as [29]: 
𝐶𝐶𝐶 = 𝑇ℎ𝑒 𝑠𝑢𝑚 𝑑𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑐𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑑𝑚𝑒𝑟 𝑚𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑡𝑒𝑠 𝑙𝑑𝑠𝑡 𝑓𝑑𝑟 𝑚𝑙𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑑𝑟𝑚𝑡𝑖𝑑𝑑 𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑠𝑒𝑠 𝑓𝑑𝑟 𝑚𝑙𝑙 𝑖𝑑𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑑𝑡
𝑇𝑑𝑡𝑚𝑙 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑛𝑒𝑟 𝑑𝑓 𝑐𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑑𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑠
 (2.14) 
Another metric [29] to quantify the number of customers re-interrupted per 100 
customers per year is: 
𝑅𝐼 = 𝑇ℎ𝑒 𝑠𝑢𝑚 𝑑𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑛𝑒𝑟 𝑑𝑓 𝑐𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑑𝑚𝑒𝑟 𝑟𝑒−𝑖𝑑𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑧𝑡𝑒𝑑
𝑇𝑑𝑡𝑚𝑙 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑛𝑒𝑟 𝑑𝑓 𝑐𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑑𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑠
∙ 100         (2.15) 
All of the previously presented reliability indices quantify the reliability performance 
in terms of long interruptions. For quantifying frequency of short interruptions of 
supply (which are not distinguished in terms of duration), the momentary average 
interruption frequency index, MAIFI, is expressed as the average number of short 
interruptions per customer per year, calculated as: 
𝐶𝐴𝐼𝐹𝐼 = 𝑇𝑑𝑡𝑚𝑙 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑛𝑒𝑟 𝑑𝑓 𝑐𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑑𝑚𝑒𝑟 𝑚𝑑𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑡𝑚𝑟𝑏 𝑖𝑑𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑧𝑡𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑠
𝑇𝑑𝑡𝑚𝑙 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑛𝑒𝑟 𝑑𝑓 𝑐𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑑𝑚𝑒𝑟 𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒𝑑
         (2.16) 
The MAIFI index is used by several European DNOs (e.g. France, Italy, etc.), while 
in the UK, DNOs report short interruption (SI) index, which is similar to the MAIFI 
index. In some cases, the aggregation of SIs and LIs is performed when the 
separation periods between them are relatively short (less than 3 minutes). For 
example, if a customer experiences SI for 2 minutes and the supply is then restored 
back for 2 minutes, but then a long interruption occur for 30 minutes, after which the 
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supply is restored permanently, this event will be categorised as a single long 
interruption of 34 minutes (the first restoration of 2 minutes is still counted as an 
interruption, as the separation of SI and LI is less than 3 minutes) [30]. For SI, in the 
case of multi-shot automatic reclosing schemes, multiple SIs are defined as a single 
SI, assuming that the supply is successfully restored within less than 3 minutes, 
regardless of the number of automatic reclosing operations resulting in SIs [30]. In 
this thesis, SIs are analysed as supply interruptions shorter than 3 minutes without 
considering minimum duration of SIs [5]. 
While previous reliability indices are basically defined as customer-oriented indices, 
average energy not supplied, AENS, and ENS are examples of energy-oriented 
indices. The AENS is expressed as energy (e.g. in kWh or MWh) not supplied per 
customer and per year and is calculated as: 
𝐴𝐸𝑁𝑆 = 𝑇𝑑𝑡𝑚𝑙 𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑏 𝑑𝑑𝑡 𝑠𝑢𝑧𝑧𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑑
𝑇𝑑𝑡𝑚𝑙 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑛𝑒𝑟 𝑑𝑓 𝑐𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑑𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒𝑑
                 (2.17) 
The ENS is calculated as the total energy not supplied for all interrupted customers, 
i.e. as AENS multiplied by the total number of served customers. Although there are 
further reliability indices, such as CAIFI, ASAI, etc., these are not presented and 
discussed, as they were not used to quantify the network reliability performance in 
this thesis. 
2.3 Distributed Generation 
Distributed generation (DG) generally denotes a small to medium-scale electricity 
generation connected to a distribution network, which is becoming increasingly 
important for the analysis of (distribution) network performance due to continuous 
growth of installed DG systems. Accordingly, this section defines the term 
“Distributed Generation (DG)” and gives an initial literature review of the impact 
and effects of integration of DG on the distribution network performances, which is 
later discussed in more detail in Chapter 6. 
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The International Energy Agency (IEA) defines DG as “a generating plant serving a 
customer on-site, or providing support to a distribution network, connected to the 
grid at the distribution level voltage” [31], while CIGRE defines it as “a generation 
with the following characteristics: it is not centrally planned and dispatched, and is 
usually connected to a distribution network with a small capacity of between 50–100 
MW” [31]. The Electric Power Research Institute defines it as “a generation from a 
few kilowatts, up to 50 MW” [31].Often, the term DG is changed to microgeneration 
(MG), typically for generation systems at a domestic scale, where the capacities are 
less than 50 kW electrical, or 30 kW thermal [32] . 
Input energy sources for DG can be fossil fuel (e.g. natural gas, or diesel), or 
renewable energy resources (e.g. solar or wind) and one of the reasons for the 
increased recent use of DG systems is utilisation of renewable energy resources 
(RER). In the past, however, the term DG was most often related to the backup or 
customer-owned generation for producing electrical and thermal energy for on-site 
use, typically by natural gas, coal and biomass-fired generation. Backup generators, 
which mostly use engines fuelled with diesel oil or gasoline, are commonly found in 
high-rise buildings, hospitals and industry, which depend on highly reliable supply of 
power. Small-scale RER-powered DG is mostly used in residential areas (as 
microgeneration systems), with most common technologies for grid-connected DG 
being wind turbines and solar photovoltaic (PV) systems. Although RER-powered 
DG has almost zero carbon dioxide emission, the output produced by the DG are 
variable and unpredictable, making it currently unable to be used as a fast response 
backup supply, or for supplying base system load. 
2.3.1 Impact of Distributed Generation on Distribution 
Networks 
Traditionally, distribution networks are designed and operated as passive systems, 
with tap-changing transformers in primary distribution substations and reactive 
power compensation (capacitor banks) being the only actively controlled elements, 
which are both typically used for voltage regulation in the networks and at some 
specific locations. Another important aspect of operation of traditional distribution 
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networks is a unidirectional flow of powers, from the primary MV substations to the 
secondary MV/LV substations and final end-users, where networks are not intended 
to accommodate (any significant) active power generation, particularly if it may 
resulted in reversed, i.e. bi-directional power flows [33]. 
The increased penetration levels of DG in modern distribution networks require 
careful re-evaluation of basic principles of operation, protection and control, 
particularly in weak distribution networks. If the power output of DG is higher than 
demand of the loads supplied from the primary substations, this typically results in 
the increased voltage at the DG location due to reverse power flows [34]. Although it 
is possible for the tap-changer transformers to regulate the voltage in the downstream 
network, this situation requires coordination of network voltage control with the DG 
operation, which might be difficult when the location of the DG is in the middle of 
the feeder [35]. 
The distributed power reduces from the higher voltage levels (upper parts of the 
network) towards the lower voltage levels in the network (downstream parts of the 
network). Accordingly, the size and capacity of network components in the upper 
parts of the network are bigger and reduce along the feeders in the downstream 
network (manifested in, e.g. tapered cross-sections of conductors). If the DG system 
is designed to satisfy only local demand, it will reduce the power flows from the grid, 
i.e. thermal loading of network components from the downstream to the upstream of 
the network [36]. However, if the DG output is greater than the local demand, energy 
will be exported to the upstream network and excessive reverse power flow might 
lead to the increased thermal loading, as well as increased losses and the higher 
probability of faults, which will then result in supply interruptions of customers. 
During the network design, the thermal capacity of network components is correlated 
with fault levels in the network, which are calculated at various locations in order to 
select adequate types and settings of protection devices. Before the implementation 
of the DG, the typical protection schemes are based on the existing operation of the 
network and coordination of the protection devices was based on unidirectional 
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power flows, i.e. on the use of non-directional protection relays. After the 
implementation of the DG, the fault levels in the network will change and protection 
systems should be re-evaluated in terms of possible fault current contributions of the 
DG. In cases of reversed power flows, some of the existing protection devices (and 
their coordination) might need to be changed, e.g. by replacing non-directional with 
directional relays. For example, particularly challenging is operation of DG in so 
called “micro-grid” mode, when in the case of the upstream fault, resulting in the 
disconnection of the faulted part of the network, DG continues to supply local load 
(“islanded” operation). Stable and safe operation of the micro-grid part of the 
network in both grid-connected and off-grid operation modes will require different 
settings of protection devices (as fault levels will change), rearrangement of earthing 
conditions and careful coordination of the transfer switches. Adaptive protection 
schemes have been developed in order to improve the coordination of the protection 
devices, and one of the solutions is to divide the distribution networks into multiple 
smaller parts [37]. The fault location can be detected separately in each of the smaller 
parts by measuring the fault level contributions from the DG. 
Most of the DG units are typically located near the consumption points, which is 
particularly true for the DG units that serve as a back-up supply. These DG units 
allow operation of a single building, or a single installation in “islanded mode”, in 
case of a fault in the upstream network, supplying all or part of the customers (e.g. 
emergency loads) in the otherwise disconnected building/installation and maintaining 
continuous power supply (from DG) and improved reliability levels [35, 38]. Since 
this type of DG does not start instantaneously, customers will experience short 
interruption during the transfer/switch to DG supply and some especially sensitive 
customers may utilize uninterruptable power supply (UPS) in conjunction with the 
DG during the transfer switch [35]. 
The DG units that normally operate in parallel with the utility source could improve 
the security and reliability levels of distribution networks to which they are 
connected, while reducing line losses. As long as the DG is connected and producing 
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some outputs, it will result in reduced power demands from the network. The 
delivery of power to the network by the DG is recorded (and controlled) by the net 
metering, which is defined as exported DG power, whenever DG output exceeds the 
local load demand and results in power being fed back into the distribution network 
[35]. In these conditions, the DG is capable of supplying a portion of, or full load 
demand and reduced energy transfers through network components (e.g. cables, 
transformers, etc.) effectively reduce system active power (I2R) losses [39], while 
also releasing network capacity. From the reliability point of view, however, reduced 
losses and thermal stress/loading of equipment result in the lower probability of 
equipment fault, and, when faults happen, in the higher capacities of healthy network 
components to supply demands (with loads reduced due to local DG generation). 
2.3.2 Technical Requirements for DG Connection 
Generally, the impact of the DG on network operation and changes in reliability 
performance will depend on the location, size and ways in which DG is controlled 
and operated. This is typically evaluated before the DG is connected, in the studies 
related to satisfying technical requirements for the grid connection of larger DG 
units, where the main concern is to demonstrate that after the DG connection there 
will be no degradation of the network performance, or that any possible negative 
impact of DG is within the specified limits. However, in case of microgeneration, i.e. 
when connected DG units are small (<50 kW), the requirement for DG owners and 
DNO to carry out detailed studies before connecting DG are less stringent – only 
general requirements should be satisfied, which are typically taken care of by the DG 
manufacturers and installers. In such cases, connection of a large number of small 
DG units might result in the impact of such aggregated DG on the network which is 
similar to the connection of larger DG units, but which is not evaluated in detail. 
Connection of DG is also subject to further technical requirements and guidelines, 
which are issued by the specific DNOs and are different in different countries. In this 
thesis, the analysis of DG impact on network reliability performance assumes that all 
technical requirements, regulative and legislative documents for the DG connection 
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in the UK are applicable. In the UK, the requirements for the connection of DG are 
provided by the Energy Networks Association (ENA) and categorised into three 
sections, based on voltage levels and DG rating. Each section provides a “route map” 
and guidelines for the installation of DG in the UK distribution networks: 
• ER G83/2 – connecting DG of up to 16 A/phase in LV networks. 
• ER G59/3 – connecting DG of up to 5 MW output below 20 kV. 
• ER G75/1 – connecting DG with more than 5 MW output, or at voltage above 
20 kV. 
2.3.3 DG Network Integration 
As previously mentioned, the existing distribution networks were designed for 
unidirectional power flows from the HV transmission system to the MV and LV 
distribution networks, where electricity is delivered to the customers. This typically 
resulted in predictable energy flows, which required low levels of monitoring, 
control and automation. Increasing numbers of DG in distribution networks impact 
changes in power flows and require further adjustment in network control, 
monitoring and communication systems, in order to support further connection of 
DG units and maintain existing or improve future security and reliability levels in the 
network.  
Different DG network integration methodologies exist, with various requirements for 
advanced design, monitoring and coordination techniques, in order to ensure correct 
and optimal operation of both network and connected DG. Three general “levels of 
DG integration” are illustrated in Figure 2.4, where the evolution of the distribution 
networks with DG progresses from passive DG network integration, through reactive 
DG network integration, to active DG system management, based on the DG 
penetration levels [23]. 
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Figure 2.4:  Evolution of DG connection and integration [17]. 
2.3.4 Passive DG Network Integration 
According to the traditional philosophy of operating and controlling distribution 
networks, the passive network DG integration applies “fit-and-forget” approach for 
the connection of DG. In this approach, the DG units are considered as the “negative 
loads” and DNOs typically provide firm capacity connections, regardless of the 
network configuration, loading conditions and security requirements (e.g. the actual 
fault level contributions of DG).  
This approach has the advantages of low monitoring, flexibility, control and 
supervision requirements for the network operation with DG. As the amount of 
connected DG is typically low, resulting in low or easily quantifiable impact, 
important aspects of network operation can be also easily re-adjusted after the DG is 
connected. For example, voltage regulation will be still performed by tap-changing 
transformers, which will be able to maintain voltages within the limit for all 
customers, including those at (most) remote network ends.  
If the DG in the considered distribution network continues to further increase, 
significant investments will be required to continue to operate the network in the 
same way, with the same configuration and without coordination with the DG (e.g. 
without installing new transformers, new feeder lines and applying other similar 
network upgrading/reinforcing measures), which, when applied, will make this 
approach for managing networks with DG less economical and, therefore, less 
practical. 
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2.3.5 Reactive DG Network Integration 
Once the DG penetration increases and results in inability to accommodate further 
DG units on a premise of firm capacity connection (so called “sterilised” network), 
the DG will start to strongly impact network operation. In this case, the specific 
operational constraints should be evaluated for coincidental conditions of high DG 
outputs and low loading conditions. In case of renewable-based DG, where the 
variability of input energy sources results in the variations of DG outputs, the 
violation of network constraints (e.g. excessive voltage variations, or thermal 
overloading of components) may occur only during a short period of time (typically 
few/several tens of hours per year). Accordingly, the “fit-and-forget” approach might 
be still implemented, like in the earlier stages of the DG development and 
installation, assuming that the excessive DG outputs are limited or curtailed, or that 
the DG will start participating in the network control, by, e.g., changing operational 
power factors, or that additional coordination or regulation devices are implemented 
to address the possible negative DG impact (e.g. installation of dedicated energy 
storage system, or demand-side manageable loads, or volt-var regulation equipment).  
The above approach is termed as “reactive DG network integration” and is often 
characterised by the specific operating conditions. Installation of new DG units is 
still encouraged, assuming that the operational constraints and restrictions (e.g. 
congestions and overloadings) are resolved by controlling, coordinating or restricting 
DG outputs and/or loads. The control of DG under the reactive integration is more 
manageable and flexible than under the passive integration, but inability of DNOs to 
plan and control the process of DG deployment will again result in the “sterilisation” 
of certain portions of the network for the further DG connections. Generally, it is 
very difficult to optimally place DG in the network, as DG locations are determined 
by the DG developers with specific land and resource availabilities. 
2.3.6 Active DG Network Integration 
The passive network integration is an approach where connecting of the DG was not 
considered in depth at both planning and operational stages. The reactive network 
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DG integration approach neglects the DG at a planning stage, but aims to fully or 
partially resolve the problems due to DG connection during the operational stage. 
The active network DG integration approach incorporates DG connection 
considerations at both planning and operational stages, allowing to perform overall 
optimisation of the distribution network design to accommodate high DG penetration 
levels, while deferring network upgrades. Compared to the two previous approaches, 
the active integration approach allows DG developers and DNOs to resolve all 
possible conflicts of interest and to find the most cost-effective solutions that will 
maximise benefits to all involved parties. 
The realisation of active network DG integration approaches is a challenging topic, 
which is still in the development. It generally requires detailed and comprehensive 
studies at the planning stage, involving complex and large sets of input data and 
parameters, which should be implemented in flexible ways at the operational stage. 
The focus of this approach is primarily on the planning stage, in order to maximise 
the DG penetration levels (so called “hosting network capacity”), while maintaining, 
or even improving, the security, reliability and stability of distribution network. 
2.4 Chapter Summary 
This chapter presented and discussed some basic aspects of the operation of power 
supply system and its three basic parts (generation, transmission and distribution) in 
relation to the assessment of reliability performance. The evolution of traditional 
reliability concepts is briefly reviewed, as well as the theoretical background for 
reliability assessment based on the relevant literature. The most commonly used 
reliability concepts, metrics and indicators are presented, including comparison of 
the UK practices with approaches in Europe and other countries (US/Canada) .The 
term “Distributed Generation (DG)” is defined and an initial discussion of the impact 
and effects of integration of DG on the distribution network performances is 
presented regarding three general levels of DG integration. 
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Chapter 3 Reliability Assessment Techniques 
This chapter presents the basic aspects of the two main techniques used in this thesis 
for the calculation of the system and customer-based reliability indices: a) analytical 
reliability assessment approaches (i.e. failure modes and effects analysis), and 
b) probabilistic reliability assessment approaches (i.e. Monte-Carlo simulations).  
Analytical approaches generally limit output results (i.e. calculated reliability 
indices) to only the mean values, while probabilistic approaches provide a more 
comprehensive information, including probability distribution functions, standard 
deviations and variations of the calculated reliability indices. Analytical approaches 
always produce one single set of output results for one single set of input parameters, 
while probabilistic approaches always produce results which vary in certain ranges, 
based on the modelling of the related random and stochastic factors (e.g. assumed 
probability distribution of input parameters). Since probabilistic approaches give 
results with certain variations, the probabilistic reliability assessment process should 
be repeated until the (estimated) accuracy of the results is achieved. For that purpose, 
error coefficients are used to indicate when the calculation process should stop, after 
some convergence criterion is satisfied. 
As mentioned, the concepts and methods for reliability assessment have evolved over 
the past decades from analysing the ability of individual components to operate 
without faults and as intended during their lifetime, into the comprehensive 
approaches for evaluating various engineering strategies for system planning, 
operation and maintenance studies. The conventional reliability assessment 
procedures now receive different perspectives in different engineering applications, 
where of particular importance is evaluation of the risks of not satisfying specified 
targets imposed to the DNOs by the Regulators, as this will typically result in 
penalties. This aspect of reliability analysis did not receive much attention in existing 
literature and is, therefore, discussed and further illustrated with the results calculated 
by probabilistic approaches (which are inherently suited for risk-based analysis) in 
Chapter 6. 
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The reliability analysis of modern networks is typically aimed at assessing the 
whole-system reliability (i.e. not individual components), and is therefore involved 
with the analysis of large, complex, and highly-integrated networks. This results in 
significant computational requirements and simulation times and (very) large sets 
and databases of output results, which introduce additionally difficulties for 
analysing, post-processing and interpreting. Consequently, the reliability analysis of 
modern interconnected power supply systems is almost always divided into three 
previously discussed segments: generation, transmission, and distribution.  
For example, [40, 41, 42] discuss the reliability assessment on these three 
corresponding hierarchical levels, where particularly analysis of MV distribution 
network level requires modelling of a large number of network components and 
analysing the multitude of ways in which these components are inter-related during 
the assessment. When reliability analysis of distribution system level includes all LV 
networks supplying individual LV customers, the modelling and computational 
requirements might prohibit the direct application of the conventional reliability 
approaches. This is further discussed in Chapter 4, where simple yet accurate 
reliability equivalents of generic LV networks are introduced for the analysis. 
Another important aspect of the reliability analysis of modern (and future) electricity 
supply networks is that some of the functionalities that were previously implemented 
only at the higher voltage levels (i.e. in transmission networks) are becoming 
increasingly present in distribution networks. Examples include automation, 
reconfiguration and remote control functionalities, as well as presence of alternative 
supply points and operation in (normally open) meshed configurations. In other 
words, more complex operation schemes and more advanced components are being 
installed in distribution networks, in order to reduce the number and duration of 
supply interruptions and allow DNOs to achieve higher reliability performance 
levels. For example, a standard fuse, which is the most common protection element 
in LV networks, is recently being replaced by a so called “smart fuse” [43], or by a 
standard circuit breaker with automatic reclosing or remote control functionalities. 
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These and other “smart grid” functionalities should be remodelled in the 
conventional approaches, in order to properly assess the changes in the reliability 
performance. 
The main advantages and disadvantages of analytical and probabilistic approaches 
for reliability assessment can be summarised as follows: 
• Analytical approaches generally have reduced ability to correctly model 
specific network or component functionalities. An example is modelling of 
the alternative supply point, which does not “operate” in the analytical 
approach, but just changes the supply restoration times (i.e. repair times of 
the corresponding faulted components are not used) to the time required for 
the transfer to alternative supply points. Probabilistic approaches, on the other 
hand, can model transfer to alternative supply points in terms of its actual 
operation, reflecting general ability of probabilistic approaches to model or 
reproduce relevant characteristics and functionalities in the analysed network. 
• Computational times for the analytical reliability approaches are much shorter 
than for the probabilistic approaches, particularly if modelled networks are 
complex/large and if long simulation periods are required for correct 
assessment. 
• The analytical approaches provide the same set of output results (average 
values of reliability indicators) for the same network model (configuration 
and operating/loading conditions) and same input parameters, while 
probabilistic approaches provide different and more detailed results 
(distributions of reliability indicators), depending on the assumed probability 
distributions of input data, criteria for convergence and accuracy. 
3.1 Analytical Reliability Assessment Approaches 
Analytical reliability assessment approaches are often used for network planning or 
system security studies (e.g. N-1, or N-2 security criteria), as well as for evaluating 
network contingencies and system capacity, or reserve requirements. Essentially, the 
analytical approaches cannot model the inherently stochastic nature of occurrence of 
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system faults, or significant variations in the fault repair times, or equally wide 
ranges of changes in system operating conditions and customer loading conditions.  
Analytical reliability assessment approaches are based on the suitably formulated 
mathematical models of healthy vs. faulty system components, which characterize 
analysed network in terms of the specified input data, typically limiting output results 
to mean/average values of reliability indices, corresponding to specified input 
mean/average fault rate and repair time data. This is considered as one of the main 
limitations of analytical approaches, as they offer only a general “snapshot” 
characterisation of the analysed system and should be repeated whenever any input 
data or parameter changes.  
In order to resolve this problem, this thesis offers a simple modification of the 
analytical reliability approaches, where only a limited set of carefully identified 
typical or characteristic loading and operating conditions are selected and inputted 
into the analytical approach, resulting in an estimation of the range of analytically 
calculated reliability indices [44, 45]. In that way, the analytically calculated ranges 
of values not only provide a more comprehensive information on possible changes of 
system reliability performance, but can also be directly compared with the 
corresponding results of the probabilistic approaches. 
3.2 Probabilistic Reliability Assessment Approaches 
Probabilistic reliability assessment procedures are widely recognized as more 
suitable for the analysis of reliability performance of modern power supply systems, 
particularly in terms of their ability to model stochastic and inherently unpredictable 
occurrence of system faults and component failures, which can be effectively 
represented through the variations of input parameters and data (e.g. fault rates and 
repair times of network components) with their assumed probability distributions. 
However, although the probabilistic approaches are capable of including in the 
model stochastic/random nature of the modelled processes, exactly this aspect of 
probabilistic approaches opens an important question of the accuracy or error of the 
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calculation. In this context, probabilistic approaches can be divided into two general 
categories: 
1. Approaches without explicit accuracy or error estimation (e.g. by using an 
independent convergence criteria, or error coefficient) in calculation 
procedure. In this case, the mean values of the calculated reliability indices 
are different from these calculated by analytical approaches. 
2. Approaches with inclusion of accuracy or error estimation, when the results 
calculated by probabilistic approaches are typically close to the mean values 
from analytical approaches (the difference can be treated as an error). 
Importantly, the probabilistic assessment approaches are able to model a wide range 
of variations of practically all input parameters and data in one, or only a few 
simulation/calculation set-ups, without the need to restart or repeat the calculation 
after a change of input data. Furthermore, probabilistic analysis can be performed 
“sequentially”, by following the chronological or time-sequence transitions of 
network components from one state to another (i.e. between "normal/healthy 
operation" states and "faulty" states) and/or by following stipulated chronological 
changes in the system loading conditions (daily, weekly and seasonal). Non-
sequential (or random) probabilistic approaches consider the time as an independent 
variable and neglect the transitions between the different states of the system. With 
both probabilistic approaches, obtained probability distributions of calculated 
reliability indices allow to study in more detail the behaviour of the network 
components and the network as a whole. A clearer picture of the possible range of 
variations of performance indicators also allows to study in more detail the impact of 
each new applied functionality, or of installing a new component, or of upgrading the 
network, which is crucial for identifying the most cost-effective actions and 
measures for the improvement of network reliability performance. 
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3.3 Analytical Reliability Assessment in this Thesis 
Several analytical reliability assessments procedures have been reported in the 
literature for the evaluation of power system performance [11, 12, 25]. Before 
performing the reliability assessment, consideration should be given to the types of 
protection devices in the analysed network. A fuse or a circuit breaker will isolate the 
fault under on-load conditions, or in system energized state (fuses are single-pole 
devices, while circuit breakers are three-pole devices). On the other hand, a 
disconnector or recloser will first require the circuit breaker to de-energize the 
faulted component, or faulted part of the system, before it can operate, due to the 
limited fault-interrupting capabilities.  
The information on the used types (and settings) of protection systems is important 
for distinguishing between LIs and SIs, i.e. for correctly assessing the duration of 
supply interruptions experienced by the customers. Similarly, it is important to know 
whether the transfer to alternative supply point is performed manually or 
automatically (i.e. manual vs. automatic or remotely controlled switches) as this, too, 
will have an impact on the duration of supply interruptions. 
The most common techniques for analytical reliability performance evaluation are: 
state-space diagram (Markov model), approximate method, network reduction 
method and failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA). The Markov model 
identifies the possible states of the considered system and components, possible 
transition paths between these states, and rate parameters of the transitions. During 
the analysis, the transitions are usually formulated in terms of components’ fault 
rates and repair times. For a single component, a simple two-state model can be 
defined as component being available (i.e. “healthy” and in normal operation) and 
component being unavailable (i.e. “faulty”, or out of operation). Although this 
method is accurate, as the number of components grows for the analysis of large 
networks, the calculation might become too complicated, or even infeasible. 
Approximate and network reduction methods are closely related. The approximate 
method generally has two basic equations for the equivalent representation of system 
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components, either in series, or in parallel connection/configuration, for which 
equivalent fault rates, repair times and unavailability are calculated. Similarly, the 
network reduction method creates a sequence of equivalent components obtained 
from combining series- and parallel-connected components.  
The FMEA method is related to the evaluation and application of the minimal cut set 
method, which is defined as a particular sub-set of all network components for which 
failure/fault of any single component from this set will cause failure, or prevent 
normal operation of all components connected/related to this faulted component. 
This is done in order to identify all components that impact interruption (both LIs 
and SIs) of specific customers. 
In this thesis, the FMEA method is used as the analytical approach for the reliability 
performance assessment of the considered LV and MV distribution networks. The 
analytical approach does not require simulation of a certain number of years, as the 
output results correspond directly to the network configuration and specified input 
data, and do not change from one year to another. The main steps of the analytical 
approach used in this thesis are shown in detail in Figure 3.1.  
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Figure 3.1:  Algorithm for the implementation of the analytical reliability 
assessment procedure 
The main steps of the algorithm can be summarised as follows; 
1. Model (create the model) of the analysed network (e.g. in PSS/E software). 
2. Create two vector-matrices (n x 1) with size of all power components, n. 
Assign fault rates (matrix 1a) and repair times, or protection times, or times 
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to operate alternative supply (matrix 1b), to all network components 
corresponding to the model of the analysed network. 
3. Create an identity matrix (matrix 2) with size of all power components (n x 
n). For each column, the single ‘1’ value denotes the fault of the certain 
component.  
4. Run simulations based on input ‘1’ (forced fault on component) and ‘0’ (no 
fault on the component). In each simulation step, only one component is 
faulty (starting from the first column of matrix 2), and simulations continue 
by taking components from the subsequent columns of the matrix, until the 
last column/component is reached. 
5. For every simulation step/component, create an array (1 x m) indicating for 
each load point/customer, m, if there is supply interruption (‘1’) or no 
interruption (‘0’), for the currently faulted component. Combine all output 
arrays in order to establish matrix 3 (n x m), specifying interrupted 
customers for each faulted component. 
6. Multiply array of fault rates of components with array of customer 
interruption to establish SAIFI index. Multiply array of fault rates and repair 
times with array of customer interruption to produce SAIDI index. Lastly, 
multiply repair times and array of customer interruptions to calculate CAIDI 
index. 
3.4 Probabilistic Reliability Assessment in this Thesis 
The probabilistic techniques have been widely recognised as suitable for the analysis 
of power system reliability performance, due to their capability to provide 
comprehensive results and possibility to estimate changes and variations in the 
network reliability performance. The most common probabilistic reliability 
assessment approach is the Inverse Transform Method, also known as the Monte-
Carlo Simulation (MCS) procedure.  
The two main variants of the MCS method are: non-sequential (random) and 
sequential simulations. The non-sequential MCS technique simulates the transitions 
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between the states of the considered components (over their lifetime) randomly and 
considers the time as an independent variable. In order to have statistically reliable 
(accurate) calculated values (e.g. average values of reliability indices), the 
simulations are repeated a great number of times (for the specified service period). 
On the other hand, the sequential MCS is characterised by chronological or time-
sequential transition of component states, where component transfer from, e.g. 
normal operation state to faulted state and, after repair time has passed, back to the 
normal operation state. Similarly, sequential MCS simulations are also 
reproduced/repeated many times over the assumed period of service to obtain 
statically reliable output results. 
In this thesis, sequential MCS is applied for the reliability analysis. The basic aspect 
of the MCS technique is the use of random, or pseudo-random numbers. The random 
numbers required for the assessment of, e.g. fault probabilities of components, are 
generated in a uniformly stochastic distributed way in the range [0, 1], independently 
for each components, therefore correctly representing or mimicking true random 
behaviour of the modelled components and processes in which components are 
involved. The operating and failure states of each network component are obtained 
through the combination of input reliability data (i.e. mean fault rates and mean 
repair times) with the allocated (i.e. assumed or known) probability distribution 
functions (e.g. Exponential, Weibull, Rayleigh, Normal, etc.). The generated random 
numbers are assigned to an inverse distribution function, in order to convert the 
network components’ mean fault rates (λ) and mean repair times (i.e. “mean time to 
repair”, MTTR) into the corresponding operating and failure states of each network 
component (i.e. “time to fail”, TTF, and “time to repair”, TTR, Chapter 2). 
The mean fault rates of network components are typically given in “faults per year” 
and the minimum period of simulation is at least one year. Although it is possible to 
perform the simulation with the maximum period of a lifetime (i.e. 40 years) of an 
average network component, sometimes that time period is not sufficient due to the 
low values of component’s mean fault rates. Accordingly, the adequate minimum 
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time period for simulations will depend on the minimum value of all components’ 
fault rates. For example, for a component with a mean fault rate of 0.0001 fault/year 
(corresponding to one component experiencing a fault in a system in which 10,000 
components are installed in one year), simulation time period of 1,000 years will 
result in around 0.1 fault of this component, while a change of the time period of 
simulation to 10,000 years will allow to have at least one fault of this component in 
the modelled network (assuming no more than one such component is present in the 
network model). However, increasing the time period of simulations will also result 
in (much) longer computational times.  
The main steps of the MCS probabilistic approach used in this thesis for the 
reliability assessment of considered networks are shown in Figure 3.2 (algorithm) 
and can be summarised as follows; 
1. Model (create the model) of the analysed network (e.g. in PSS/E software). 
2. Assign mean fault rates and mean repair times (or protection times, or times 
to operate alternative supply) to all network components from the model of 
the analysed network. 
3. Establish type of the probability density function to model initial conditions 
for all components’ fault rates and repair times. 
4. Generate random numbers for all network components in the network and 
convert them in times of fault (the start time of each fault), based on the 
values of the corresponding fault rates. 
5. For each faulty component, generate random number and convert it to period 
of fault (duration of each fault), based on the corresponding repair time. 
Associate each period of fault with start time of the fault. 
6. Run power flow algorithm after the fault of each component. In this thesis,  a 
steady state analysis with balanced power flow solver, using the standard 
Newton-Raphson iterative method with the PSSE software package. 
7. Count every supply interruption for each customer (i.e. how many customers 
are interrupted for each fault). 
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8. Calculate the duration of each supply interruption. 
9. Compute reliability indices (e.g. SAIFI, SAIDI, CAIDI, ENS, etc.). 
10. Estimate the error/accuracy (e.g. by checking the average values of calculated 
reliability indicators with some analytical approach, or use other criteria). 
 
Figure 3.2:  Algorithm for the implementation of the probabilistic reliability 
assessment procedure (MCS). 
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3.4.1 Classification of Long and Short Customer Interruptions 
An important aspect of reliability analysis is correct distinction between long and 
short supply interruptions. For example, faults of some network components are 
often temporary, i.e. not permanent, which is perhaps best illustrated with the faults 
on bare overhead conductors (animal and branch contacts, swinging wires due to 
strong wind, lightning, etc.), typically resulting in only short supply interruptions. 
Furthermore, there are various instances when permanent faults of network 
components do not result in long interruptions (LIs) of customers, e.g. in case of 
previously discussed transfer to alternative supply points, when again only short 
interruptions (SIs) are experienced by customers.  
In this thesis, evaluation of numbers of SIs and LIs is performed by analysing the 
available network statistics from the DNOs and linking it to the applied reliability 
assessment procedure. Based on the OFGEM statistics from 14 UK DNOs for the 
year 2009, it is estimated that 46% of supply interruption events were caused by 
permanent faults (i.e. LIs) and 54% by momentary/transient faults (i.e. SIs). 
However, although this statistics allows to evaluate contributions of both types of 
interruptions to the overall network performance, the provided information is 
general, i.e. related to all of the UK distribution networks, without specifying how 
the numbers change in different areas/types of the networks, e.g. in urban areas 
(characterised by underground cable networks) and in rural areas (characterised by 
overhead line networks). Therefore, an extensive review of available literature is 
performed in order to specify variations in LV and MV distribution networks in 
highly-urban (HU), urban (U), sub-urban (SU) and rural (R) areas. This is shown in 
Table 3.1, which presents the reported statistical data for percentage contributions of 
both long and short supply interruptions in these four main areas/types of the LV and 
MV distribution networks. The results for the DNOs in France and Italy are used for 
further analysis, while statistics from Finland are not taken into account due to much 
larger variations compared to others statistics (attributed to much longer length of 
LV and MV networks and much lower number of customers). Furthermore, the 
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values for highly-urban (HU) areas (which are not reported in original sources) are 
assumed to be the highest value of reported values for urban (U) areas. 
Table 3.1: Percentage contributions of long and short supply interruptions. 
LI/SI 





























Based on the statistics in Table 3.1, it can be seen that the number of SIs (and their 
percentage contributions to all supply interruptions of customers) are increasing from 
highly-urban, through urban and sub-urban, to rural areas, while the opposite is true 
for LIs. The main reasons for these changes are types of components and 
installations (underground cables vs. overhead lines, open vs. closed substations, 
manual vs. automatic control and protection, etc.), which directly reflect the impact 
of the exposure to weather conditions, external factors and required supply 
restoration times. The demand densities and numbers of served customers also differ 
from highly populated urban areas to sparsely populated rural areas, impacting, for 
example, available space for network components and transfer from overhead-line 
networks (rural areas) to underground-cable networks (urban areas).  
As mentioned, the analysis becomes rather complex when modelled networks can be 
reconfigured during the fault and when alternative supply points (with limited or 
restricted capacities) are available. This requires to make further distinction between 
activation of protection systems (clearing the faults), automatic/manual switching for 
reconfiguration and transfer to alternative supply (within or outwith the 3-minute 
limit between SIs and LIs) and repair times of faulted components in determining 
both frequency and duration of customers’ supply interruptions. In other words, 
faults might not be directly associated with the LIs based on the MTTR values (see 
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for example Table 5.2 in Chapter 5), but might result in only SIs, regardless of the 
actual (or reported) values of MTTR required for the repair of faulted components. 
3.4.2 Correlation of Long and Short Interruptions with Actual 
Load Profiles 
Traditionally, for both analytical and MCS reliability assessment approaches, the 
supplied loads are usually represented by a bulk/lumped model, specifying rated or 
maximum power demands. This basically corresponds to the “worst case” scenario, 
as the analysis of faults will then result in the interruption of the maximum number 
of customers, i.e. in the maximum load/energy not supplied. However, for most of 
the time, the actual customer demands are lower than the maximum one, and this 
approach for reliability performance assessment typically (significantly) 
overestimates calculated reliability indices, i.e. results in lower than actual reliability 
performance levels. By incorporating actual time-variable load demands, only a part 
of customers, or possibly no customer will be disconnected. Moreover, a better 
correlation between the time at which faults occur in the network and the time-
dependent changes of actual demands (represented by e.g. load profiles/curves) will 
significantly improve calculation of reliability indices, as the higher fault rates 
should be allocated to the periods of time when demand (and therefore loading 
conditions of network components) are higher, than when the demands are lower 
(e.g. during the night). This is discussed in the further text. 
In order to satisfy peak demand, a 33 kV grid supply point (GSP), which is a primary 
distribution substation, is typically supplied by two identical parallel transformers, 
each with a lower rated power than the peak demand (normally 60-70% of the peak 
demand) due to the lower capital and maintenance costs, compared to installing two 
transformers rated at 100% of the peak demand. If one of the transformers is faulty, 
or disconnected for a maintenance, the other transformer will still be able to supply 
customers, as long as the load demand is below the transformer's rated capacity. 
Although each transformer is capable to operate with a higher than rated capacity 
(e.g. 120%-150%) for a limited time (minutes to hours), this is unfavourable, as it 
will lower the expected lifetime of the transformer. 
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Figure 3.3 illustrates the significance of accurate evaluation of the time at which a 
fault occurs, as otherwise the results for reliability indices will be underestimated or 
overestimated. All customers will still receive continuous supply demand (i.e. there 
will be no customer interruption) when one of the transformers is out of operation for 
the period of time for which load demand (black solid line) is lower than rated power 
of a single transformer (black dashed line), which is between 23:30 hours and 07:00 
hours for the presented load profile. Figure 3.3 also shows how probability of a fault 
of the transformer changes during the 24-hour period, which then allows to directly 
correlate and incorporate daily load profiles and daily fault probabilities into a more 
accurate sequential MCS analysis.  






































Figure 3.3:  Correlation of daily load profile and daily fault probability 
The daily fault probabilities used in this thesis are obtained from a detailed 
investigation of available statistical data, i.e. two years of recordings of all SIs and 
LIs for one UK DNO [4, 47], shown in more detail in Figure 3.4. This analysis 
allowed to define “empirical time-distribution for the probability of faults” in the 
analysis of the considered LV and MV distribution networks.  
The daily probability profiles of the LIs and SIs are first represented with the 
theoretical interruption probability model (dashed green line) in Figure 3.4, using the 
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formula in (3.1), and then were used to estimate daily variations in reported statistics 
for mean fault rates of the power components. The theoretical curve is divided into 







𝜆𝑚𝑒𝑚𝑑 ∙ (−0.00248𝑡 + 0.02621),        0 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 3
𝜆𝑚𝑒𝑚𝑑 ∙ (0.0071𝑡 − 0.00251),           3 < 𝑡 ≤ 10
𝜆𝑚𝑒𝑚𝑑 ∙ (−0.0042𝑡 + 0.1105),         10 < 𝑡 ≤ 13
𝜆𝑚𝑒𝑚𝑑 ∙ (0.0559),                                13 < 𝑡 ≤ 15
𝜆𝑚𝑒𝑚𝑑 ∙ (−0.00497𝑡 + 0.13047),    15 < 𝑡 ≤ 21
𝜆𝑚𝑒𝑚𝑑 ∙ (0.00457𝑡 − 0.06987),       21 < 𝑡 ≤ 23
𝜆𝑚𝑒𝑚𝑑 ∙ (−0.00903 + 0.24293),      23 < 𝑡 < 24
           (3.1) 
where: t is the hour of the day.  
The aggregate daily load profiles (100% of demand) are recorded from the actual 
annual demands at a 33 kV GSP of the same DNO, which represent average daily 
contribution of 36.7% residential, 29.9% commercial and 33.4% industrial 
customers. It can be seen from Figures 3.3 and 3.4 that there is a close correlation 
between LI/SI probability distributions and daily load profiles, confirming a higher 
probability of LI and SI when load demands are higher, particularly during the hours 
of the morning peak demand. 
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Figure 3.4:  Load profiles and LI/SI daily probabilities used in this thesis. 
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3.4.3 Probability Distributions of Input Reliability Data 
For analytical reliability assessment approaches, it is not possible to (directly) 
incorporate probability distribution function (PDF) of mean fault rates and mean 
repair times as the basic input data. On the other hand, MCS approaches explicitly 
assume that the input data vary with certain probability distributions, in order to 
evaluate how target reliability indicators might change (ranges of changes) during the 
total simulation period, divided in annual intervals with different input data.  
The initial conditions of components’ mean fault rates (λ) and mean repair times (i.e. 
MTTR) are in this section modelled with different PDFs, in order to investigate how 
the calculated reliability indicators change for different PDFs. Several previous 
references (e.g. [48, 49, 50]) suggest to use exponential distribution to convert 
random numbers into ‘time to fail’ (TTF) and ‘time to repair’ (TTR) values for 
power components, but for comparison purposes, the Weibull and Rayleigh 
distributions are also included in this section. The assessment of input probability 
distributions has been also discussed in [5], indicating error coefficients for the 
calculated mean values of the output probability distribution functions.  
The coefficient of error for mean values is different from the coefficient of variation. 
For example, if the input mean repair time is 100 hours and after inverse 
transformation method (e.g. inverse PDF), a data set of outputs of: 90, 100 and 110 
hours of repair times is obtained, the mean value will be 100 hours (i.e. mean value is 
preserved) and standard deviation will be 8.165 hours. 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑓𝑖𝐶𝑖𝑡 𝐶𝑓 𝐶𝑟𝑟𝐶𝑟 = |𝑖𝑑𝑧𝑢𝑡 𝑑𝑚𝑡𝑚−𝑚𝑒𝑚𝑑 𝑠𝑚𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑠|
𝑖𝑑𝑧𝑢𝑡 𝑑𝑚𝑡𝑚
𝑥100%           (3.2) 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑓𝑖𝐶𝑖𝑡 𝐶𝑓 𝐶𝑟𝑟𝐶𝑟 =
0
100
𝑥100% = 0% 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑓𝑖𝐶𝑖𝑡 𝐶𝑓 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝐶𝑖 = 𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑑𝑑𝑚𝑟𝑑 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑡𝑖𝑑𝑑
𝑚𝑒𝑚𝑑 𝑠𝑚𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑠
𝑥100%           (3.3) 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑓𝑖𝐶𝑖𝑡 𝐶𝑓 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝐶𝑖 =
8.165
100
𝑥100% = 8.165% 
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The above example shows a relatively large difference between the two coefficients, 
where (3.2) measures the error of mean value, or in other words, the efficiency of 
calculating mean value against the input data, while (3.3) measures the variation of 
the calculated data. Thus, for the purpose of assessing the accuracy of the output 
results in this thesis, the assessment of input probability distributions is included with 
the coefficient of error, with (3.4), (3.5) and (3.6) providing general characteristics of 
the three considered PDFs for the calculation of the TTF and TTR values. 
𝐸𝑥𝐸𝐶𝑖𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝐴:𝑇𝑇𝐹 𝐶𝑟 𝑇𝑇𝑅 = 𝑖𝑖𝑣𝐶𝑟𝑠𝐶{1 − exp(−𝜆𝑡)}           (3.4) 




}                     (3.5) 
  𝑅𝑎𝑅𝐴𝐶𝑖𝑅ℎ:𝑇𝑇𝐹 𝐶𝑟 𝑇𝑇𝑅 = 𝑖𝑖𝑣𝐶𝑟𝑠𝐶{1 − exp (−0.5(𝑡
𝜎
)𝛽)}           (3.6) 
The initial calculation step requires the selection of a power component for 
calculating the initial condition (i.e. TTF or TTR). In this case, from Table 5.1 in 
Chapter 5, the selected power component is 0.4 kV busbar, with mean values of 
0.005 faults per year and 4 hours of repair time per fault. Fault rates are modelled 
with exponential distribution for all cases, while the input values for the repair times 
are modelled with the three probability distributions (PDFs), giving the 
corresponding durations of LIs with a simulation period of 10,000 years. The reason 
for applying the simulation period of 10,000 years is due to the coefficient of error, 
which will be explained later in this section. 
Furthermore, in order to directly compare the output results for the calculated MTTR 
values (i.e. durations of LIs) with different considered PDFs, the output fault rates 
must be maintained the same, or as close as possible. For this example, the input 
fault rate of 0.005 faults per year results in 49 faults (λ_output=0.0049, with error 
coefficient of 2%) within 10,000 years.  
Figure 3.5 illustrates the results of the analysis for faults of 0.4kV busbars, 
corresponding to repair times modelled through the inverse transformation method 
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with Exponential, Weibull (β = 6), and Rayleigh (β = 2) PDFs. Although the curves 
in Figure 3.5 are not smooth, due to a lower number of plotted points, all curves 
clearly follow the initially assumed PDFs. Table 3.2 shows the numerical results for 
the calculated output parameters for different selected PDFs, with comparison of 
mean, minimum, maximum, standard deviation, error coefficient and variation 
coefficient values. 














 Exponential (mean value = 4.1972 hours)
 Rayleigh (mean value = 4.1389 hours)
 Weibull (mean value = 3.8163 hours)
 
Figure 3.5:  PDFs for MTTR of 4 hours (for 0.4kV busbar) 














hours percent (%) 
Exponential 4.1972 0.0947 11.6177 3.2602 4.93 77.68 
Rayleigh 4.1389 1.2094 9.0308 2.1302 3.47 51.47 
Weibull 3.8163 1.5957 5.2530 0.8067 4.59 21.14 
According to Figure 3.5 and Table 3.2, there are noticeable differences between the 
three sets of results. Although each PDF for input data resulted in error coefficient 
lower than 5%, mean values of exponential distribution are with the biggest 
difference from the input mean repair times (4 hours) and have the highest standard 
Reliability Assessment of Distribution Networks Incorporating Regulator 
Requirements, Generic Network Equivalents and Smart Grid Functionalities 
 
Reliability Assessment Techniques 57 
deviation (due to a long ‘tail’ of curve). On the other hand, Weibull distribution 
provides the lowest variation coefficient, but fully neglects the possible longer repair 
times, as there is no tail in the corresponding curve in Figure 3.5. This is important, 
as in practice there might be situations of occasional but long TTRs, as well as the 
situations resulting in much shorter TTRs. 
The analysis in this section shows that there are no clear conditions for eliminating 
any of three considered PDFs from general reliability analysis. Based on the results 
in Table 3.2, all PDFs give an error coefficient lower than 5% (which is less than a 
typical tolerance for the duration of interruptions of 12% in [23, 51]). In addition, 
several studies implemented both exponential distribution [48, 49, 50] for TTF (fault 
rates values) and Rayleigh distribution (special case of Weibull distribution) for 
TTR/MTTR [23]. 
3.4.4 Total Simulation Times and Accuracy 
As mentioned, the required MCS computational times depend on a number of 
parameters and factors, such as the size of the analysed network, the time-step of the 
simulations, the specified error or accuracy and the total duration of the simulated 
periods (e.g. 1,000 years or 10,000 years). However, the total simulated time will 
also impact the accuracy of the output reliability indices calculated by MCS 
approaches. This is illustrated further on an example of a 33 kV circuit breaker, with 
a mean fault rate of 0.0041 faults/year and mean repair time of 96 hours. Table 3.3 
shows the output results and error coefficients for repair time of 96 hours, when 
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Table 3.3:  Comparison of output results for repair times by different total 
simulation times 
Year of Simulation 













Set 1 93.3888 2.72 95.5723 0.45 
Set 2 98.6803 2.79 97.1156 1.16 
Set 3 93.2349 2.88 96.8885 0.93 
Set 4 98.7151 2.83 96.5276 0.55 
Set 5 97.6190 1.69 96.7359 0.77 
As illustrated in Table 3.3, even though the effects of the random variations of repair 
times for a single component between the two total simulation periods are different, a 
1,000 years of simulation has higher error coefficients than the simulations with a 
total period of 10,000 years. This effect of higher error coefficients becomes more 
pronounced and more visible, i.e. results in the cumulative effects, during the 
analysis in which a large number of network components is equivalented or 
aggregated. 
Another important difference between the two sets of results for the two total 
simulation periods can be seen if the distributions of the TTR are plotted, Figure 3.6. 
Figure 3.6 presents two different curves of the probability distributions for two 
periods of simulations. Even though the error coefficients for the two periods of 
simulations are relatively small (less than 5%), the 10,000-year-simulation curve 
shows the more realistic values than the 1,000-year-simulation curve. This is 
expected, as the simulation period of 10,000 years resulted in around 40 faults of the 
component, as compared to around 4 faults for the simulation period of 1,000 years. 
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 10,000 years of simulation (mean value = 95.5723 hours)
 1,000 years of simulation (mean value = 97.6190 hours)
 
Figure 3.6:  Variation between distribution curves for two periods of simulation 
Finally, it should be noted that it is possible for repair time to achieve lower errors, 
as the non-integer output results simply transfer to a fraction of an hour (decimal 
points can be expressed in minutes, or even seconds). However, this is not the case 
for the fault rate results, which can have only integer number of faults per-year. For 
example, a single power component can possibly have 1 or 2 faults in a year, not 
1.65 faults in a year. For that purpose, the following analysis will again consider 
0.4 kV busbars, with a mean fault rate of 0.005 and mean repair time of 4 hours.  
Table 3.4 shows the comparison of the calculated output parameters for the fault 
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Table 3.4:  Comparison of output results for simulated fault rates by two different 
total simulation periods 
Year of Simulation 













Set 1 0.006 20 0.0049 2 
Set 2 0.006 20 0.0051 2 
Set 3 0.005 0 0.0052 4 
Set 4 0.004 20 0.0051 2 
Set 5 0.006 20 0.0050 0 
 
The first MCS period of 1,000 years can generate 4, 5, or 6 faults of the considered 
component. Although the fluctuation of the calculated results is small (it changes by 
only ±0.001), it is clear that there is a high variation of the error coefficient. It is 
possible to combine all sets (total of 5,000 years), which will reduce the error 
coefficient to around 8% (i.e. 27 faults in 5,000 years, corresponding to a mean fault 
rate of 0.0054). This again confirms that longer simulation times are required to 
achieve the required (or desired) error coefficient in this simple case of a single 
component.  
The MSC approach with 1,000 years of simulation has a higher error coefficient, but 
requires much shorter simulation time than the 10,000 years of simulation (at least 
ten times shorter). In practice, there is a trade-off between the error coefficient and 
required computational time, and in this thesis all MCS simulations are performed 
with the total simulation period of 10,000 years. As a general guidance for achieving 
a reasonably low coefficient of error, it is envisaged for input parameters with two 
decimal points to apply MCS with 1,000 years of simulations, while for input 
parameters with three decimal points, 10,000 years simulations should be applied. 
For input parameters with more than four decimal points, no clear recommendation 
for increasing the period of simulation can be given, as much longer simulation times 
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might be required in that case, even prohibiting the completion of the simulations, 
unless high (parallel) computational resources are available. 
Another important factor in the MCS approaches is based on the inclusion and 
control of the precision estimation. This is illustrated by comparing the results of the 
two different MCS options. The first option allows MCS simulation to be performed 
fully stochastically, with no evaluation of coefficient of error, resulting in a higher 
coefficient of error. The second option is with precision estimation (by implementing 
coefficient of error in MCS procedure), which effectively controls and provides a 
lower error coefficient of the TTR and TTF parameters and, therefore, results in a 
more accurate estimation of reliability indices. Although the former option reflects 
and mimics the stochastic/random nature of the considered phenomena (based on the 
assumed probability distributions), it does not precisely follow the statically defined 
input mean values (e.g. fault rates and MTTR). The following assessment shows the 
difference between the two options for the same example of a 0.4 kV busbar with 
0.005 faults/year. Table 3.5 shows the comparison output parameters for fault rates 
by two different options of precision. 
Table 3.5:  Comparison of output parameters for fault rates by two different options 
of precision estimation 
10,000 Years 
of Simulation 
Stochastic MCS procedure  
(Option 1) 
MCS procedure with precision 









Set 1 0.0038 24 0.0049 2 
Set 2 0.0069 38 0.0051 2 
Set 3 0.0057 14 0.0052 4 
Set 4 0.0045 10 0.0051 2 
Set 5 0.0064 28 0.0050 0 
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Based on the results in Table 3.5, there are noticeable differences in the results of the 
two options. All results in all simulation runs are generally different, due to the use 
of a random number generator in the MCS procedure, but the option with precision 
estimation is more consistent. In Option 1, the error coefficient is greater than 10%, 
i.e. it does not reflect the input (and output) mean value of 0.005 faults per year; for 
Option 2, the error is much smaller, around 2%. Similar differences will be present in 
the output PDFs for the two options. The ultimate decision for the precision control 
will depend on the (pre-simulation) assessed ranges of variations of input parameters. 
The MCS approach creates “fluctuating” outputs and although there is no clear 
guidance, by increasing the number of samples, the error bound will decrease (or the 
confidence range will increase), allowing to use the coefficient of variance as a 
measure for the achieved accuracy level and as the “stopping criteria” of the MCS 
process. Again, various definitions can be used, but the coefficient of variance should 
be formulated as an estimator/measure of the dispersion of the output results 
corresponding to the ratio between the standard deviation and mean output value.  
Generally, the coefficient of variance depends on the output results. As long as the 
mean value of the output deviates from the statically expressed input mean data, the 
MCS calculations must continue until the output mean value is close to the input 
mean value, or until the coefficient of variance becomes lower than the (prespecified) 
acceptable tolerance limit. For example, a typical tolerance limit/level in [23, 51] for 
frequency of short and long interruption (e.g. SAIFI or MAIFI) is specified as 7%, 
while limits for the durations of interruption (e.g. SAIDI, CAIDI and ENS) is 12%. 
On the other hand, another stopping criterion for the MCS process is error 
coefficient. The difference between the error coefficient and variance coefficient is in 
the selection of the input or output data. The error coefficient uses input parameter 
(e.g. input mean fault rates or input MTTR values), while variance coefficient uses 
output parameter (e.g. calculated/output mean fault rates or MTTR values) as the 
benchmark target. 
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3.5 Comparison of Analytical and Probabilistic 
Reliability Assessment Methodologies for 
Offshore Renewable Generation System 
This section illustrates previously discussed aspects of the reliability assessment 
procedures and presents the results of the reliability analysis during the planning 
stage of offshore renewable (i.e. wind) generating plants and interconnecting MV 
networks. Both analytical and probabilistic reliability calculation methods are 
implemented and compared during the assessment, in order to obtain a more 
confident estimation of the operational reliability performance. Furthermore, 
standard reliability performance indices (related to frequency and duration of faults 
and related interruptions), as well as other energy-related reliability indicators are 
presented and compared, in order to identify the best combination of network 
configurations, network interconnections and generation technologies. The benefits 
of each case, expressed in terms of e.g. reduction of interrupted or curtailed energy 
outputs, are assessed against the actual cost. This is a suitable example for the 
previously considered general analysis, as improving reliability and availability of 
the offshore generating plants and networks, i.e. reducing revenue losses due to 
reliability-related events (for instance, faults of the components), requires correct 
assessment of the reliability of both individual plant components and complete 
offshore generating plant, including interconnecting network. This example differs 
from all other network examples in the further chapters of the thesis for the reason of 
illustrating versatility of the presented approaches. 
3.5.1 Input Reliability Data 
The reliability of an offshore renewable generating system (ORGS) can be assessed 
with confidence only if the relevant input data for the analysis are represented as the 
statistically significant datasets, which are typically available after many years of 
operation. Although it can be generally concluded that the current available 
reliability data and information do not allow performing an in-depth analysis of the 
ORGS, an extensive review of the available reports and other published literature 
was performed in this thesis, in order to estimate the main input parameters required 
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for the reliability analysis of the ORGS. For example, the results of several field 
studies from the Reliawind project, representing a total of 35,000 downtime events 
involving 350 wind turbines, are compiled and processed in [52], indicating that 
power module (converter and associated switchgear and transformer) and wind 
turbines’ pitch control system are the most frequent causes of faults and downtimes. 
Power cables (inter-array and export cabling installations) were responsible for 
around 1%-5% of faults/downtimes. Reliability statistics is typically collected from 
10-min average turbine and substation SCADA databases, fault logs per turbine and 
substation, as well as monthly operational reports compiled by the wind farm 
operators and/or manufacturers. Tables 3.6 and 3.7 overleaf show the reported values 
of the main reliability analysis parameters, giving the minimum, maximum and 
average values of the fault rates and mean repair times, which are used specifically 
for the analysis of the reliability performance of a typical medium-sized wind-based 
ORGS in this thesis. 
3.5.2 Analysed Medium Size ORGS 
Among the different possible ORGS configurations, Figure 3.7 shows the selected 
configuration for further analysis, while the corresponding network and component 
parameters are listed in Table 3.8. This assessment is aimed at comparing the 
reliability performance with and without normally open switches at the ends of the 
wind turbine radial strings (inter-array cables), in order to assess the feasibility of 
installing these switches in the final design of the ORGS configuration. 
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Figure 3.7:  Typical medium size ORGS configuration selected for the analysis [53, 
54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59]. 
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Table 3.8:  Parameters of the typical medium size ORGS components selected for 
the analysis [68, 69, 70, 71]. 
Component R X 
(p.u. on 100 MVA) 
33kV Submarine Cable  (300 mm2) 0.0073 per km 0.0104 per km 
33kV Submarine Cable  (120 mm2) 0.0184 per km 0.0118 per km 
132kV Submarine Cable  (400 mm2) 0.0004 per km 0.008 per km 
Nacelle Transformer 
(0.69/33kV) - 1.2 
Transformer 
(33/132 kV) 0.007 0.244 
 
3.5.3 Results for Analytical and Probabilistic Assessment of 
the ORGS Reliability Performance 
The concepts of reliability and availability of network components and the whole 
offshore renewable generating system (ORGS) are analysed in this section. The 
ORGS reliability performance is quantified and compared for all considered cases 
using the “Estimated Energy Not Supplied” (EENS) index. This approach allows a 
straightforward assessment of the impact of different reliability (and power quality) 
events and disturbances, as it translates frequency and duration of downtimes of the 
ORGS components and plant as a whole into the electrical energy (MWh), which is 
either not produced, or can be produced, but it cannot be exported to the onshore 
grid. The equation used for the calculation of the EENS index is: 
𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑆 = ∑ (𝜆𝑖𝑃𝑖𝑟𝑖)𝑁𝑖=1              (3.7) 
where: N is the total number of power components, λi is the mean fault rate of the 
i-th component, Pi is the unavailable or installed power of the i-th component when 
component is faulty, and ri is the mean time to repair the faulted i-th component. 
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As mentioned previously, the output of the analytical reliability performance 
assessment methods is one set of calculated indices and parameters, which are in the 
presented analysis extended to three sets of output results, corresponding to the 
minimum, maximum and average values of the mean fault rates and mean repair 
times from Tables 3.6 and 3.7. These three sets of results are selected for calculation 
due to uncertainties in the actual values for wind-based ORGS shown in Figure 3.7.  
Furthermore, the analysis of the ENS index required estimation of the generating 
capacity not available for exporting, and for that purpose an average capacity factor 
during downtime of 40% is assumed. This means that 40% of the rated power of all 
wind turbines not able to operate, or to export produced energy due to a fault or 
failure within the ORGS, was assumed to be lost for the whole duration of the 
downtime event. 
The results from Table 3.9 show that better reliability performance is obtained if the 
ORGS is designed with normally open switches at the ends of the radial strings of 
wind turbines, which will close after a fault in any of the strings is cleared by the 
protection system and, in that way, provide connection for the remaining wind 
turbines in the faulted string (downstream the fault location) to export the generated 
electricity.  
In order to assess the range of possible losses in profit and income due to the 
downtimes of wind turbines for any related fault within the ORGS, an average cost 
of £140/MWh is assumed in the next analysis, based on [72]. If the average values of 
fault rates and mean repair times are used, the estimated lost profit is about 10.5% of 
the total generated power outputs (£44,150,400) if there are no switches that allow 
connection at the end of the radial strings. However, if the switches are installed, the 
estimated lost profit is reduced to about 9.9%, representing reduction of 0.6%. 
 
 
Reliability Assessment of Distribution Networks Incorporating Regulator 
Requirements, Generic Network Equivalents and Smart Grid Functionalities 
 
Reliability Assessment Techniques 70 













Without switches at 
the ends of radial 
strings 
Minimum 308.824 43,235.36 0.1 
Average 33,176.501 4,644,710.14 10.5 
Maximum 136,605.506 19,124,770.84 43.3 
With switches at 
the ends of radial 
strings 
Minimum 244.408 34,217.12 0.1 
Average 31,167.430 4,363,440.20 9.9 
Maximum 129,414.100 18,117,974.00 41 
The results for the probabilistic reliability performance assessment (Monte Carlo 
approach, with 1,000 years of simulation) provide not only mean/average values of 
the calculated indices and parameters, but also provide information on their 
distributions. Both analytical results (Table 3.9) and probabilistic results (Table 3.10) 
are closely matched, thus providing more confident estimation of reliability 
performance. This is illustrated in Table 3.10 (mean values of EENS index for both 
analysed cases) and in Figures 3.6-3.9 (distribution of EENS index values for both 
analysed cases), with again assumed average capacity factor during the downtime of 
wind turbines of 40%. 
















at the ends of radial 
strings 
Minimum 292.80 40,992.00 0.1 
Average 31,237.06 4,373,188.40 9.9 
Maximum 111,491.34 15,608,787.60 35.4 
With switches at 
the ends of radial 
strings 
Minimum 217.736 30,483.04 0.1 
Average 29,457.7 4,124,078.00 9.3 
Maximum 106,945.01 14,972,301.40 33.9 
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Figure 3.8:  Calculated EENS values throughout 1,000 years of simulation for 
ORGS design without switches at the end of radial strings (average input parameters) 
















Figure 3.9: PDF of EENS values for ORGS design without switches at the end of 
radial strings (average input parameters) 
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Figure 3.10:  EENS values throughout 1,000 years of simulation for ORGS design 
with switches at the end of radial strings (average input parameters) 

















Figure 3.11:  PDF of EENS values for ORGS design with switches at the end of 
radial strings (average input parameters) 
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It is interesting to note that if the selected medium-sized ORGS is designed with 
switches at the ends of radial strings of wind turbines, the improvement in the 
reliability performance is relatively small (~0.6%), as MV cables are reliable 
components, and also allow for a simple replacement, instead of a repair. The cables 
are modelled with average values of 0.009116 faults/year (i.e. once in a hundred 
years) and 752 hours of mean repair time (i.e. around 30 days), in accordance to data 
in Tables 3.6 and 3.7. In other words, investing in these switches may not repay the 
investment, but the presented analysis is essentially an indication and ultimate 
decision should be based on a more detailed evaluation of the actual costs of 
switches and cables, the size of the ORGS, location and weather-specific 
repair/replacement times and costs of these repairs/replacements, etc. For the 
purposes of this thesis, this example was used to illustrate the main aspects of the 
discussed analytical and probabilistic reliability assessment approaches, as well as 
their implementation in conditions significantly different from the standard analysis 
of the LV and MV (onshore) distribution networks. 
3.6 Chapter Summary 
This chapter discussed and presented background analysis of a number of the 
relevant aspects of two main reliability assessment techniques, commonly denoted as 
analytical and probabilistic approaches. The step-by-step algorithms for the 
implementation of both approaches are given and their general advantages and 
disadvantages are discussed.  
Analytical approaches provide only mean values of output reliability indicators, but 
require shorter computational times, while probabilistic approaches present more 
comprehensive results, but require longer computational times, depending on the size 
of the network, total simulation period and steps of the simulation. 
The results of the MCS process produce fluctuating outputs due to the stochastic 
effects, therefore requiring specification of a stopping criteria and analysis of the 
convergence of output results in terms of acceptable errors and limits/boundaries. In 
order to analyse these conditions and requirements, two types of precision indicators 
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are simulated and discussed in this chapter (variance coefficient and error 
coefficient). Generally, these two coefficients are different, as variance coefficient 
uses mean output values for benchmark, while error coefficient uses mean input 
values. Another factor affecting the accuracy of MCS approaches is related to the 
total period of simulation. These factors need to be correlated with each other before 
starting the process of simulations. Lastly, the MCS outputs can be defined in various 
probability distributions during the integration of random number generator with 
input parameters. To illustrate the main aspects of discussed analytical and 
probabilistic reliability assessment approaches, an example of the offshore wind 
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Chapter 4 Modelling of LV and MV Distribution 
Networks: Generic Network Models 
Identifying network configurations, sizes and types of network components and other 
relevant network characteristics and parameters (e.g. the lengths of the lines, the 
numbers of the connected customers, etc.) is not only important from the point of 
view of providing required input data for the reliability assessment. The detailed data 
and information on modelled networks are crucial for obtaining accurate results of 
the analysis. Accordingly, this chapter focuses on the typical LV and MV 
distribution networks in the UK and Scotland, for which all required data and 
information on network configurations, components, parameters and characteristics 
were obtained after an extensive review of available statistics, reports and other 
literature, mostly from the UK/Scottish distribution networks operators (DNOs).  
In the UK, distribution networks are normally operated in radial configurations, 
starting from the step-down transformers (e.g. 132/11 kV, or 132/33 kV), 
representing bulk grid-supply points (GSPs), which from the primary distribution 
substations supply a number of underground cable or overhead line feeders, which 
vary in lengths and sizes. Finally, in order to deliver power to customer loads at 
suitable voltage levels (e.g. three-phase 400 V or single-phase 230 V), secondary 
substation transformers are connected along the MV feeders, which themselves 
supply LV networks up to the service connections of the individual customers. 
4.1 LV/MV Network Design Criteria 
In order to identify the models of the typical UK/Scottish LV/MV networks, the 
design criteria and characteristics of these network should be analysed first. For 
instance, the size of the feeder at different locations is determined by both maximum 
supplied demand and short circuit levels, which vary for different fault types. 
Protection devices detect the faulty condition/location/level, in order to properly and 
selectively clear the faults (using e.g. circuit breakers or fuses) and isolate the faulted 
sections and limit impact of service supply interruptions on connected customers. 
The typical design fault levels for the UK distribution networks are shown in Table 
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4.1, which gives indicative values of maximum fault currents for different voltage 
levels. 
Table 4.1:  Typical UK symmetrical fault currents and fault levels [73, 74] 
Voltage (kV) Fault current (kA) Fault level (MVA) 
132 21.9 5000 
33 17.5 1000 
11 13.1 250 
0.4 (LV) 34.8 25 
The next important step during network modelling is to identify the type of the 
protection system installed within the network, as well as the corresponding settings. 
Most faults on the underground cables are permanent faults, e.g. from excavation, 
soil movement and equipment failures. This differs from the overhead lines, which 
are exposed to external and weather-related factors, such as winds and storm, snow 
and ice loading, lightning, animal and tree contacts. Faults due to some of these 
external factors are considered as momentary/temporary faults, and overhead line 
networks are usually equipped with automatic recloser circuit breakers (ARCBs). 
The guidelines of installing ARCBs in the UK are given in [75]: 
i. More than 1 km of overhead lines (including spur/lateral lines) shall be 
equipped with AR at sources (substations), or at another CB. 
ii. Not more than 500 customer between AR 
iii. Not more than 2000 customer per circuit 
iv. A maximum of three AR devices at 11 kV. 
However, some considerations must be given to disabling the ARCBs in the 
substation and for installations of ARCBs at the first main sections of overhead lines, 
where the first section from the primary substation consists entirely of underground 
cables that supply more than 50 customers [76]. In addition, the type of the applied 
protection devices for lateral/spur feeders depends on the length of the feeders: 
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i. Long spurs (lines longer than 5 km) shall be protected by AR. 
ii. Medium spurs (lines between 0.5 km and 5 km) shall be protected by a 
sectionaliser. 
iii. Short spurs (lines less than 0.5 km) shall be protected by a fuse. 
As for the LV network, most feeders and LV sides of secondary distribution 
transformers are typically protected by fuses with different ratings and clearing 
times. However, it is more suitable to install circuit breakers for the protection of the 
first feeder section and also in the middle of a long LV main feeder (typically with 
multiple radial spurs/laterals), when there is usually a large secondary distribution 
transformer, which is then also protected by circuit breaker at LV side, in order to 
reduce the impact of interrupting large number of customers due to non-permanent 
faults. The MV sides of secondary distribution transformers are protected by circuit 
breaker for easier maintenance and replacement of transformers, LV busbar and 
fuses in substation, etc. Within the MV/LV secondary substation, the CB-based 
protection devices are designed to operate with three-pole activation, in order to 
avoid unbalanced supply. 
Typically, due to capital cost and lower impact on customers (i.e. lower numbers of 
interrupted customers), the design of UK LV networks is not based on N-1 security 
criteria and LV networks are always operated in fixed radial configurations. 
Therefore, there are no redundant components in the LV secondary substation, which 
feature only a single transformer per LV load point. As for the MV network, it is 
preferred to install a matched pair of primary transformers, to provide N-1 security. 
Additionally, a number of parallel feeders supplied from a MV primary substation 
are operated in “normally open” radial configuration, i.e. with a normally open 
connection to another parallel feeder, which can be closed (manually or 
automatically) to form a meshed/ring MV network configuration, or to provide 
alternative supply point to another MV substation. On the other hand, for certain 
areas with lower demands, it is more economical to install only a single primary 
transformer (in rural networks), or to locate and operate normally a open device (in 
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sub-urban networks) to split the load approximately 50/50 over two halves of the ring 
or, sometimes, 60/40 is applied, depending on the circumstances [77]. 
4.1.1 Fuse-saving scheme 
The fuse-saving scheme is designed to prevent the activation of fuses during 
transient faults. Although in this scheme transient faults will result in SIs, this is 
assumed to contribute to a higher reliability performance (i.e. lower duration of 
supply interruptions), as the time required to change the fuses activated by transient 
faults will result in LIs. This scheme typically uses automatic reclosing circuit 
breaker (ARCB) in a low-set instantaneous overcurrent protection, which will the 
trip feeder CB before any fuse on the lateral branches operates. The CB is then 
automatically reclosed, which will restore the supply if the fault is transient, 
preventing fuse replacement. In case of permanent faults, ARCB will allow the fuse 
nearest to the fault to operate after a few reclosing attempts. 
The main disadvantage of the fuse saving scheme is that all customers within the 
protection zone of the ARCB will experience short supply interruption(s) for 
temporary faults on branch fuses, which are essentially unnecessary in case of 
permanent faults. At MV level, fuse-saving schemes are applied in sub-urban and 
rural MV networks by utilising ARCBs, but not in highly-urban and urban MV 
networks, since all protection devices there are CBs, which might also feature 
automatic reclosing functionalities. Since the fuse-saving scheme requires additional 
equipment (instantaneous overcurrent relays with automatic reclosing 
functionalities), it is not applied in LV networks. 
4.1.2 Fuse-blowing scheme 
This scheme is allowing the fuse to trip first during both permanent and temporary 
faults, and is also called trip-saving or breaker-saving scheme. With this scheme, all 
customers connected to the faulted feeder will experience long supply interruptions 
due to the operation of the dedicated fuse, except in case of (very) short duration 
transient faults. For such transient faults, the fuse will not operate and customers will 
experience either a short interruption, or a voltage dip. 
Reliability Assessment of Distribution Networks Incorporating Regulator 
Requirements, Generic Network Equivalents and Smart Grid Functionalities 
 
Modelling of LV and MV Distribution Networks: Generic Network Models 79 
4.2 Single-Phase and Three-Phase Network 
Operation: Importance of Full LV Network Models 
Most of the existing studies prefer modelling of distribution networks as symmetrical 
three-phase networks, using the corresponding single-line network representations, 
as that substantially simplifies the analysis. Generally, this assumes that the 
protection components (e.g. circuit breakers or fuses for “feeder cut-off”, i.e. 
disconnection of faulted feeders) operate in a three-pole mode of operation. This 
means that for asymmetrical single-phase and double-phase faults, which are 
typically 5-6 times more frequent than the three-phase faults, the protection 
component will disconnect all three phases, not just the faulted one(s). Generally, 
this reflects the correct application and setting of the three-pole protection systems in 
MV networks, but it is not likely for the UK LV networks, where most of the 
customers are connected to a single-phase 230 V supply and where fuses, as the most 
common protection components, are operated in a single-pole mode. Conversely, 
using a single-line representation of LV networks means that there will be no 
distinction between the different fault types and that the assessed number of 
interrupted customers will be significantly overestimated. Accordingly, if this aspect 
of the LV network design is not accurately modelled, the assessment of reliability 
performance of LV networks will not be correct. 
4.2.1 Importance of Considering Different Types of Faults 
The design of the networks takes into account the statistics of different fault types. 
The faults can be classified into single-phase, two-phase (with and without earth) and 
three-phase faults. In available literature, the statistics on the different types of faults 
is given for both HV and MV networks, while statistics on the types of faults in LV 
networks is scarce. Again, this shows that more emphasis in the past analyses was 
given to HV and MV networks, with much lower attention to LV networks, most 
likely due to a much lower impact in terms of the number of interrupted customers 
(compared to MV and HV networks). In order to help the analysis of MV and, 
particularly, LV networks, Table 4.2 shows the percentage contributions of different 
fault types identified in existing literature. The calculation of average values is based 
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on a simple arithmetic mean formula (for example, the value for single-phase faults 
for MV level mixed overhead, O/H, and underground, U/G, network is obtained as 
the average of two reported values of 50% and 70%, i.e. as 60%). 
Table 4.2:  Percentages of different fault types in LV and MV networks 















[84] O/H U/G Mix 
LV 
S - - - - - - 
78 
50 50 50 
D - - - - - - 10 10 10 
DG - - - - - - 18 18 18 
T - - - - - - 22 22 22 22 
MV 
S 50 70 70 80 65 76 - 71.6 76 60 
D 9 15 15 2 9 0 - 8.7 0 12 
DG 24 10 10 17 20 24 - 15.7 10 17 T 17 5 5 1 6 - 4 14 11 
 
4.3 Modelling of MV/LV Distribution Networks 
In this thesis, residential customers are classified in four general, i.e. “generic” 
subsectors, based on their location (e.g. urban or rural), size (small, medium or 
large), the geographical dispersion (concentrated or distributed load points), and the 
type of residential dwelling (flat or house) [85]. This classification into four different 
subsectors allows to specify the typical configurations and components (types and 
sizes) of the LV and MV networks supplying residential customers at different 
locations, ranging from highly-urban, through urban and sub-urban, to rural areas. 
In each subsector, depending on the location, there will be different configurations, 
arrangements of network components and protection systems, as well as differences 
in network operating conditions. In urban and large city areas, where the load density 
is high and customers are evenly distributed, the feeders are shorter and underground 
cables are used due to limited space for overhead lines and substations, increased 
reliability and aesthetic reasons. On the other hand, in sub-urban and rural areas, the 
customers are non-evenly distributed, as the dwellings are typically in proximity of 
the roads, resulting in longer overhead feeders and lower demand densities.  
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This section presents further updates and additional details on the four generic LV 
and MV networks, which are initially considered in [5].This was stipulated as one of 
the tasks of this PhD research, as, for example, previously modelled MV networks 
did not include “direct transformation” by 132/11 kV transformers in highly urban 
areas, or detailed consideration of single-pole fuses in overhead rural networks. 
4.3.1 Four Generic Residential Load Subsectors 
In this thesis, “load sector” is defined as the aggregation of loads, i.e. electrical 
devices and equipment, which are used for certain purpose and in specific 
applications by the end-users performing similar activities and tasks. The alternative 
term to load sector is “customer class” and some of the commonly used load sectors 
are, e.g., residential, commercial, industrial, agricultural, etc. The load structure and 
load composition in one load sector usually exhibit similar characteristics, as well as 
patterns of active and reactive power demands, allowing to use similar (load) models 
for the representation of the aggregate demands of all users in that load sector. The 
simplest approach, which typically does not introduce large errors, is to use the same 
general load profile for the representation of the aggregate demand in one load 
sector. This approach is used for the representation of aggregate demands in the four 
different generic residential load subsectors in this thesis, based on the location, size, 
and type of residential dwellings, [85].  
Based on the differences in general characteristics and parameters of supplying LV 
and MV distribution networks, the residential load sectors can be further divided into 
the four following generic sub-sectors: highly-urban, urban, sub-urban, and rural. 
Similar approach is previously used to make distinction between residential load sub-
sectors based on “building area efficiency” and “load density”, reflecting land use 
control and construction conditions in the built environments. The building area 
efficiency is expressed as a density measure, which is defined as the ratio of floor 
area of the built environment and the total geographical area. This is illustrated in 
Table 4.8, which is adopted from [86]. An additional difference between the different 
subsectors is the level of public and street lighting. 
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Table 4.3:  Area efficiency and MV load density (MWh/km2) for various load 
sectors [86]. 
Area efficiency HU U SU R 
Low 0.8 0.3 0.13 0.05 
Medium 1.9 0.74 0.26 0.11 
High 3.3 2.1 0.52 0.18 
     
MV load 
density HU U SU R 
Low 13 3.2 1.4 1.3 
Medium 41 10.9 3.6 3.1 
High 137 24.9 6.9 6.5 
 
4.3.2 Highly-urban (HU) residential load sub-sector 
This residential sub-sector is usually found in large cities (“metropolitan” areas), 
where residential dwellings are multi-storey and high-rise buildings, representing 
highly concentrated grid supply points. In large cities, the building area efficiency 
exceeds unity, which means the multi-storey buildings are built densely, often side-
by-side. High building area efficiency also indicates restriction of land-use, as, for 
instance, limited or no space is available for air-insulated equipment and switchgear 
(e.g. lines, or outdoor transformer substations). Furthermore, the presence of the 
dedicated public and street lighting is greater than in other sub-sectors, due to the 
presence of parking spaces and higher required levels of lighting of streets and public 
spaces in metropolitan areas. 
4.3.3 Urban (U) residential load sub-sector 
This residential sub-sector consists of house-type dwelling, ranging from one to few-
storey buildings, located in city urban areas and characterised by medium to high 
concentration of power demand. The building area efficiency also exceeds unity, but 
is somewhat reduced than highly-urban building area efficiency. It has the same 
restrictions for space availability, which again limits the network components and 
network construction in outdoor applications. The load demand from public/street 
lighting in this sector is also high, but reduced with respect to highly-urban area. 
Reliability Assessment of Distribution Networks Incorporating Regulator 
Requirements, Generic Network Equivalents and Smart Grid Functionalities 
 
Modelling of LV and MV Distribution Networks: Generic Network Models 83 
4.3.4 Sub-urban (SU) residential load sub-sector 
This residential load sub-sector represents individual house dwellings located in city 
sub-urban areas and towns, which are in close proximity to big cities and 
characterised by medium to low power densities. The building area efficiency for this 
sector is below unity, which indicates less buildings and higher space area 
availability. The mixture of load structure is almost similar with that of urban sector, 
but the contribution of public and street lighting is reduced. 
4.3.5 Rural (R) residential load sub-sector 
This residential sub-sector represents house-type dwellings, ranging from one to few-
storey buildings located in more remote areas. The houses/buildings are located far 
from each other, resulting in low power density and dispersed demand. Since the 
available space is vast, it normally has much lower building area efficiency than that 
in sub-urban sector and the network components installation are typically aerial 
feeder type and outdoor type switchgear. Another noticeable difference from the 
other sectors is minimum, or almost no presence of public/street lighting. 
4.3.6 Two General Types of Networks and Network 
Components 
The selection of network components mainly depends on the load density and 
distribution of supplied customers in the served geographic/network area. An 
important additional factor is space availability, as “space” is one of the most-valued 
commodities in urban and highly-urban areas, where space restrictions and 
limitations have direct impact on the selection of component types (enclosed and 
compact components with suitable type and level of electrical insulation). 
Accordingly, the two following general types of network components can be 
distinguished: 
i. Air-insulated and open-air network components (e.g. air-insulated switchgear 
(AIS), air-insulated lines (AIL) and pole-mounted transformers) 
ii. Enclosed network components, with gas, liquid or solid insulation (e.g. SF6 
circuit breakers and oil-type insulation). 
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As mentioned for (highly) urban areas, where available space for network component 
is limited, network components are enclosed and insulated with pressurized gas 
(SF6) or solid insulation, where enclosed/indoor installations are located within the 
buildings. Underground cable conductors are used to provide environmental 
protection and for aesthetic reasons. On the other hand, there is a much larger 
availability of space in sub-urban and rural areas, where components with air 
insulation are used, requiring larger insulation distances due to relatively low 
dielectric strength, as in the case of bare overhead conductors. 
4.4 LV Residential Networks 
LV networks in the UK are typically configured as radial networks, operating at 
415 V three-phase, or 230 V single-phase voltages. A LV network starts after 
stepping down a primary voltage of 33 kV or 11 kV by either 33/0.4 kV or 11/0.4 kV 
secondary distribution transformers. The characteristics (size, location, protection, 
etc.) of secondary transformers will differ in different LV networks. In urban and 
highly-urban areas, where the load density is high, the secondary transformer is 
located within a multi-storey (residential or commercial) buildings, or in a stand-
alone enclosed secondary substation. In sub-urban and rural areas, often only a pad-
mounted or pole-mounted transformer is used, due to more dispersed customers and 
lower demands. The selection of LV distribution feeder, which can be in the form of 
underground cable, aerial cable or overhead line, also depend on the availability of 
space and load density, i.e. “cost per served customer”. Accordingly, Table 4.3 
provides some general information (types and cross-sections of LV distribution 
feeders and spurs) typically used in the UK. Additionally, Table 4.4 provides a more 
detailed information for direct use in the four generic network models: highly-urban 
(HU), urban (U), sub-urban (SU) and rural (R), allocating identification letters for 
each line in the generic network models in Figs. 4.1-4.8. 
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Table 4.4:  Typical characteristics of LV feeders in the UK [39, 87, 88, 89, 90] 
Highly-Urban/Urban Underground Network 
Interconnector Cross-Sections  (mm2 Al) 
Main trunk feeder 4x300; 4x185; 4x120 
Lateral spurs 4x185; 4x120; 4x95 
Service connection 4x120; 4x95; 4x70; 4x35 2x35(Cu) 
Sub-Urban/Rural Aerial Network 
Interconnector Cross-Sections  (mm2 Al) 
Main trunk feeder 4x120; 4x95; 4x70 
Lateral spurs 4x95; 4x70; 4x50 
Service connection 4x70; 4x50; 4x35 2x35(Cu); 2x25(Cu)  
Description of the LV distribution network is incomplete without the secondary 
MV/LV step-down transformers. Typically, the MV/LV substation comprises of a 
single transformer, with a rating from a few tens kVA up to 1.5MVA. Normally, in 
the UK, the primary (MV) winding of transformer is connected in delta, in order to 
isolate the earth faults on the secondary side and cancel the zero-sequence 
component. The secondary (LV) winding is connected in star and earthed (with 
neutral conductor), enabling supply of single-phase loads, i.e. typical residential 
customer loads, connected between the phase and neutral conductors, with an 
operating voltage of 230 V. Table 4.5 provides detailed information on typical 
11/0.4kV transformers in the UK, again directly correlated with the four generic 
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Table 4.5:  Typical characteristics of LV feeders in the UK, as used in the presented 































































Id. Configuration Rph Xph R0 X0 Izph (mm2) (Ω/km) (Amps) 
HU A Underground 
Line (Cable) 
 
EPR or XLPE  
0.6/1 kV  
4x(CSA) Al / 
Cu (earth)  
CNE 
300 0.1 0.073 0.593 0.042 465 
HU/
U 
B 185 0.164 0.074 0.656 0.05 355 
C 120 0.253 0.071 1.012 0.046 280 
D 95 0.320 0.075 1.280 0.051 245 
U 
E 70 0.443 0.076 1.772 0.052 205 
F 35 0.87 0.085 3.481 0.058 156 







120 0.284 0.083 1.136 0.417 261 
H 95 0.32 0.085 1.355 0.406 228 
SU/
R I 70 0.497 0.086 2.387 0.447 195 
R 
J 50 0.397 0.279 2.570 0.396 168 








PVC or XLPE 
0.6/1 kV  
1x(CSA) Al / 
Cu (neutral / 
earth)  CNE 
35 0.851 0.041 3.404 0.03 120 
SU/
R M 25 1.191 0.043 4.766 0.03 100 
where: EPR - Ethylene propylene rubber, XLPE - Cross-linked polyethylene,  PVC - 
Polyvinyl chloride, CNE – Combined Neutral Earth, Al – Aluminium, Cu - Copper 
Additionally, the secondary distribution systems are also designed based on the 
requirements for dielectric and mechanical strength, thermal capacity limits and 
voltage regulation. The maximum thermal capacity of a network component is 
determined by the maximum allowed temperature for the conductor insulation 
(underground cables), or the maximum elongation (sagging of overhead lines). The 
thermal capacity limit is related to the current capacity limit, but actual operating 
conditions (ambient temperature, wind speed, etc.) might have additional impact. 
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Finally, the total voltage drop between the LV side of the secondary substation and 
the last served customer (the farthest load point on the feeder for the maximum 
demand conditions) should be within the maximum permitted voltage variation limit 
in a LV network, which is between +10% and -6% of the nominal voltage in the UK.  
Table 4.6:  Typical characteristics of the UK 11/0.4kV secondary distribution 








































































































15810 1400 5 0.70267 3.2584 
1000 11000 1350 4.75 1.1 4.62 
HU/
U 800 7410 1000 4.75 1.1575 5.8225 
U 500 5100 680 4.75 2.04 9.28 
U/SU 315 3420 580 4.75 3.4444 14.6794 
SU 200 2900 540 4.75 7.5 22.5 
SU/R 100 1750 320 4.5 17.5 41.45 
R 
50 1100 190 4.5 43.72 78.6 
11/ 
0.23 25 - 400 110 4.5 64.0076 146.6424. 
For each residential load sub-sector, the network diagram provides information on 
MV/LV transformer size (Table 4.5), the length of LV feeder with cross-section 
(Table 4.4), and the number of LV customers at each load point with total demand. 
4.4.1 Highly-Urban Generic LV Network Model 
Highly-urban (HU) LV distribution network model is defined for large cities and 
metropolitan areas with concentrated demands and heavy loading conditions. The 
networks are designed with indoor type of substations/switchgear and underground 
cable lines in radial configuration. The typical HU LV network in the UK is assumed 
to have four main three-phase feeders, supplied from LV busbars of the infeeding 
1.5 MVA 11/0.4 kV substation, as shown in Figs. 4.1 and 4.2. The four main feeders 
are protected by circuit breakers, supplying several lateral branches (spurs) with a 
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maximum number of 380 single-phase connected customers, represented by 19 load 
points, LP1 to LP19. The protection devices are either circuit breaker or fuse, 
depending on the number of supplied customers. Since the main feeder supports a 
large number of customers, it is likely that a circuit breaker is used as protection 
device. Due to high load density and voltage regulation limit, the length of the 





SMAX= 2.34 kVA/customer, pf=0.97
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Figure 4.1:  Single-line model of generic LV highly-urban network [77, 102, 103, 
104, 105]. 
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Figure 4.2:  Full three-phase model of generic LV highly-urban network [77, 102, 
103, 104, 105]. 
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Furthermore, according to [71, 73], Scottish Power (DNO in Scotland) provides 
designs of highly-urban LV networks with normally-closed alternative supply from 
the similar adjacent (“mirror”) highly-urban LV distribution network (type ‘X’ LV 
network). The provision of the alternative supply maintains continuous supply to the 
customers for faults originating from the LV substation (i.e. MV/LV transformer and 
circuit breakers), or from the upstream 11 kV feeder (Figure 4.9). In order to further 
improve continuity of supply, each lateral feeder is connected to a LV pillar, which 
contain either fuse or circuit breaker (based on the connected customers) to isolate 
the faulty downstream section from the rest of the network. 
The maximum/peak load is 862.6kW, the minimum load is 142.5kW [39], both for 
assumed power factor pf=0.97. The selection of transformer with the rating of 
1.5 MVA, which is almost twice the maximum load, is to accommodate 1-2% annual 
increase of load [71, 73], as well as to provide continuous supply to adjacent LV 
highly-urban customers. Excluding the 30 m long service cable connection (marked 
as ‘L’ type of lines in Table 4.4), the highly-urban network has the total length of 
underground cables of 1,222 m: 300 mm2 (355 m), 185 mm2 (601 m), 120 mm2 
(218 m), and 95 mm2 (48 m). 
4.4.2 Urban Generic LV Network Model 
The generic urban (U) LV distribution network model is similar to the generic HU 
LV network model, but has lower number of connected customers and, therefore, 
operates at lower loading conditions (around 50% lower). The typical 11/04 kV 
transformer is with a power rating of 800 kVA and, as the available space inside the 
city urban areas is rather limited, all MV/LV substations and switchgears are of 
indoor type. Again, underground cable lines are used for distributing power in radial 
configuration, as shown in Figs. 4.3 and 4.4. Main feeders are protected by circuit 
breakers, while lateral feeders are protected by fuses. The network is able to supply a 
total of 190 single-phase customers, connected to 19 load points (LP1 to LP19). 
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Figure 4.3:  Single-line model of generic LV Urban network [39, 77, 102, 103, 104]. 
The configuration of the generic urban network lacks N-1 security for secondary 
distribution transformer and substation main circuit breaker, as there is no provision 
of alternative supply point via an additional cable from adjacent “mirror” MV/LV 
substation. The maximum demand is 431 kW, while minimum demand is 71.25 kW 
[39]. Again, the size of the transformer is almost twice the maximum loading 
condition, in order to accommodate an increase of 1-2% each year and possible 
expansion of the LV network. The total length of underground cable network is 
1,587.6 m (feeders are longer than in HU LV network model): 300 mm2 (122 m), 
185 mm2 (41 m), 120 mm2 (157 m), 95mm2 (219.6 m), and 70 mm2 (1,048 m). 
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Figure 4.4:  Full three-phase model of generic LV urban network [39, 77, 102, 103, 
104]. 
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4.4.3 Sub-Urban Generic LV Network Model 
The generic sub-urban (SU) LV network model is defined for smaller towns and sub-
urban areas around the big cities, with medium to low load demands. From MV/LV 
substation, the powers are transferred to customers via overhead lines, and although 
it is common to use bare conductors due to lower capital cost, some sub-urban areas 
are using aerial cables for better reliability, as bare conductors are considered 
vulnerable to environmental and external impact, such as lightning, snow, animal, 
trees and wind. The typical arrangement consists of several overhead main feeders, 
with about 30 m of pole-to-pole distance, in radial configuration. Supplied load 
points in this network are with lower demands, and typically only the feeder head is 
protected by a CB, while branch/lateral feeders are protected by fuses, as shown in 
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Figure 4.5:  Single-line model of generic LV sub-urban network [77, 97, 101, 103, 
104, 106]. 
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Figure 4.6:  Full three-phase model of generic LV sub-urban network [77, 97, 101, 
103, 104, 106] 
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The generic SU network has no redundancy (N-1 security for distribution 
transformer and substation main fuse) and no alternative supply point. The substation 
and switchgear for this network are of the outdoor type and the maximum rating of 
transformer is 315 kVA, supplying a total of 76 customers connected to nine load 
point (LP1 to LP9), with maximum demand of 172.5 kW and minimum demand of 
28.5 kW [39]. Excluding the service cable (‘L’ type) lengths, this network has the 
total length of 840 m, with mixture of overhead lines (OHL main feeders) and 
underground cables (lateral feeders): OHL 95 mm2 (420 m), cable 95 mm2 (150 m), 
and cable 70 mm2 (270 m). 
4.4.4 Rural Generic LV Network Model 
The generic rural (R) LV network model is defined for supplying remote customers, 
located far from the city and urban areas, where load demand is low and customer 
load points are highly dispersed. The network is radial and made from overhead 
conductor lines, with typically two main three-phase overhead feeders supplying 19 
individual single-phase customers (each presenting a separate load point). The 
customers are normally located along the roads, with pole-to-pole distance of around 
35 m, where each service connection supplying a single customer is protected by a 
pole-mounted fuse, as shown in Figs. 4.7 and 4.8. 
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100 kVA 
Transformer
SMAX= 2.34 kVA/customer, pf= 0.97
19 customers
Total LoadMAX= 44.46 kVA
11 kV
0.4 kV
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Figure 4.7:  Single-line model of generic LV rural network [77, 103, 104, 106]. 
Although a vast amount of space is available in rural areas, most of the secondary 
transformers and dedicated switchgear are pole-mounted, due to its low power rating. 
In the generic network model, the 11/0.4 kV transformer with a power rating of 
100 kVA is selected, although in certain rural areas demand could be around 
50 kVA, or even lower, when it is preferable to use a single-phase secondary 
transformer, again in order to reduce costs. The maximum demand is 43.13 kW and 
minimum is 7.13 kW [39]. Excluding the service cable length (‘M’ type), the rural 
network has a total length of 1,235m, with the following OHLs: 50 mm2 (665 m), 
and 35 mm2 (570 m). 
 
 
Reliability Assessment of Distribution Networks Incorporating Regulator 
Requirements, Generic Network Equivalents and Smart Grid Functionalities 
 
Modelling of LV and MV Distribution Networks: Generic Network Models 97 
100 kVA
Transformer
ZT=17.5 + j41.45  
(p.u. on 100MVA)
19 customers




















































R = red phase
Y= yellow phase
B = blue phase
Circuit Breaker
 
Figure 4.8:  Full three-phase model of generic LV rural network [77, 103, 104, 106]. 
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4.4 Generic MV Distribution Network Models 
Following an approach similar to the formulation of the four generic LV networks, 
the development of the models of the corresponding four generic MV networks is 
presented in this section. It should be noted that the identification of MV network 
designs, configurations and network parameters/components requires careful 
consideration, as the assessed impact of supply interruptions in terms of connected 
customers is much higher than in the LV networks. The technical and economic 
factors, such as the selection of feeder type and size, switchgear and transformer 
rating, as well as type of protection devices, must be considered based on network 
area, load demand and space availability for network components. An additional 
aspect of analysis is related to regulatory requirements, i.e. security and quality of 
supply (SQSS) [107], which should be analysed together with the GSPs [108] and 
permissible voltage variations [19], directly affecting DNO’s performance. 
The modelling of MV networks considers two different voltage levels of GSPs, 
which are 132 kV and 33 kV in the UK. For most networks, the typical substation 
transformer is 33/11 kV, while (highly) urban areas, where demand is high, are 
supplied via direct transformation, 132 kV to 11 kV. Most of substations are 
equipped with two transformers operated in parallel, in order to provide better 
voltage control, loadability and security, whereas in rural areas with low demands a 
single 33/11 kV transformer is commonly used. All transformers are equipped with 
on-load tap changers (OLTC), in order to control the voltage of the secondary side 
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The primary 132/11 kV or 33/11 kV substation typically supplies several 11 kV 
outgoing/main feeders, with each 11 kV feeder supplying a number of 11/0.4 kV 
secondary substations (as discussed in the previous sections). The selection of the 
type of feeder is based on the location and the space availability for network 
components, with Tables 4.6 and 4.7 providing the information on the type and 
characteristics/parameters of the four corresponding generic MV network models. 
Table 4.6 provides detailed information regarding the types and parameters of 11 kV 
feeders in the UK, together with the identification letters for modelling and 
classification in Figs. 4.9-4.13, while Table 4.7 provides detailed data on typical 
132/11 kV and 33/11 kV transformers for each sub-sector (HU, U, SU and R). 
Table 4.8: Typical characteristics of the UK 132/11 kV and 33/11 kV distribution 





























































































e 30 0.0314 0.674 0.674 
33 / 11 
HU 30 
Dy11 
0.035 0.78 0.5 0.8 1.04 
HU, 
U 
24 0.0291 0.7083 0.45 0.85 1.05 
15 0.0833 1.088 0.54 0.9 1.05 
U, 
SU 10 0.069 1 0.5 
0.85 1.045 SU, 
RU 










5 0.14 1.3 0.8 
RU 2.5 0.3609 2.8 1.77 0.81 1.04 
where:  HU - highly urban,  U - urban,  SU - suburban,  R - rural 
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4.4.1 Highly-Urban Generic MV Network Model 
Highly-urban (HU) generic MV distribution network model refers to areas of big 
cities (metropolitan areas), where there is a large number of customers with a high 
concentration of demands. Accordingly, it is common to use underground cables and 
indoor substations/switchgears, as the space for network components is limited. The 
networks are strong with meshed configuration and shorter cable lengths than in 
other sub-sectors, in order to allow for the optimal voltage regulation. 
Normally, an HU MV network has a radial configuration and it is supported by an 
alternative supply point, either from an MV primary substation, or from a ‘reflection 
centre’, or both. A reflection centre presents a normally open closed-loop 
arrangement between all ends of 11 kV main feeders that provides supply to some of 
the feeders in case of network faults. Reflection centre is connected to the adjacent 
(same) MV network, acting as alternative supply in cases when the main feeder is 
faulty or unable to provide supply (e.g. due to maintenance). During normal 
operation and without any failure, the network presents a radial configuration with 
normally open protection devices between the main feeders and the alternative 
supply/reflection centre. 
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Figure 4.9:  Generic MV 132/11 kV highly-urban network [75, 87, 89, 110, 111, 
112] 
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Figure 4.10:  Generic MV 33/11 kV highly-urban network [75, 87, 89, [110, 111, 
112] 
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An additional network component in HU generic network model is an 11 kV main 
underground cable between the 11 kV busbars in the primary substation and the 
reflection centre. This cable is denoted as “cable 0’ and it does not carry any power 
during normal operation. In case of the faults on main feeders, however, the cable ‘0’ 
allows for independent support of all customers (up to the rated power of two 
transformers) even without use of an alternative supply point from the adjacent MV 
primary substation. Furthermore, and as previously discussed for HU LV network, 
each of the MV/LV secondary substations can also support other adjacent LV 
networks during the faults on 11 kV main feeders, or faults of the secondary 
transformers. In practice, DNOs typically connect a maximum of six 11 kV main 
feeders to a primary HV/MV substation, with up to ten MV/LV secondary 
substations (generic HU LV network) on each 11 kV feeder. According to [77, 112], 
primary substations are operated with two parallel transformers, where each 
transformer should not carry more than 70% of its rated capacity during normal 
operation. 
As illustrated in Figs. 4.9 and 4.10, there are two variants of the UK generic HU MV 
networks: with a standard transformation (33/11 kV) and with a direct transformation 
(132/11 kV). The latter is capable of supporting 18,240 customers, while the former 
can supply 13,680 customers, based on the previously used “after diversity maximum 
demand” (ADMD) level of 2.27 kW or 2.34 kVA (pf=0.97) per individual household 
[39]. The 33/11 kV transformation HU generic MV network has a total lengths and 
cross-sections of 11 kV underground cables: 300 mm2 (5.94 km) and 185mm2 (6.84 
km) while the 132/11 kV transformation HU generic MV network consists of total 
length and cross-sections of 11kV underground cables: 300 mm2 (7.2 km) and 
185mm2 (12.9 km). The first two sections of each 11 kV main feeder have larger 
cross-section areas due to higher loading, [77, 112]. For direct and standard 
transformation variants of HU generic MV networks, the total maximum demands 
are 41,4 MW and 31,05 MW, while minimum demands are 6,84 MW and 5,13 MW, 
respectively [39]. 
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Each section of 11 kV main underground cable feeders and primary sides of 
11/0.4 kV transformers are protected by a tele-controlled circuit breaker for ease of 
reconfiguring of network and energy transfer during certain network faults. 
Typically, automatic recloser circuit breakers (ARCB) are not used (e.g. [76]), as 
most of the faults on underground cables are permanent faults, originating from the 
cable itself (e.g. water ingression) and human activities (e.g. land excavation). 
4.4.2 Urban Generic MV Network Model 
The urban (U) generic MV network model is almost identical in configuration to the 
HU generic MV network, but has slightly reduced strength, transformer rating, 
switchgear rating and longer feeder length. The urban network also uses underground 
cables to transfer power to all customers and indoor type of substation/switchgear. 
The network is operated in radial configuration with (normally open switches 
providing) support from an alternative supply and reflection centre. During the faults, 
this network reconfigures after a faulted part is isolated, in order to provide 
continuous supply to all, or most of the customers (the same N-1 security and 
additional cable ‘0’ as in the case of HU network). 
The important difference between urban and highly-urban MV networks is that there 
is no additional interconnection between the pairs of secondary MV/LV substations. 
Accordingly, although generic urban MV network is capable of reconfiguring in case 
of faults on 11 kV underground cable sections, or circuit breakers (cable ‘0’), the 
faults of MV/LV substation/switchgear result in supply interruptions, which makes 
urban MV network somewhat less reliable than a highly-urban MV network. The 
urban MV network also has a maximum of six 11 kV main feeders, with up to ten 
11/0.4 kV spurs on each feeder. 
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Figure 4.11:  Generic MV urban network [75, 87, 89, 110, 111, 112] 
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Again, as in the case of HU generic MV network, the first two sections of each 
11 kV feeder have higher cross-sections than the rest of the feeder due to higher 
loading [77, 112]. Each feeder section and head of spurs are protected by a tele-
controlled circuit breaker for easy reconfiguration. Typically, two parallel 33/11 kV 
transformers are installed in the primary MV substation, each rated around 70% of 
the maximum demand. The network supplies 9,120 residential customers, has a total 
length and cross-section of 11 kV underground cables are: 185 mm2 (9 km) and 
95 mm2 (9.9 km). The maximum demand (ADMD) is 20,7 MW, while minimum 
demand is 3,42 MW [39]. 
4.4.3 Sub-urban Generic MV Network Model 
In smaller cities and towns, where the load demand is medium to low, the developed 
UK generic network model is referred as sub-urban (SU) network. Here, the network 
is weaker than in highly populated urban areas and is operated in radial configuration 
with two main feeders and normally open CBs between them. In a case of fault, the 
normally open CBs will close after the fault is isolated, to provide supply to all, or 
most of the customers. According to [77, 112], load is equally distributed (50/50) 
between two main feeders (made as overhead line conductors), although it is 
permitted to have up to 60/40 loading ratio between them. 
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Figure 4.12:  Generic MV sub-urban network [75, 89, 112, 113, 114] 
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As there is much larger space availability, the preferred type of substation is outdoor 
and mostly overhead lines are used due to lower capital and maintenance cost. In 
some areas, aerial cables are used to increase the reliability. The lengths of the 
feeders are increased, due to higher dispersion of customers, lower density of 
housing and increased distance from the primary MV substation. Normally, the 
support in form of alternative supply point is provided from the adjacent MV 
substation [89], as indicated in Fig. 4.12. 
Two 11 kV main feeders supply a number of 11/0.4 kV load points, which usually do 
not have a back-up or alternative supply point. The network design includes circuit 
breakers, either with automatic reclosers or tele-controlled, as well as automatic 
sectionalisers and fuses. The allocation and the coordination of protection 
arrangements are based on main factors discussed in Section 4.1 [76]. Plus, as 
automatic sectionaliser is not preferable to be disconnected during line energising, 
the automatic sectionaliser must be coordinated with the circuit breaker. In other 
words, during a fault within the zone of the automatic sectionaliser, the main feeder 
circuit breaker will trip (open) and de-energise the line. During that moment, the 
automatic sectionaliser will open and after that, the circuit breaker will reclose. Since 
this network contains fuses, the fuse-saving scheme is applied. During a temporary 
fault originated from the fuse protection zone, the main circuit breaker will trip 
(open) and reclose in order to save the fuse from blowing. 
The primary MV substation again has two parallel transformers, each with rating of 
around 70% of the total maximum (ADMD) load, supplying 3,344 residential 
customers (maximum demand is 7.59 MW; minimum demand is 1.25 MW [39]). The 
overhead line network is designed with the following total lengths and cross-sections 
of 11 kV OHLs: 150 mm2 (17.1 km) and 100 mm2 (24.4 km). 
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4.4.4 Rural Generic MV Network Model 
The rural (R) generic MV distribution network model represents typical UK low-
strength radial distribution networks supplying highly dispersed customers with low 
total demands. The outdoor type of substation/switchgear and overhead lines are 
used due to low capital and maintenance cost and as space is available for installing 
network components. The feeder lengths are generally long due to the increased 
distance of individual customers from the primary MV substation. 
Within the primary MV substation, it is common to find only a single 33/11 kV 
transformer, which directly impacts the reliability performance of the network. The 
substation supplies a total of 646 rural customers, with maximum demand of 
1.47 MW and minimum demand of 0.24 MW [39]. The generic rural network has the 
total lengths and cross-sections of 11 kV OHLs: 100 mm2 (18.5 km) and 50 mm2 
(18 km). 
In addition, this network has two main O/H feeders with a number of lateral/branch 
feeders. Each main feeder supplies almost the same load (53/47 ratio) and the 
network is equipped with various types of protection devices. The allocation and the 
coordination of these protection devices are again based on factors discussed in 
Section 4.1 [76]. Since the rural MV network is based on O/H lines and air-insulated 
(i.e. not enclosed) switchgear and transformers, it is vulnerable to environmental 
conditions (e.g. snow, wind, animal and trees), which are statistically resulting in a 
high number of temporary faults. Therefore, it is preferable to install ARCBs 
(automatic reclosing circuit breaker) with up to four reclosing attempts before the 
lock-out (in case of a permanent fault) [76]. This network also operates with the fuse-
saving scheme as in the SU generic MV network model (Subsection 4.4.3). 
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Figure 4.13:  Generic MV rural network [75, 89, 112]. 
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4.5 Load Profiles of Residential Customers 
An important requirement in modelling and assessing reliability performance of MV 
and LV networks is to identify the actual demand patterns and load profiles, which 
are typically used as design criteria during planning (sizing of network components, 
allocation of network reconfiguration capabilities, etc.). Furthermore, the aggregated 
load profiles of, e.g., residential and commercial load sectors are widely used in 
power system analysis (power flow, voltage regulation, reactive power 
compensation, etc.) [115, 116, 117, 118, 119].  
The whole process of planning and modelling presented in this thesis is based on the 
UK residential load sector, i.e. the considered network models are assumed to supply 
residential customers in their dwellings (flats, houses, etc.). Therefore, two sets of 
data are required for the reliability assessment: load curves, with detailed information 
on variations of active and reactive power demands over the considered time period, 
as well as statistical information on different load types contributing to the total load 
demand. 
4.5.1 Residential Load Curves 
According to [120], the typical aggregate load curves of the UK residential load 
sector are shown in Figure 4.14, which represent the overall UK residential sector 
demand. However, as the urban subsector accounts for more than 50% of the 
residential demand [121], this subsector can be considered as the representative of 
the overall UK residential load demand. The curves in Figures 4.14 show the three 
typical loading conditions, i.e. seasonal variations in demand over the course of the 
year. Accordingly, each curve can be allocated to a specific season, e.g., the 
maximum loading conditions correspond to the winter demand. However, the general 
shape of the three load curves is very similar, as the behaviour of the users does not 
change significantly throughout the year (with only exceptions being somewhat 
higher demand during the night due to “economy 7” customers utilising electrical 
heating loads in winter). The recorded seasonal variations are the result of changing 
contributions from actual customers’ loads, i.e. loads that respond to changes in 
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ambient condition (temperature, solar irradiance, etc.). Therefore, it is expected to 
have increased or decreased contributions of specific load types in different seasons, 
for example, mentioned increase of electric space and water heating loads during the 
winter season. 
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(c) Maximum demand curve [120] 
Figure 4.14:  Active power demand of residential load 
Based on [77, 112], the after diversity maximum demand (ADMD) of residential 
customers is estimated between 2 kW and 3 kW, depending on whether gas-heating 
or electrical heating is used in dwellings (approximately 19% of all UK households 
have “economy 7” tariff, which suggests use of electrical heating load). The average 
power factor value of 0.97 is assumed for all analysis in this thesis. From [87], the 
load demand figures show that the maximum and the minimum demands were 
1.3 kVA and 0.16 kVA respectively. However, the analysis in this thesis considers 
minimum demand of 0.375 kW and 2.27 kW for maximum loading conditions, with 
power factor of 0.97, as suggested in [39]. Although the considered values are almost 
twice higher than in [87], it is assumed that this presents a ‘worst case’ scenario, 
enabling for analysis of future upgrading of network models, including connection of 
DG, new customers, etc. Additionally, the maximum loading condition value (2.27 
kW) is considered suitable, as it is between 2 kW and 3 kW (see [77, 112] for more 
detail). 
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Accordingly, each of the secondary 11/0.4 kV substations in the analysed generic 
network models supplies between 50% and 60% of the maximum demand (obtained 
from equal contributions of all customers), in order to avoid overloading of the 
transformers. As previously stated, the reason for the 50%-60% maximum load is 
selected to accommodate for the future expansion of the network with 1%-2% annual 
increase of load and for the provision of alternative supply capabilities [73]. 
4.6 Chapter Summary 
This chapter presents the generic models of medium and low voltage distribution 
networks for the four main residential load subsectors. The presented classification 
of these subsectors is based on the location, size, geographic dispersion and few 
other important characteristics of the corresponding residential types of customers 
and their typical dwellings. For that purpose, a comprehensive database of 
specifications, characteristics and parameters of LV and MV distribution networks, 
network components, configurations and applied types and settings of protection 
systems is developed and used for modelling. Importantly, the LV distribution 
networks are modelled with a full three-phase model, rather than single-line 
representation, in order to realistically reproduce the actual network operating 
conditions.  
Particular attention was given to the identification of protection devices (circuit 
breaker, reclosers, sectionalisers and fuses), as well as to their settings and principles 
of operation, as this is very important for the analysis of short and long supply 
interruptions in cases of different types of faults. Additionally, automatic and remote 
control functionalities in MV networks, together with the provision of alternative 
supply points are all considered (e.g. in terms of N-1 security requirements in MV 
networks, where load densities are high and it is likely to install two parallel 
transformers). For subsectors where the load densities are low, a single transformer is 
installed within the 33/11 kV substation. 
The four generic residential subsectors are modelled in detail with the corresponding 
HU, U, SU and R network models, where each subsector is represented with both 
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MV and LV networks. For example, fuses and circuit breakers are most commonly 
used protection devices, but previous work did not provide clear identification of 
typical implementations in considered types of the LV and MV networks. Therefore, 
this thesis provides detailed descriptions of protection devices/systems in all generic 
networks, as well as the implementation of two general protection schemes (fuse-
saving and fuse-blowing, where fuse-saving is primarily used for reducing impact of 
temporary faults, while fuse-blowing for reducing impact of permanent faults). 
Although there are no publicly available guidelines on DNOs practices for using 
fuse-saving and fuse-blowing schemes, these are again analysed for each of the 
generic subsectors.  
Finally, another important aspect of modelling and assessing reliability performance 
of MV and LV networks is analysed in this chapter: incorporation of actual demand 
patterns and load profiles into the analysis. This is represented with the three main 
loading conditions (minimum, average and maximum demands), based on the change 
of seasons throughout the year. Accordingly, maximum loading conditions 
correspond to winter, minimum conditions to summer and average conditions to 
spring and autumn. All these results are used in the next chapters for the calculation 
and comparison of reliability performance of different scenarios and operating 
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Chapter 5 Reliability Equivalents of Generic LV 
Distribution Networks 
This chapter discusses formulation of the more detailed reliability equivalents of the 
four generic LV distribution network models (developed in Chapter 4) for improved 
reliability assessment. The required input data (fault rates and repair times), the 
distinction between the different fault types (permanent vs. temporary, as well as 
single-, double- and three-phase), the use of different protection devices (single-pole 
vs. three-pole) and some other important aspects are discussed, evaluating their 
importance for the reliability assessment. The results are presented for different sizes 
of the modelled generic networks, based on the typical ratings of transformers in 
secondary distribution substations. 
During the standard reliability performance analysis of medium voltage (MV) and 
high voltage (HV) networks, downstream connected low voltage (LV) networks are 
typically not represented in much detail. The two main reasons for that are: a) a 
general lack of accurate information on LV network configurations (particularly 
service entry connections of LV customers), applied LV protection systems and 
actual fault rates and repair times of LV network components, and b) a significant 
increase in complexity of calculations, leading to excessive computational 
requirements and long simulation times, if LV networks with a large number of 
components are included in the analysis. Consequently, as the analysis proceeds from 
lower voltage levels to higher voltage levels (i.e. to the analysis of larger networks), 
more and more LV network components have to be included. Particularly important 
is representation of the new and emerging network components connected at LV 
levels, such as energy storage, microgeneration and demand-side manageable loads, 
as these might have strong impact on the actual reliability performance of analysed 
networks at all voltage levels. Nevertheless, in standard reliability analysis, LV 
networks are usually represented using some “equivalent form” [39, 87, 134, 135, 
136, 137], instead of a more detailed (reliability) model. 
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The most common equivalent form representation of LV networks is by a simple 
aggregate (“lumped”) load, specifying number of supplied customers and their peak 
active and reactive power demands (and sometimes minimum, or average demands, 
or daily load profiles) downstream of the MV point of aggregation, which is typically 
a primary or secondary distribution substation or transformer. Another common 
assumption is that most of the permanent faults resulting in long interruptions (LIs) 
of supply occur in MV networks, e.g. [128, 138, 139]. However, the contributions of 
the LV networks to the overall system reliability performance in terms of frequency 
and, particularly, duration of LIs could be significant, although permanent LV faults 
(the main cause of unplanned LIs) usually do not result in the interruptions of a large 
number of customers.  
In order to address the abovementioned issues related to the correct modelling and 
representation of LV networks, and following the formulation of the four generic LV 
and MV network models from Chapter 4, this chapter discusses and illustrates how 
more detailed and more accurate “reliability equivalent models” can be derived for 
the considered LV networks, which then can be directly implemented for the analysis 
of MV (and HV) networks. This is followed by the analysis of the ongoing and 
anticipated changes in the operation of modern networks in Chapter 6, which 
discusses modelling of LV networks with distributed and micro generation (DG/MG) 
and energy storage (ES). 
5.1 Input Data for Reliability Analysis 
Correct assessment of reliability performance strongly depends on the availability 
and accuracy of the required input data, where of the highest importance are mean 
fault rates and mean repair times (or mean unavailability) of the network components 
in the analysed networks. This is acknowledged in the available literature, reports 
and statistics, as mean fault rates and mean repair times are the most common data 
used both as inputs for the reliability analysis and as outputs for presenting or 
comparing reliability performance of different networks (e.g. [25], [122], [123] and 
[46]). However, as discussed in the previous chapters and as will be shown in the 
Reliability Assessment of Distribution Networks Incorporating Regulator 
Requirements, Generic Network Equivalents and Smart Grid Functionalities 
 
Reliability Equivalents of Generic LV Distribution Networks 119 
further text, some additional input data are required for the analysis of unplanned 
supply interruptions.  
The first additional data are percentage contributions of temporary (i.e. transient or 
momentary) faults and permanent (i.e. sustained) faults to the total (annual) number 
of faults, as this usually allows to make distinction between short and long supply 
interruptions (i.e. supply interruptions shorter or longer than 3 minutes). The second 
additional input data are percentage contributions of different types of the faults (i.e. 
single-, double- or three-phase faults) to the total (annual) number of faults, as this 
usually defines the requirements for modelling analysed networks in terms of single-
line or three-line diagrams, due to the use of single-pole or three-pole protection 
(fuses vs. circuit breakers), as discussed in Chapter 4. Finally, this thesis introduces 
type of the network, or type of the load (sub)sector, as the additional data required 
for the analysis. All that is discussed in the further text. 
5.1.1 Mean Fault Rates and Mean Repair Times 
As mentioned, the most-common input data for reliability analysis are mean fault 
rates and mean repair times of network components. Most of the available statistics, 
however, give these data only for components operating at specific voltage levels and 
provide no further information as to how the corresponding values change in 
different networks. Without that information, it is not possible to assess the 
variations in reliability performance of LV and MV networks supplying customers in 
highly-urban, urban, sub-urban and rural areas and, subsequently, to formulate their 
equivalent models for the analysis of sub-transmission and transmission networks. 
Tables 5.1 and 5.2 present the statistics on the mean fault rates and mean repair times 
obtained from the three main sources: Energy Network Association (ENA) report 
[124], Scottish Power Distribution (SPD) [105, 125, 126], and other sources [8, 122, 
123, [127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132]. ENA statistics were obtained as part of the UK 
National Fault and Interruption Reporting Scheme (NaFIRS), to which all DNOs in 
the UK send their annual reliability statistics, while SPD is one of the two DNOs in 
Scotland, for which detailed statistics on fault rates and repair times were available 
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for one calendar year. The “other sources” represent data that are found after an 
extensive survey of available literature, reports, and statistics from other countries. 
The last column (“selected value”) in Tables 5.1 and 5.2 lists the values assumed in 
this thesis as the most representative for the analysis of the UK/Scottish generic 
networks, which are mostly based on the statistics from the UK-based reports [124] 
and [105], [125], [126]. Footnotes for both tables explain that in some cases data 
from other sources are used as the more realistic values and that for components with 
no information in [124] or [105], [125], [126], average value from the other sources 
is assumed. In a few cases when only one value was available, this value is used. 
The following example illustrates the selection of the final value outside of the ENA 
report: the ‘urgent’ repair time, corresponding to faults resulting in customer supply 
interruptions, of 33/11kV transformer based on the ENA report is 205.5 hours 
(equivalent to 8.6 days), while ‘non-urgent’ repair time, referring to repair time of 
the faulted network component that does not result in customer supply interruption 
(e.g. due to redundancy of the components), is 545.6 hours (equivalent to 22.7 days),. 
The urgent repair time of 33/11kV transformer reported in SPD and other references 
is much lower, around 100 hours, so the value from SPD statistics is selected for the 
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Table 5.1:  Mean fault rates for LV and MV network components 
Component kV 
Fault rate (fault/year) Final  








0.015[8], 0.01[122], 0.01[128], 0.0096[129], 





33 - 0.001[8] 0.001 
11 - 0.005[130], 0.001[8] (0.001-0.003-0.005) 0.003 
0.4 - 0.005[130] 0.005 
Overhead 
Line (per km) 
33 0.034 0.046[8], 0.0075[131] (0.0075-0.0268-0.046) 0.034 
11 0.091 
0.065[8], 0.123[122], 0.05[128], 0.0189[131], 










Cable (per km) 
33 0.034 0.044[127], 0.00336[131] (0.0034-0.0237-0.044) 0.017
2 
11 0.051 
0.046[127], 0.005[130], 0.04[8], 0.019[122], 
0.02[128], 0.00617[131], 0.0236[129], 











33 0.0041 0.002[8] 0.0041 
11 0.035 




0.4 - 0.005[130], 0.02[128], 0.00201[132] (0.0020-0.0090-0.02) 0.0071
6 
Fuse 







Sectionaliser 11 0.034 0.0025[123], 0.002[129] (0.002-0.00225-0.0025) 0.0071
9 
Where S=Sweden, D=Denmark, F=Finland and brackets give (minimum-average-maximum) values found in other sources. 
                                                 
1 Most of the values from the other sources were around 0.01. 
2 Based on [131], fault rates for 33 kV cables are 1/2 of 33 kV overhead lines values. 
3 Based on [8], [123], fault rates for 11 kV cables are 2/3 of 11 kV overhead lines. 
4 Based on [122], fault rates for 11kV cables are around twice higher than for 0.4kV cables (SPD 
value). 
5 Average value from other sources is around 0.007. 
6 Based on [130], fault rates were same for 11kV and 0.4kV circuit breakers. 
7 ENA values were too low compared to the other sources. 
8 Based on [122], fault rate for 0.4kV was 1/3 of 11kV fuse. 
9 Based on [124], fault rates for circuit breakers and sectionalisers are similar, so these are changed, 
too. 
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Table 5.2:  Mean repair times for LV and MV network components (U-urgent repair 
time, for faults resulting in supply interruptions; NU-non-urgent repair time, for 
faults not resulting in supply interruptions) 
Component kV 
Mean Time To Repair (hours/fault) Final 
selection ENA [124] Other sources [8], [122], [123], [127]–
[132]/  
SPD [105], [125], [126] U NU U NU 
Transformer 
33/11 205.5 545.6 120[8] 100.12(SPD) 100.12
10 545.6 
11/0.4 75 515.6 





33 - - 8[8] 8 
11 - - 120[130], 8[8] (8.00-64.00-120.00) 8 
0.4 - - 24[130] 412 
Overhead 
Line 
33 18.8 95.2 8[130], 8[131] 18.8 95.2 
11 7.1 191.3 5[130], 25[122], 6[128], 4.6[131] (4.60-10.15-25.00) 7.1 191.3 
0.4 5.7 80.2[122], 6.44(SPD) 5.7 
Underground 
Cable 
33 201.6 338.4 16[131] 37.613 338.4 
11 56.2 256.9 











33 140 158.1 96[8] 96 158.1 
11 120.9 801.4 48[130], 72[8] (48.00-60.00-72.00) 72 801.4 
0.4 - - 36[130], 4[128], 11.22[132] (4.00-17.07-36.00) 36
15 
Fuse 
11 35.3 385.4 4.2[122] 4.216 385.4 





Sectionaliser 11 36.2 559.5 - 36.2 559.5 
Where brackets give (minimum-average-maximum) values found in other sources. 
 
                                                 
10 SPD value is close to the only available value from other sources. 
11 SPD value had been the only value close to the two values from the other sources. 
12 In [130], 0.4kV busbar repair times was 1/5 of 11kV busbar repair times; it is impossible to replace 
within 1.6 hours, at least 4 hours is reasonable. 
13 Double the value of repair times, when compared for 33kV O/H lines and 33kV U/G cables, [131]. 
14 Based on [122], 11kV cable repair times were around three times lower than 11kV lines repair 
times. 
15 33kV CB took 4 days, while 11kV CB took 2-3 days to repair. Therefore, it is reasonable that 0.4kV 
CB repair time is around 36 hours (maximum value from other sources). 
16 Value of 35.3 hours is much longer repair time than the value suggested in the UK Guaranteed 
Standard of Performance  value; 3-4 hours is selected [108]. 
17 Close to the mean value from all other sources. 
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Mean fault rates and mean repair times of components in Tables 5.1 and 5.2 are 
given for specific voltage levels, with no distinction between networks in different 
areas, e.g. LV or MV networks supplying urban and rural residential customers. In 
existing literature, some European DNOs provide SAIFI and SAIDI statistics for 
urban (U), sub-urban (SU) and rural (R) areas, while one Australian DNO also 
provides data for highly-urban (HU) areas. This is illustrated in Table 5.3, which 
shows that the network reliability performance in terms of both SAIFI and CAIDI 
indices in almost all cases improves from rural, through sub-urban and urban, to 
highly-urban areas. The values from Table 5.3 are used to calculate coefficients for 
estimating how mean fault rates and repair times change in different types of the 
networks, (5.1)-(5.4), with Table 5.4 showing disaggregated values for four UK 
generic residential sub-sectors. 
𝐴1𝑖 =
𝑆𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑠𝑒𝑖
𝑆𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑠𝑒 𝑑𝑓 𝐻𝐻,   𝐻,   𝑆𝐻 𝑚𝑑𝑑 𝑀
            (5.1) 
𝐴2𝑖 =
𝑆𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑠𝑒𝑖
𝑆𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑠𝑒 𝑑𝑓 𝐻𝐻 𝑚𝑑𝑑 𝐻
              (5.2) 
𝐴3𝑖 =
𝑆𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑠𝑒𝑖
𝑆𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑠𝑒 𝑑𝑓 𝑆𝐻 𝑚𝑑𝑑 𝑀
              (5.3) 
𝐴4𝑖 =
𝑆𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑠𝑒𝑖
𝑆𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑠𝑒 𝑑𝑓 𝐻𝐻,𝐻 𝑚𝑑𝑑 𝑆𝐻
              (5.4) 
where: i denotes HU, U, SU or R load sectors. A1 denotes network components 
found in all four generic sub-sectors (e.g. transformers), A2 denotes network 
components found only in HU and U sub-sectors (e.g. 33kV and 11kV cables), A3 
denotes components found only in SU and R sub-sectors (e.g. 11kV fuses), while A4 
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Table 5.3:  Fault rate and repair time coefficients for the disaggregation in four 
generic residential load subsectors 












Norway[15] 0.9 1.50 2.70 
- 
Finland[46] 0.27 0.89 4.20 
Australia[16], [133] 0.07 1.45 2.40 4.47 
France[14]  0.73 0.91 1.37 
Italy[14] 1.48 2.27 3.23 
Portugal[14] 1.61 2.47 4.33 
Romania[14] 4.20 9.75 
Slovenia[14] 0.64 1.37 1.97 
Spain[14] 1.56 2.34 3.42 
Average of recorded 
statistics 1.27 1.43 2.66 3.94 2.32 1.35 3.30 1.78 
Mean fault rates 
coefficient 
A1 0.55 0.61 1.14 1.70 
- A2 0.94 1.06 - - A3 0.71 0.80 1.49 - 
A4 - - 0.81 1.19 
CAIDI 
Norway[15] 1.20 2.80 5.10 
- 
Finland[46] 0.62 0.93 0.85 
Australia[16], [133] 3.00 1.61 1.47 2.37 
France[14] 0.80 0.84 1.21 
Italy[14] 0.55 0.59 0.61 
Portugal[14] 0.88 0.89 1.00 
Romania[14] 1.26 1.76 
Slovenia[14] 0.82 0.69 0.67 
Spain[14] 0.68 0.77 0.95 
Average of recorded 
statistics 1.09 0.94 1.19 1.61 1.21 1.01 1.40 1.07 
Mean times to 
repair coefficient 
A1 0.90 0.77 0.99 1.34 
- A2 1.08 0.92 - - A3 1.02 0.87 1.11 - 
A4 - - 0.85 1.15 
The reported SAIFI and CAIDI values in Table 5.3 are based on related number of 
customers, frequency and duration of interruptions. In other word, for example, HU 
SAIFI and CAIDI values are based on the frequency and duration of interruptions 
experienced by the total number of customers within the coverage area of the HU 
subsector, not total number of customer from all sectors (HU, U, SU and R). The first 
step of calculation of coefficients is averaging all recorded values by its subsectors. 
For example, in SAIFI of R sector, by averaging all values of R sector, the result is 
3.94. The second step is selecting the type of component available in each subsector. 
For example, circuit breakers are available in all four HU, SU, U and R sectors, 
while overhead lines are is available only in SU and R sectors. For all sectors (HU, 
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U, SU and R) column, the average of all values in ‘average of recorded statistics’ 
(1.27, 1.43, 2.66 and 3.94), is 2.32. The final step is calculation of the mean 
coefficient by dividing average value of recorded statistics of each subsector with 
2.32. For example in A1 (HU), 1.27 divided by 2.32, give the result 0.55. 
Table 5.4:  Final fault rates and repair times for four generic UK load sub-sectors. 
Component kV Fault rates (fault/year) Repair times (hours/fault) HU U SU R HU U SU R 
Transformer 33/11 0.0055 0.0061 0.0114 0.0170 94.12 93.12 99.12 102.12 11/0.4 0.0055 0.0061 0.0114 0.0170 14.62 13.62 19.62 22.62 
Bus bar 
33 0.0006 0.0006 0.0011 0.0017 7.16 6.16 12.16 15.16 
11 0.0017 0.0018 0.0034 0.0051 7.16 6.16 12.16 15.16 
0.4 0.0028 0.0031 0.0057 0.0085 4.08 3.08 9.08 12.08 
Overhead 
Lines per km 
33   0.0275 0.0405   17.98 21.62 
11   0.0737 0.1083   6.04 8.17 




33 0.0160 0.0180   35.59 34.59   
11 0.0479 0.0541   12.96 11.96   
0.4 0.0839 0.0946 0.1761  7.04 6.00 7.66  
Circuit 
Breaker 
33 0.0023 0.0025 0.0047 0.0070 90.04 89.04 95.04 97.04 
11 0.0039 0.0043 0.0081 0.0121 66.28 65.28 71.28 74.28 
0.4 0.0039 0.0043 0.0081 0.0121 30.64 29.64 35.64 38.64 
Fuse 11   0.0057 0.0083   3.00* 3.00* 0.4 0.0015 0.0016 0.0031 0.0046 3.00* 2.34 3.00* 3.00* 
Sectionalizer 11   0.0057 0.0083   30.77 41.63 
Where * is repair time limit by 3 hours (GSP requirement). 
From Table 5.3, the available statistics only give SAIFI values, which correspond to 
long interruptions, while there was no information on MAIFI (short interruptions). 
The two most likely reason are that there is still no obligation to report statistics on 
short interruptions, or simply that MAIFI data are not publicly reported. 
Accordingly, it is assumed in this thesis that the coefficient for calculating MAIFI is 
the same as the SAIFI coefficient and all statistics are averaged into the related single 
values and changed into coefficient values in order to adequately modify the final 
selection from Tables 5.1 and 5.2. Although the MAIFI coefficient is assumed the 
same as the SAIFI coefficient, the final result is different due to incorporating LI/SI 
ratio (Table 5.5) in the simulation/calculation process. This is illustrated in Table 5.4, 
which shows the final mean fault rates and mean repair times allocated to the four 
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generic subsectors. Again, some of the values are adjusted based on the requirement 
of the UK Regulator, representing, for example, the additional access times due to 
traffic conditions in dense downtown city areas, or the longer travelling distances to 
rural areas, where average access and repair time are also longer due to weather 
conditions (e.g. strong wind, rain and snow). 
5.1.2 Types of Faults 
The reliability performance of power supply systems is quantified through a series of 
indices corresponding to long interruptions (LIs) and short interruptions (SIs) of 
supply, where unplanned LIs occur mainly due to permanent faults, while SIs occur 
both due to transient faults and due to permanent faults, for which application of fault 
response and fault isolation schemes successfully prevented LIs by, e.g. network 
reconfiguration, or switching to alternative supply points.  
It is a commonly known fact that overhead rural network have significantly higher 
number of SIs than number of LIs, while the opposite is true for underground urban 
networks. However, it is generally not possible from available statistics and reports 
on actual DNOs’ performance to make a clear distinction between the numbers of 
LIs and SIs in different types of the networks. For example, using available OFGEM 
statistics for 14 UK DNOs [6, 14], it is possible to identify that 46% of all supply 
interruption events in all distribution networks and at all reported voltage levels were 
LIs (caused by permanent faults), while 54% were SIs (caused by 
transient/temporary faults).  
Although this allows to have a general idea about the overall percentage 
contributions of both types of supply interruptions, further segregation into different 
areas/types of networks (e.g. urban vs. rural network) is not possible. After another 
extensive review of available literature, it was found that only three DNOs (from 
Finland, France and Italy) reported statistics for LIs and SIs in urban (U), sub-urban 
(SU) and rural (R) networks, Table 5.5.After careful examination of these DNO data, 
statistics from Finland were not taken in to account for calculating average values 
(the last column in Table 5.5), due to much higher reported values than in the reports 
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of two other DNOs. As none of the DNOs statistics lists values for LIS and SIs in 
their highly-urban (HU) networks, the highest reported urban (U) value for LIs was 
assumed for HU networks (which also determined percentage contribution of SIs). 
Table 5.5: Available DNOs’ statistics on long and short supply interruptions in 
different types of networks, [15, 18]. 
LI/SI 





























After obtaining the final fault rates and repair times of four generic UK load sub-
sectors for every component (Table 5.4), these values are incorporated with the LI/SI 
ratio based on the related subsector. For example, in Table 5.4, in column fault rates 
for R sector, the value for overhead lines per km for 0.4 kV is 0.1999 fault/year. By 
applying LI/SI ratio of 24% is LI and 76% is SI, the final fault rates of overhead lines per 
km for 0.4 kV are 0.0480 LI per year and 0.1519 SI per year. 
5.2 Generic LV and MV Equivalent Network Models 
Typically, the LV network is represented using limited information, specifying 
number of customers, maximum active and reactive power demands. This results in 
high uncertainties and errors in estimated reliability performance, as the input data 
(fault rates and repair times) are not properly disaggregated based on the actual 
network components and parameters. Therefore, formulating accurate equivalent 
networks will result in a more confident assessment of reliability performance. 
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5.2.1 Significance of including LV Equivalents in the Analysis 
This sub-section illustrates the importance of including correct models and 
equivalent representations of LV networks in the reliability analysis of MV and HV 
networks. As an example, a one-year statistics for one DNO in the UK (Scottish 
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Figure 5.1:  Number of permanent faulted components and SAIFI index [126]. 
It can be seen from Fig. 5.1 that most of the permanent faults of network components 
resulting in LIs of customers occurred in LV networks (significantly higher number 
than in 11kV and, particularly, 33kV MV networks). The SPD provides energy to 
almost two million customers in Scotland, of which the vast majority are connected 
to LV networks (e.g. residential and small commercial customers). This clearly 
illustrates the importance of taking into account configurations, network components 
and protection systems in LV networks, although the contribution of faults/LIs in LV 
networks to the total SAIFI values is lower than the contribution of faults/LIs in MV 
networks (because a fault in MV networks results in higher number of disconnected 
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customers than a fault in LV networks). Accordingly, the impact of faults/LIs in LV 
networks on the total SAIDI values is higher, as the number of actually interrupted 
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Figure 5.2:  Total duration of permanent faulted components and SAIDI index 
[126]. 
5.2.2 Formulation of LV Network Equivalents 
The formulation of accurate reliability equivalent models of the four generic LV 
networks from Chapter 4 (corresponding to the four load subsectors, HU, U, SU, and 
R) requires detailed modelling of network configurations, parameters, characteristics 
(e.g. protection systems) and fault conditions (e.g. types of faults). This is illustrated 
in this and further sub-sections, where the main motivation is to allow for a more 
comprehensive QoS/reliability analysis and, consequently, for a higher confidence in 
the obtained results of the reliability assessment.  
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The presented methodology for the formulation of reliability network equivalents 
reduces analysed LV network (typically operating in radial configuration) to a single 
“equivalent network” component. This allows to achieve short computational times 
(as only one component is used to represent the whole LV network), but requires 
accurate calculation of the equivalent mean fault rates and mean repair times of that 
single-equivalent component. Basically, the methodology is applying a bottom-up (or 
reverse) approach, beginning at the individual customer level (i.e. customer supply 
points, CSPs), then going through secondary (LV) distribution substations, all the 
way up to the primary (MV) distribution substations, where aggregate/equivalent 
demands and lumped/equivalent representations of the modelled networks are 
typically connected. 
The main challenges in modelling MV and, particularly, LV distribution networks 
are large numbers of various network components, complex and dispersed network 
structures and variations in applied protection systems, which all lead to the 
difficulties in devising fast and accurate methodologies for evaluation of network 
reliability performance. A number of techniques have been developed to simplify the 
calculation and reduce the complexity of the modelled networks, i.e. to reduce the 
computational times. The most common techniques that had been previously applied 
to quantify reliability network performance were: approximate method, network 
reduction method and failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) method [140, 141, 
142, 143].  
The approximate method requires to select the priority of the network components 
that needs to be modelled/equivalented, which generally depends on the 
configuration of the network and on the location of the component in the network. 
For each group of the components, i.e. a sub-equivalent network, a set of equations 
needs to be established, based on the size of the sub-equivalent network. 
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Figure 5.4:  Example for illustrating network reduction technique. 
The network reduction technique reduces the network sequentially, or in steps, by 
using the appropriate equations for both series- and parallel-connected combinations 
of components, typically until the original network is reduced to a single equivalent 
component. However, for certain network configurations, this cannot be done simply 
by combining the components into series- or parallel-connections. Based on Fig. 5.3, 
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it is difficult to combine network components in a “triangle-configuration” into 
series/parallel connections. Furthermore (and this applies to both methods), 
sequential substitution and combining of a number of components into the single 
equivalent component might cause that certain attributes and characteristics of the 
original components are lost (or “absorbed”) and, therefore, their effects on 
reliability performance would become more difficult to be identified as the amount 
of the network reduction is increasing. The example in Fig. 5.4 shows that after 
applying the network reduction technique (bottom network), it is difficult to estimate 
the number of actually disconnected customers if a fault occurs on S2, or on L2. 
On the other hand, the FMEA method eliminates the need for the transformations of 
parallel or series connections and directly indicates the predominant failure modes of 
the system, which then allows for the direct identification of the types of the 
components that cause specific faults/interruptions. Furthermore, in the FMEA 
method, the characteristics of each component are still preserved, which makes this 
method flexible and suitable, or at least possible to use, for the analysis of the control 
of the network operation. As the FMEA method has been successfully used in a 
number of previous studies to calculate the reliability indices [25, 140, 144, 145], this 
thesis also uses the FMEA method for the analysis and establishing the equivalent 
fault rates and repair times for the modelled/equivalented LV network. 
An example of a simple distribution network is shown in Fig 5.5, in order to illustrate 
abovementioned points. The network in Fig. 5.5 is supplied from a three-phase 
upstream network (protected with circuit breaker or fuse S) and has three parallel 
single-phase LV main feeders, with four main sections, each with four lateral 
spurs/branches supplying a single load point (LP). The symbols SkA and SkB 
represent the two protection devices (circuit breaker or fuse) installed on each main 
feeder (k is phase: R-red, Y-yellow or B-Blue), Mki represent the corresponding 
sections on the main feeder, i=1, 2, 3, 4, Ski represents protection devices on the 
lateral spurs (fuse) (i=1, 2, 3, 4 spurs), while LPki represents the load points (i=1, 2, 
3, 4 load points).  
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Figure 5.5:  Example of simple distribution network 
The equations for the calculations of equivalent fault rates, as well as unavailability 
and repair times for each load point and for the whole network are presented below. 
Equivalent fault rates at each single-phase load point k can be calculated separately 
for i=1,2 and i=3,4 (due to the second protection device on the main feeder, SkB): 
𝜆𝐿𝑃𝐿1,2 = ∑ (𝑍𝜆𝑆 + 𝜆𝑆𝐿𝑆 + 𝜆𝑀𝐿1 + 𝜆𝑀𝐿2 + 𝜆𝑆𝐿𝑖 + 𝜆𝐿𝐿𝑖)2𝑖=1             (5.5) 
𝜆𝐿𝑃𝐿3,4 = ∑
(𝑍𝜆𝑆 + 𝜆𝑆𝐿𝑆 + 𝜆𝑀𝐿1 + 𝜆𝑀𝐿2+𝜆𝑆𝐿𝑀
+𝜆𝑀𝐿3 + 𝜆𝑀𝐿4 + 𝜆𝑆𝐿𝑖 + 𝜆𝐿𝐿𝑖)
4
𝑖=3              (5.6) 
where λS, λSkA, λSkB and λSki are fault rates of fuses, λMk1, λMk2, λMk3, λMk4 and λLk1 are 
fault rates of feeders. 
The total equivalent fault rate (for the whole LV network) is then: 
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                (5.7) 
where N is the number of customer load points. 
Similarly, equivalent unavailabilities are calculated as: 
𝑈𝐿𝑃𝐿1,2 = ∑
(𝑍𝜆𝑆𝑟𝑆 + 𝜆𝑆𝐿𝑆𝑟𝑆𝐿𝑆 + 𝜆𝑀𝐿1𝑟𝑀𝐿1
+𝜆𝑀𝐿2𝑟𝑀𝐿2 + 𝜆𝑆𝐿𝑖𝑟𝑆𝐿𝑖 + 𝜆𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑟𝐿𝐿𝑖)
2
𝑖=1              (5.8) 
𝑈𝐿𝑃𝐿3,4 = ∑
(𝑍𝜆𝑆𝑟𝑆 + 𝜆𝑆𝐿𝑆𝑟𝑆𝐿𝑆 + 𝜆𝑀𝐿1𝑟𝑀𝐿1 + 𝜆𝑀𝐿2𝑟𝑀𝐿2+𝜆𝑆𝐿𝑀𝑟𝑆𝐿𝑀
+𝜆𝑀𝐿3𝑟𝑀𝐿3 + 𝜆𝑀𝐿4𝑟𝑀𝐿4 + 𝜆𝑆𝐿𝑖𝑟𝑆𝐿𝑖 + 𝜆𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑟𝐿𝐿𝑖)
4
𝑖=3     (5.9) 
where rS, rSkA, rSkB and rSki are repair times of fuses, rMk1, rMk2, rMk3, rMk4 and rLk1 are 
repair times of feeders. 
The total equivalent unavailability (for the whole LV network) is: 




              (5.10) 
If fuse-saving protection is applied, the protection devices SkA and SkB are circuit 
breakers and the equations are different from the previous ones. 
Equivalent fault rates at each single-phase load point k: 
𝜆𝐿𝑃𝐿1,2 = 𝑍𝜆𝑆 + 𝜆𝑆𝐿𝑆 + 𝜆𝑀𝐿1 + 𝜆𝑀𝐿2 + ∑ (𝜆𝑆𝐿𝑖 + 𝜆𝐿𝐿𝑖)2𝑖=1            (5.11) 
𝜆𝐿𝑃𝐿3,4 = 𝑍𝜆𝑆 + 𝜆𝑆𝐿𝑆 + 𝜆𝑀𝐿1 + 𝜆𝑀𝐿2+𝜆𝑆𝐿𝑀 + 𝜆𝑀𝐿3 + 𝜆𝑀𝐿4 + ∑ (𝜆𝑆𝐿𝑖 +4𝑖=3
𝜆𝐿𝐿𝑖)                          (5.12) 
The total equivalent fault rate: 




              (5.13) 
Equivalent unavailabilities: 
𝑈𝐿𝑃𝐿1,2 = 𝑍𝜆𝑆𝑟𝑆 + 𝜆𝑆𝐿𝑆𝑟𝑆𝐿𝑆 + 𝜆𝑀𝐿1𝑟𝑀𝐿1 + 𝜆𝑀𝐿2𝑟𝑀𝐿2 + ∑ (𝜆𝑆𝐿𝑖𝑟𝑆𝐿𝑖 +2𝑖=1
𝜆𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑟𝐿𝐿𝑖)                (5.14) 
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𝑈𝐿𝑃𝐿3,4 = 𝑍𝜆𝑆𝑟𝑆 + 𝜆𝑆𝐿𝑆𝑟𝑆𝐿𝑆 + 𝜆𝑀𝐿1𝑟𝑀𝐿1 + 𝜆𝑀𝐿2𝑟𝑀𝐿2+𝜆𝑆𝐿𝑀𝑟𝑆𝐿𝑀 +
𝜆𝑀𝐿3𝑟𝑀𝐿3 + 𝜆𝑀𝐿4𝑟𝑀𝐿4 + ∑ (𝜆𝑆𝐿𝑖𝑟𝑆𝐿𝑖 + 𝜆𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑟𝐿𝐿𝑖)4𝑖=3            (5.15) 
The total equivalent unavailability: 




              (5.16) 
This gives the total equivalent repair time: 
𝑟 = 𝐻
𝜆
                  (5.17) 
Again, in above equations k is red, yellow or blue phase and N is the number of 
customer load points. If there is an always available unconstrained alternative supply 
point, ZλS is equal to 0.  
It should be noted that the above equations are different from those in [5], in which 
the equivalent fault rate for the whole LV network is a simple sum of fault rates of all 
components, while the equivalent repair time for the whole LV network is the 
average value of repair times of all components, as given in (5.18) and (5.19). 




∑ 𝑟𝑖𝑁𝑖=1            (5.19) 
Generally, equations (5.18) and (5.19) can be applied when there are no protection 
devices within the modelled network, which is not the case in the real networks [88], 
[89], as LV networks are always protected by either fuses or circuit breakers. 
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5.2.3 Formulation and Analysis of Reliability Equivalents of 
Generic Residential LV Networks 
DNOs are required to report annually on both their target and achieved reliability 
performance to the Regulator (OFGEM in the UK) and to the general public. In order 
to satisfy the imposed targets and to plan their investments in network reliability, 
DNOs use various network modelling approaches, which however may not be 
completely adequate. For example, and as discussed previously, there will be much 
higher levels of uncertainties and, therefore, bigger errors in the estimated or 
calculated reliability indices if the input data (fault rates and repair times) are not 
properly disaggregated based on the actual types of the components, specific area 
supplied by different networks, etc. This has been confirmed in the numerous 
reliability performance studies [128, 138, 139], where LV and MV networks (i.e. 33 
kV, 11 kV, and 0.4 kV networks in the UK) have been simply represented by the 
aggregate/bulk load, in which the characteristics, parameters and data required for a 
more detailed reliability assessment were neglected in the analysis.  
This thesis aims to contribute to resolving the above issues by formulating more 
accurate equivalent reliability models of the four previously developed generic 
LV/MV networks, ultimately resulting in a more confident reliability performance 
assessment. This is presented in the further text, where specific numbers of 
customers for the load points from the four generic network models from Chapter 4 
are now given for calculating reliability equivalents of the corresponding networks of 
different sizes (supplying estimated different numbers of customers). 
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Figure 5.6:  Generic residential LV highly-urban (HU) distribution network [77, 
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Scenario B  
Figure 5.7:  Generic residential LV urban (U) distribution network [39, 77, 102, 103, 
104]. 
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Scenario B  
Figure 5.8:  Generic residential LV sub-urban (SU) distribution network [77, 97, 
101, 103, 104, 106]. 
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Table 5.6:  Estimated number of supplied customers (based on transformer rating). 








































Size of customers 
LP1 21 15 12 8 5 3 6 3 3 1 1 0 
LP2 21 15 12 8 5 3 11 6 3 1 1 0 
LP3 16 10 9 6 3 3 13 7 2 1 1 0 
LP4 20 14 11 4 3 3 4 3 0 1 1 0 
LP5 33 21 18 30 18 12 5 3 3 1 1 0 
LP6 33 21 18 15 9 6 16 10 3 1 1 0 
LP7 20 14 9 11 6 3 10 6 4 1 1 0 
LP8 20 14 9 12 6 3 3 3 1 1 1 0 
LP9 24 15 9 9 6 3 8 5 0 1 1 0 
LP10 14 9 6 8 5 3 - - - 1 0 0 
LP11 10 7 6 6 3 3 - - - 1 0 0 
LP12 22 15 9 12 6 4 - - - 1 0 0 
LP13 16 10 9 9 6 3 - - - 1 0 0 
LP14 8 5 5 6 3 3 - - - 1 0 0 
LP15 8 5 5 6 3 3 - - - 1 0 0 
LP16 22 12 6 9 6 3 - - - 1 0 1 
LP17 14 9 6 7 5 3 - - - 1 0 1 
LP18 31 21 16 12 6 6 - - - 1 0 1 
LP19 27 18 15 12 6 6 - - - 1 0 1 
Total 380 250 190 190 110 76 76 46 19 19 9 4 
 
5.2.4 Calculated Results for Reliability Equivalents of Generic 
Residential LV Networks 
In order to verify the calculated results, both analytical calculations and probabilistic 
simulations were used to quantify the reliability performance of the modelled generic 
LV networks. As discussed before, analytical approaches calculate the same set of 
output results (mean values) for the same set of input data, parameters and models, 
while probabilistic simulations offer a comprehensive evaluation of the reliability 
performance, as the output results are expressed as the probability distributions 
(showing ranges of variations), rather than one set of output data (e.g. mean values). 
As previously discussed, exponential distribution is applied to the initial conditions 
of the component fault rates and mean repair times, although Weibull, normal or 
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Poisson could be adopted as well. Accordingly, the exponential distribution function 
has been applied for the final selection of the fault rates and repair times for 
calculating results presented in this chapter, based on [48, 49, 50]. 
In the presented analysis, two different scenarios are modelled for each network, as 
indicated in Figs 5.6-5.9. In Scenario A, the reliability equivalent was calculated for 
the LV network within the rectangle indicated with red dashed line (without 
secondary distribution substation), while in Scenario B the reliability equivalent was 
calculated for the LV network within the rectangle indicated with blue dashed line 
(with secondary distribution substation). Even though in most of the studies (e.g. 
[142, 143, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151]) the analysis has been performed for the 
reliability equivalent as presented in Scenario B, this does not exclude studies in 
which the equivalent model is applied only for the load/demand connected at the 
secondary distribution substation. 
Fig. 5.6 shows that the HU LV network is supported from an adjacent 11/04kV 
secondary substation, through a cable connection between the two identical LV 
substations [105], where each substation was equipped with a single busbar only. 
Based on Table 5.6, the sub-sectors were segregated into different transformer sizes, 
and it was possible that different sub-sectors overlap, as each of them has three 
different possible transformer sizes. As a result, every feeder size for each sub-sector 
from Table 4.4 in Chapter 4 is matched with the corresponding transformer size (for 
each sub-sector) from Table 4.5 (also in Chapter 4). As the network configurations 
and transformer sizes depend on the number of supplied customers, changing the 
transformer size corresponds to different numbers of supplied customers for every 
sub-sector, which is further disaggregated for each load point (LP) in Table 5.6, 
showing the number of supplied customers for different generic networks with 
various sizes of transformers. 
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5.2.5 Mean Values 
Tables 5.7 and 5.8 compare results calculated by both analytical and probabilistic 
approaches (mean values only). 








𝜆𝑒𝑒_𝑗 𝜇𝑒𝑒_𝑗 LI SI LI SI 
HU 
1500 0.0194 0.0210 9.4023 0.0192 0.0206 9.3585 
1000 0.0161 0.0174 9.8371 0.0159 0.0171 9.7555 
800 0.0146 0.0158 10.1107 0.0145 0.0155 10.0188 
U 
800 0.0175 0.0223 8.3464 0.0177 0.0223 8.3382 
500 0.0155 0.0197 8.7478 0.0156 0.0197 8.7387 
315 0.0141 0.0179 8.8240 0.0142 0.0180 8.8159 
SU 
315 0.0224 0.0499 9.4684 0.0221 0.0495 9.5321 
200 0.0197 0.0438 9.7067 0.0194 0.0436 9.7744 
100 0.0145 0.0323 11.0323 0.0144 0.0322 11.1503 
R 
100 0.0208 0.0657 11.8988 0.0208 0.0651 11.6976 
50 0.0192 0.0608 12.2280 0.0192 0.0605 12.0387 
25 0.0237 0.0750 11.4001 0.0234 0.0736 11.2416 
 








𝜆𝑒𝑒_𝑗 𝜇𝑒𝑒_𝑗 LI SI LI SI 
HU 
1500 0.0207 0.0224 9.0569 0.0208 0.0222 9.0676 
1000 0.0174 0.0189 9.3932 0.0175 0.0187 9.3936 
800 0.0159 0.0173 9.6022 0.0160 0.0171 9.6008 
U 
800 0.0254 0.0323 14.4538 0.0254 0.0323 14.7206 
500 0.0233 0.0297 15.2650 0.0233 0.0297 15.5551 
315 0.0219 0.0279 15.7208 0.0219 0.0280 16.0288 
SU 
315 0.0312 0.0694 15.3769 0.0311 0.0694 15.3245 
200 0.0284 0.0633 16.1080 0.0284 0.0634 16.0507 
100 0.0233 0.0462 18.3536 0.0234 0.0518 18.1948 
R 
100 0.0309 0.0978 18.8734 0.0314 0.0986 18.6304 
50 0.0293 0.0929 19.4602 0.0298 0.0939 19.3086 
25 0.0338 0.01071 17.9224 0.0349 0.1086 17.6007 
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Table 5.9 Analytical results based on conventional equivalent equation (5.18 & 5.19) 
for Scenario A. 
Sub-sector Transformer size (kVA) 
Analytical 
𝜆𝑒𝑒_𝑗 𝜇𝑒𝑒_𝑗 LI SI 
HU 
1500 0.9952 1.0782 7.4779 
1000 0.7740 0.8384 7.6602 
800 0.6719 0.7278 7.7898 
U 
800 0.6529 0.8310 7.2273 
500 0.5281 0.6721 7.3235 
315 0.4751 0.6046 7.3840 
SU 
315 0.2313 0.5148 5.9467 
200 0.1984 0.4416 5.7410 
100 0.1595 0.3549 5.8539 
R 
100 0.1313 0.4158 4.8768 
50 0.0606 0.1919 4.8692 
25 0.0270 0.0856 4.9059 
The calculations of results in Table 5.9 is based on (5.18) and (5.19), showing that as 
the number of supplied customers increase (from R, to SU and U, to HU networks), 
the number of interruptions and durations of these interruptions increase. This 
follows (5.18), reflecting increase of network components for increased number of 
supplied customers, therefor resulting in increasing fault rates and mean repair times. 
By comparing Tables 5.7 and 5.9, the number of interruptions in Table 5.7 is lower, 
showing that the network performance for reliability equivalents is more accurately 
assessed if a simple sum of all components’ fault rates is not used. 
It can be seen from the results in Tables 5.7 and 5.8 that the equivalent fault rates for 
each sub-sector have the general tendency to decrease when the number of served 
customers (i.e. the size of the supplying network/transformer) is reduced, while the 
trend for the equivalent repair times is the opposite. The only exception is the 25kVA 
transformer in generic rural LV networks, which is the only single-phase 
transformer. For example, the higher equivalent fault rates in this case are due to the 
connection of only four customers to the one single-phase feeder (Table 5.6), while 
nine customers are supplied by a three-phase 50 kVA transformer (through which 
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each single-phase feeder is supplying three customers), resulting in a lower 
probability of a fault for the latter case. 
The trends in Tables 5.7 and 5.8 are due to the decreasing numbers of network 
components as the size of the network is reduced to supply the lower number of 
customers. Consequently, as the number of network components decreases, the 
contributions of fault rates of individual components to the total/equivalent fault rate 
of the whole network is smaller, while an increase of the equivalent repair times is 
strongly impacted by the predominant contributions from L and M types of service 
connection feeders (from Table 4.4 and Figs. 4.4-4.8 in Chapter 4). 
Practically all calculated results for the different types of the networks, supplying 
residential customers in the four generic sub-sectors, show an overall trend of 
increasing equivalent fault rate and repair time values from HU, through U and SU, 
to R networks. In order to verify this “trend”, the results for calculated mean values 
from Tables 5.7 and 5.8 are compared with available data from Swedish 
benchmarking report [152] given in Table 5.10, which presents the statistics from 64 
different DNOs in Sweden for 11 years (from year 1998 to 2008). 
Table 5.10:  Swedish Benchmark report [152] 
Sub-sectors SAIFI SAIDI CAIDI (hours) 
Urban 0.30 0.30 1.00 
Sub-urban 0.69 1.20 1.74 
Rural 1.65 6.00 3.64 
Moreover, in Table 5.7 for scenario A, only HU results are different, featuring higher 
equivalent fault rates and equivalent repair times than the U sector results due to 
higher number of network components. As for Table 5.8, the HU sector had lower 
equivalent failure rates and equivalent repair times than the U sector, in this case due 
to the presence of alternative supply (from adjacent LV network). Therefore, in order 
to verify the results, they should be calculated as a whole network (Scenario B), and 
not part of the network (Scenario A). In that way, the presented results demonstrate a 
pattern of improving reliability performance from rural and sub-urban networks, to 
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urban and highly-urban networks, generally confirming the validity of the presented 
methodology and obtained results. Additionally, it is very to verify the presented 
results by comparison with the Swedish Benchmark Report [152] and recorded 
statistics in Table 5.10, as these results are related to both LV and MV networks. 
5.2.6 Probability Distributions 
In addition to Tables 5.7 and 5.8, the results from the probabilistic approach (Monte 
Carlo Simulations, MCS) provide information on both mean values and distributions 
of the calculated equivalent fault rates and mean repair time. These results are 
illustrated in Figs. 5.10-5.15, where the calculated equivalent fault rates for different 
sizes of the four generic LV networks from Table 5.6 are divided in “permanent” and 
“temporary/transient” faults, corresponding to LIs and SIs. Distributions of 
equivalent mean repair times are given for permanent faults, which typically result in 
LIs. The results are provided first for Scenario A (Figs. 5.10-5.12) and then for 
Scenario B (Figs. 5.13-5.15). 




















 MCS HU1500A (mean values=0.0192)
 MCS HU1000A (mean values=0.0159)















(a) highly-urban (HU) 
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 MCS U800A (mean values=0.0177)
 MCS U500A (mean values=0.0156)















(b) urban (U) 

















 MCS SU315A (mean values=0.0221)
 MCS SU200A (mean values=0.0194)
 MCS SU100A (mean values=0.0144)
Analytical SU315A=0.0224














(c) sub-urban (SU) 
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 MCS R100A (mean values=0.0208)
 MCS R50A (mean values=0.0192)














(d) rural (R) 
Figure 5.10:  Equivalent fault rates (permanent faults resulting in LIs) for Scenario 
A and different sizes of network/transformers from Table 5.6 (indicated in Legend). 
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(a) highly-urban (HU) 
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 MCS U800A (mean values=0.0223)
 MCS U500A (mean values=0.0197)
 MCS U315A (mean values=0.0180)
Analytical U800A=0.0223












(b) urban (U) 




















 MCS SU315A (mean values=0.0495)
 MCS SU200A (mean values=0.0436)












(c) sub-urban (SU) 
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 MCS R100A (mean values=0.0651)
 MCS R50A (mean values=0.0605)
 MCS R25A (mean values=0.0736)
Analytical R100A=0.0657













(d) rural (R) 
Figure 5.11:  Equivalent fault rates (temporary faults resulting in SIs) for Scenario A 
and different sizes of network/transformers from Table 5.6 (indicated in Legend). 



















 MCS HU1500A (mean values=9.3285)
 MCS HU1000A (mean values=9.7555)
 MCS HU800A (mean values=10.0188)
Analytical HU1500A=9.4023










(a) highly-urban (HU) 
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 MCS U800A (mean values=8.3382)
 MCS U500A (mean values=8.7387)
 MCS U315A (mean values=8.8159)
Analytical U800A=8.3464









(b) urban (U) 



















 MCS SU315A (mean values=9.5321)
 MCS SU200A (mean values=9.7744)
 MCS SU100A (mean values=11.1503)
Analytical SU315A=9.4684










(c) sub-urban (SU) 
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 MCS R100A (mean values=11.6976)
 MCS R50A (mean values=12.0387)











(d) rural (R) 
Figure 5.12:  Equivalent repair times (after LIs) for Scenario A and different sizes of 
network/transformers from Table 5.6 (indicated in Legend). 




















 MCS HU1500B (mean values=0.0208)
 MCS HU1000B (mean values=0.0175)
 MCS HU800B (mean values=0.0160)
Analytical HU1500B=0.0207













(a) highly-urban (HU) 
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 MCS U800B (mean values=0.0254)
 MCS U500B (mean values=0.0233)















(b) urban (U) 

















 MCS SU315B (mean values=0.0311)
 MCS SU200B (mean values=0.0284)
 MCS SU100B (mean values=0.0234)
Analytical SU315B=0.0312











(c) sub-urban (SU) 
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 MCS R100B (mean values=0.0314)
 MCS R50B (mean values=0.0298)
 MCS R25B (mean values=0.0349)
Analytical R100B=0.0309












(d) rural (R) 
Figure 5.13:  Equivalent fault rates (permanent faults resulting in LIs) for Scenario 
B and different sizes of network/transformers from Table 5.6 (indicated in Legend). 




















 MCS HU1500B (mean values=0.0222)
 MCS HU1000B (mean values=0.0187)
 MCS HU800 (mean values=0.0171)
Analytical HU1500B=0.0224













(a) highly-urban (HU) 
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 MCS U800B (mean values=0.0323)
 MCS U500B (mean values=0.0297)















(b) urban (U) 




















 MCS SU315B (mean values=0.0694)
 MCS SU200B (mean values=0.0634)
 MCS SU100B (mean values=0.0518)
Analytical SU315B=0.0694
















(c) sub-urban (SU) 
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 MCS R100B (mean values=0.0986)
 MCS R50B (mean values=0.0939)
 MCS R25B (mean values=0.1086)
Analytical R100B=0.0978











(d) rural (R) 
Figure 5.14:  Equivalent fault rates (temporary faults resulting in SIs) for Scenario B 
and different sizes of network/transformers from Table 5.6 (indicated in Legend). 



















 MCS HU1500B (mean values=9.0676)
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 MCS HU800B (mean values=9.6008)
Analytical HU1500B=9.0569
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 MCS U800B (mean values=14.7206)
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 MCS U315B (mean values=16.0288)
Analytical U800B=14.4538










(b) urban (U) 
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Analytical SU315B=15.3769













(c) sub-urban (SU) 
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 MCS R100B (mean values=18.6304)
 MCS R50B (mean values=19.3086)













(d) rural (R) 
Figure 5.15:  Equivalent repair times (after LIs) for Scenario B and different 
sizes of network/transformers from Table 5.6 (indicated in Legend). 
It can be seen that the higher equivalent fault rates and repair times result in the 
longer tails of the distributions, i.e. in the higher expected maximum annual values of 
equivalent fault rates and repair times. Second, by comparing analytical and 
probabilistic results, the probabilistic result show the same trends as analytical result, 
in which the probabilities of faults decrease as the size of the supplying transformer 
decreases (within the same sub-sector). However, this is not the case for the rural 
sector, where reducing of the network size results in a strong decrease of the supplied 
customers.  
The red dashed circles in Figs. 5.12 and 5.15 indicate the operation of the protection 
devices, which cause “spikes” on the PDF curves. They indicate faults that originate 
from protection devices (CBs and fuses), which are fully included in the presented 
simulations. Since some of these protection devices are used to protect larger 
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numbers of customers, they can cause disconnection of supply for these (larger 
number of) customers whenever local protection device is faulty, therefore causing a 
noticeable “spike” on PDF curves around corresponding repair times (e.g. 3 hours for 
fuses). These situations are different from the permanent faults on overhead lines, 
which might also activate a fuse (fuse blowing), as in that case the fuse will be 
replaced within 3 hours, but customers will still experience a longer supply 
interruption due to repair times of 0.4 kV overhead lines, which is 5.7 hours (from 
Table 5.7). 
5.3 Chapter Summary 
The assessment of network reliability performance strongly depends on the 
availability and accuracy of the required input data, which typically (significantly) 
differ in e.g. urban and rural areas/networks. To correctly acknowledge this fact, the 
analysis in this chapter continued the approach from Chapter 4, where LV and MV 
distribution networks are divided into four subsectors (HU, U, SU and R) based on 
the location and density of customers and supplied loads. Accordingly, all required 
input reliability data are in this chapter considered and evaluated for the 
corresponding subsectors, where appropriate coefficients for recalculating fault rates 
and repair times are derived and applied to obtain the final values of input reliability 
data. Since the coefficient of fault rates only provide information on LIs (from the 
recorded statistics in Table 5.3), it was also necessary to obtain information for SIs.  
The outcome of the analysis in this chapter are detailed information and more 
accurate representation of typical/generic LV networks, which are expressed in the 
form of reliability equivalents for the assessment of reliability performance of HV 
and MV networks. 
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Chapter 6 Reliability Analysis with Regulator 
Requirements, Penalty Risks and 
DG/ES Technologies 
Practically every country with developed and mature electricity network 
infrastructure has formulated Security of Supply, SoS, and/or Guaranteed Standard 
of Performance, GSP, requirements for the reliability of their networks. Their main 
function is to protect residential/domestic and non-domestic customers from (too) 
frequent and (too) long supply interruptions. In addition, DNOs in Europe also report 
on their annual performance, which is assessed by the Regulators against the pre-set 
annual targets, resulting in penalties for low reliability performance (i.e. worse than 
the specified targets) or rewards for high reliability performance (i.e. better than the 
specified targets). However, although these requirements have been set and although 
the penalty/reward scheme is incentivising a continuous improvement of reliability 
performance (e.g. from one calendar year to another), there is still a possibility that 
certain customers will experience more frequent and/or more longer duration of 
supply interruption than those prescribed by specified targets.  
Another issue is that reliability targets are usually stipulated for the overall/average 
network performance, through the system reliability indices (most commonly SAIFI 
or CI and SAIDI or CML), which means that: a) these values are related to no 
specific customer, as they are average system values, and b) that there will always be 
customers with worse/better performance than the system average values. In order to 
allow for a more detailed analysis of reliability performance, this chapter analyses 
the reliability performance requirements from the perspectives of the “worst and best 
served customers” in the modelled networks and also calculates the probabilities of 
values higher than the pre-specified targets (e.g. from the GSP), which essentially 
introduces the “risk of paying penalty” into the reliability analysis. Finally, the last 
part of this chapter is dedicated to the analysis of the potential improvement of 
reliability performance through the coordination and management of distributed 
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generation (DG) and energy storage (ES) technologies, which are evaluated using the 
time-sequential MCS approach for assessment of their benefits. 
6.1 Continuity of Supply Requirements 
Regulators usually define two main continuity of supply requirements: guaranteed 
standards of performance (GSP) and security of supply (SoS) requirements. The 
former should ensure that any single customer receive at least the minimum 
(“guaranteed”) level of continuity of supply from the DNOs. The latter monitors the 
performance of the DNOs at the system level and it is used as a basis for 
reward/penalties schemes, usually against the set targets for (system average) number 
of supply interruptions, per year and per customer served, (SAIFI), as well as for 
(system average) duration of supply interruptions, per year and per customer served, 
(SAIDI).  
In principle, Regulators do acknowledge that it is almost impossible to avoid faults 
occurring in the power supply systems. Therefore, they use reliability standards and 
setting of performance levels for “dealing with faults”, i.e. for limiting their effects 
and impact on supplied customers. The GSP requires DNOs to compensate end-users 
for each supply interruption event which is not dealt with within the maximum 
allowed time, or for too frequent supply interruption events. There is additional 
discrimination in requirements based on the number of interrupted customers, or total 
amount of the (un)supplied demands. 
In the UK, the interruption incentive scheme has symmetric annual rewards and 
penalties, depending on each DNO’s performance against their targets for the 
number of customers interrupted per 100 customers (CI) and the number of customer 
minutes lost (CML). The DNO’s reliability performance, i.e. CI and CML indices, is 
audited each year and an audit report is published, detailing the accuracy of the 
measurements and any adjustments, if applied to their annual performance. The 
proportion of revenue exposed under the scheme is 1.2% for CI and 1.8% for CML. 
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6.1.1 The UK Security of Supply (SoS) Requirements 
The UK SoS specifies the maximum prescribed times (i.e. the maximum durations of 
LIs) for restoring supply to at least a minimum group demand of the interrupted 
customers, before the involved DNO would be liable for paying a penalty, Table 6.1. 
Accordingly, the network configuration, the protection schemes and the actual fault 
restoration and repair processes of faulted network components are the main factors 
determining the duration of LIs. Moreover, six classes of supply are defined based on 
the group demand ranges for which the maximum durations of LI are correlated with 
the minimum demands that have to be restored in case of LIs. For example, Class A 
corresponds to a group demand lower than 1MW, for which interrupted supply 
should be restored according to the repair times of the faulted components. For all 
other group demands, shorter supply restoration times should be achieved by DNOs: 
for group demand between 1MW and 12MW, the supply restoration times are not 
based on the repair times of faulted components, but the supply must be restored to 
most of the customers within three hours. This implicitly suggests that DNOs should 
implement additional measures (besides prompt repairs of faulted components) for 
achieving the required reliability levels. Typically, these include, as discussed in 
previous chapters, network reconfiguration and network automation functionalities, 
or provision of alternative supply points. 
Table6.1:  Security of Supply requirements in the UK [107] 
Class Corresponding  Group Demand (GD) 
Required supply restoration times and minimum 
demands to be met after the first circuit outage 
A GD ≤ 1 MW In repair time: GD 
B 1 MW < GD ≤ 12 MW a) Within 3 h: GD-1MW b) In repair time: GD 
C 12 MW < GD ≤ 60 MW 
a) Within 15 min: 
min{GD-12MW; 2/3 GD} 
b) Within 3 h: GD 
D 60 MW < GD ≤ 300 MW 
a) Immediately: 
GD-up to 20 MW 
b) Within 3 h: GD 
E 300 MW < GD ≤ 1500 MW Immediately: GD 
F GD > 1500 MW According to transmission license security standard 
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Table 6.1 specifies the maximum durations of supply restoration times, which in 
most cases are significantly shorter than the network component repair times, already 
discussed and given in Table 5.2. Although some of the network component repair 
times are outside this limit and do not accrue to the specific DNO penalties, they 
nevertheless can affect the reliability performance of the network to be outside the 
specified annual targets. 
Accordingly, the maximum supply restoration times shown in Table 6.1 (and Table 
6.3) have been implemented in this thesis, in order to more accurately quantify the 
effects of different functionalities of certain network components, such as the manual 
or automatic control for reconfiguration, transfer to alternative supply and reclosing. 
It is shown that without including Regulator requirements in the reliability 
assessment, the calculated values will not properly reflect the practical situations, i.e. 
the calculated reliability indices will not be as accurate as it should be expected. 
6.1.2 UK Guaranteed Standard of Performance (GSP) 
The UK GSP specifies guaranteed standards of service levels that must be met by 
each DNO and are reasonable to expect to be delivered in all cases. If a DNO fails to 
meet the required level of service, it must make a payment to the customer (subject 
to certain exemptions). These “GSP payments” are envisaged as a compensation for 
the inconvenience caused by a loss of supply and are not designed to compensate 
customers for related financial losses (which are assessed independently). 
As mentioned, the GSP is directly aimed to protect domestic (i.e. residential) and 
non-domestic customers from excessively long and frequent supply interruption 
events, i.e. those categories of customers without special contracts or agreements 
with the DNOs regarding LIs. Accordingly, the UK Regulator specifies requirements 
for the duration and the number of LIs, with [153] and [154] being the main UK 
statutory instruments for specifying the allowed supply restoration times for up to 
5,000 customers, more than 5,000 customers, and in severe weather conditions.  
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This is illustrated in Table 6.2 (only for normal system operating conditions), 
together with the corresponding compensations that DNOs will pay directly to the 
customers (not to the Regulator), if supply is not restored within the time specified in 
[153] and [154]. 
Table 6.2:  Guaranteed Standard of Performance (2010 Edition) in the UK [154] 
Supply Restoration Time Compensation Paid to: 
No. of customers 
interrupted 
Maximum supply restoration 
time Domestic customers 
Non-domestic 
customers 
< 5,000 18 h £54 £108 After each succeeding 12h £27 
≥ 5,000 
24 h £54 £108 




Maximum supply restoration 
time Compensation Paid to all customers 
Fuse 
Working 





Multiple Interruptions Compensation Paid to all customers 
Four or more interruptions (≥ 4), 
each lasting at least three hours (≥ 3 h) £54 
Furthermore, the DNOs have to keep continuously improving their network 
performance by maintaining, changing, and upgrading to new technological devices 
and components, in order to meet the annual targets specified by the Regulator. In 
order to provide the best reliability performance, the UK Regulator has revised the 
SoS in 2015 and is now enforcing increased compensation payments and some new 
requirements for the maximum supply restoration times (e.g. previously allowed 18 
hours limit is now reduced to 12 hours). Table 6.3 illustrates the new GSP 
requirements that came into force on the 1st of April 2015. 
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Table 6.3:  Guaranteed Standard of Performance (2015 Edition) in the UK [108] 
Supply Restoration Time Compensation Paid to: 
No. of customers 
interrupted 
Maximum supply restoration 
time Domestic customers 
Non-domestic 
customers 
< 5,000 12 h £75 £150 After each succeeding 12h £35 
≥ 5,000 
24 h £75 £150 




Maximum supply restoration 
time Compensation Paid to all customers 
Fuse 
Working 





Multiple Interruptions Compensation Paid to all customers 
Four or more interruptions (≥ 4), 
each lasting at least three hours (≥ 3 h) £75 
 
6.1.3 Comparison with Requirements in European Countries 
Similarly to the requirements in the UK, Tables 6.4 and 6.5 list the Italian Supply 
Quality Standard (SQS-I) and the Guaranteed Standards of Performance (GSP-I), 
[4]-[5]. The SQS-I defines the maximum restoration times, the average number of 
interruptions and the average duration of interruption with a separation of inhabitant 
concentrations that logically defines the network sub-sectors as used in this thesis 
(i.e. urban, sub-urban and rural area). On the other hand, the GSP-I defines the 
compensation rates in accordance with the criteria for different types of customers. 
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(I > 50,000)* 
Medium Concentration 
(5,000 < I ≤ 50,000)* 
Low Concentration 








4 h 6 h 8 h 
Average number of 
interruptions 1 int/customer 2 int/customer 4 int/customer 
Average duration of 
interruptions 25 min/customer 40 min/customer 60 min/customer 
*I – number of inhabitants; this thesis assume that 5,000 inhabitants correspond to about 2,000 
residential customers and around 5 MW of residential load demand. 
Table 6.5:  Guaranteed Standard of Performance in Italy, GSP-I [156] 
Customers interrupted Criteria for compensation Compensation 
Domestic 
If longer than SQS-I duration limit €30 
For each succeeding 4h €15 
Maximum €300 
LV & MV 
Non-domestic 
Non-public 
≤ 100 kW 
If longer than SQS-I duration limit €150 





> 100 kW 
If longer than SQS-I duration limit €2/kW 




> 100 kW 
If longer than SQS-I duration limit €1.5/kW 
For each succeeding 2h €0.75/kW 
Maximum €6,000 
LV & MV 
With license    for 
generation* 
If longer than SQS-I duration limit €0.15/kW 
For each succeeding 4h €0.075/kW 
Maximum €3,000 
 
*It is assumed that for prosumers (producers-consumers) the maximum compensation between 
producers and consumers is applied. 
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Table 6.6:  Guaranteed Standard of Performance in some European countries 






















≥12 HV (>110kV) – RON 300 (Additional RON 100 every 6h, max RON 700) 
MV(1kV<V≤110kV) – RON 100 
(Additional RON 40 every 12h, max 
RON 200) 
LV(<1kV) – RON 30 (Additional 
RON 20 every 12h, max RON 100) 
***cooling time for each interruption 
is 3 minutes 
Rural (normal 
weather) ≥24 
Urban / Rural 








 Urban 4 
Max 12h 
each 
interruption HV (>110kV) – RON 150 MV(1kV<V≤110kV) – RON 50 





















𝑃𝑓(𝑇𝐿 − 𝑈𝑇) (max 10% of 
energy consumption on previous year) 







 (max 10% of 
energy consumption on previous year) 
Where; 
FE = Energy consumption billed over 
the previous year, as established in the 
regulation of 12 January 1995 for 
electrical tariffs. 
E = Annual energy supplied. 
Pf = Average power billed over the 
year. 
TI = Annual interruption time 
accumulated. 
NI = Annual number of interruptions 
accumulated. 
UT = Time threshold of the supply 
zone. 
UN = Threshold for number of 

































240 / 400V 
- 
≥4 EUR 35 
400<Voltage≤20kV ≥4 EUR 910 




Not specified in Swedish 
Electricity Act 
- 12≤T<24 
12.5% of tariff 
a, minimum 
2% of b 
Where; a = 
individual customer 
annual network tariff 
b = yearly set base 
amount (for 2007, 
Swedish 
Government set it to 
SEK 41,100) 
-max up to 300% of 
tariff a for one 
outage period 
cooling period is (2 
hours) 
- 24≤T<48 
37.5% of tariff 
a, minimum 
4% of b 
- 48≤T<72 
62.5% of tariff 
a, minimum 




of 24 hours 
+25% of tariff 
a, +2% of b 
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6.1.4 Supply Restoration Time after Temporary Faults 
One of the important requirements for the correct implementation of reliability 
assessment methods is a clear (or as clear as possible) separation of customer supply 
interruptions into SIs and LIs. This requires to accurately model activation and 
operation of certain network protection devices (in different protection schemes) that 
typically have an impact on the supply restoration times. For example, a permanent 
fault of a network component may not result in a LI, but in a SI, if the network is 
reconfigured to provide alternative supply to all affected customers within 3 minutes 
(in Europe) or 1 minute (in the US). The opposite is also true for certain protection 
components: a temporary fault may not result in SI, but in a LI, when a fuse is 
activated by a temporary fault and manual intervention is required to restore the 
supply (i.e. to replace the fuse). In other words, the calculation of LIs should also 
include temporary faults that contribute to LIs due to the settings and characteristics 
of the protection systems. This is applied in the analysis presented in this chapter, 
where the typical values from Table 6.7 for the protection components in the UK are 
used to model fault clearing times and their effects on the calculated reliability 
indices. 
Table 6.7:  Typical Fault Clearing Times in UK [71, 92] 
Power Component Voltage Level (kV) Protection System 
Fault clearing time 
(s) 
Overhead Lines 
11 Circuit breaker with auto-reclosing 10-120 
33 Circuit breaker with auto-reclosing 90 
Cables 
11 Circuit breaker with auto-reclosing up to 3 
33 Circuit breaker with auto-reclosing 90 
Transformers 
11/0.4 Fuse repair time 
33/11 Circuit breaker with auto-reclosing 0.15-10 
Buses 
0.4 Fuse repair time 
11 Circuit breaker 0.15 
33 Circuit breaker 0.15 
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6.2 Assessment of Penalty and Compensation Risks 
Network reliability performance is one of the most important criteria in designing, 
planning, operating, maintaining and upgrading the power supply systems. 
Generally, the DNOs put significant efforts aimed at providing power supply to their 
customers with certain reliability levels, e.g. based on the annual targets imposed by 
the Regulators, or on the GSP requirements. At the same time, the DNOs have two 
other equally important objectives: to provide a low cost power supply to customers 
and to reduce the (capital and maintenance) costs of operating their networks. As the 
improved reliability levels usually come with the higher investment and operation 
costs (therefore resulting in higher costs for customers), these objectives are 
conflicting, requiring careful planning by the DNOs. 
However, and as mentioned before, the recent statistics from the UK suggest that 
maintaining the highest possible reliability levels with as low cost to the customers as 
possible is not an easy task. In one year, 14% of the UK DNOs have been penalised 
by the Regulator for not achieving their annual targets for customer interruption (CI) 
index, while 50% of DNOs were penalized for exceeding their annual targets for 
customer minutes lost (CML) index, [6]. 
Inefficient DNOs’ reliability planning strategies may result in reliability performance 
of their network being below the annual targets, when involved DNOs will pay 
penalties. Therefore, DNOs need to carefully decide on the level of reliability 
investments and expected return of these investments, in terms of the achieved 
reliability improvements against the level of penalty payments in cases when 
specified targets are not met. Accordingly, among the several possible reasons for the 
abovementioned penalisation of a large number of the UK DNOs (e.g. a higher fault 
exposure in that particular year), one reason might be that the DNOs are not using 
the most robust, accurate and flexible reliability assessment procedures for the 
correct evaluation of (variations in the expected) reliability performance in terms of 
frequency and duration of LIs.  
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It could be generally concluded that the assessment of reliability performance of 
modern networks requires to use sophisticated probabilistic procedures, i.e. Monte-
Carlo Simulations (MCS) instead of analytical approaches, as this will allow to 
correctly estimate the ranges of variations of reliability indicators. Furthermore, it is 
very important to provide accurate input reliability data, parameters and network 
models, which should be then correctly implemented in related probabilistic/MCS 
assessment approaches. Up to this point, this thesis discussed, implemented and 
demonstrated a number of possible improvements of reliability assessment 
procedures. This chapter continues further, by including in the presented generic 
network methodology the following factors: a) reliability targets imposed by the 
Regulator, b) assessment of performance of the worst/best served customers, and 
c) by evaluating impact of distributed generation and energy storage technologies. 
First, the previously discussed penalty limits/thresholds defined by the UK Regulator 
have been assessed and then applied as a criteria for quantify the risk of paying the 
penalty or compensation by the DNOs. Afterwards, the characteristics and settings of 
protection systems from Table 6.7 and related SoS requirements are also included in 
the analysis, where the calculated LI and SI results again include all four generic LV 
distribution networks. 
In the analysis, the three general cases are defined, Table 6.8, based on the use of LV 
protection devices. These cases reflect both the fact that the DNOs are improving 
their network reliability performance on an annual basis (e.g. by employing new and 
more sophisticated protection devices), and the fact that the Regulator constantly 
enforces new and more stringent requirements for the DNOs’ reliability performance.  
Table 6.8:  Description of three cases selected for the analysis 
Case Description 
1 Z1/Z2 changes to fuses and Z3 change to CB in Figures 4.1-4.8. 
2 Protection systems are the same within Figures 4.1-4.8. 
3 Z1/Z3 changes to smart fuses and Z2 changes to CB in Figures 4.1-4.8. 
Reliability Assessment of Distribution Networks Incorporating Regulator 
Requirements, Generic Network Equivalents and Smart Grid Functionalities 
 
Reliability Analysis with Regulator Requirements, 
Penalty Risks and DG/ES Technologies 169 
In the presented analysis, one recently introduced protection device is included in 
Case 3: “smart fuse”, [43]. A smart fuse is aimed at improving both the reliability 
performance and power quality performance, as it has two cartridges instead of only 
one, where the activation of the first cartridge due to a transient fault does not result 
in the supply interruption, as the second/reserve cartridge is automatically placed to 
preserve the supply. In that way, a smart fuse is similar to a CB with one reclosing 
operation followed by a disconnection (the second cartridge will blow in the case of 
a permanent fault), but a smart fuse is assumed to have lower fault rates and mean 
repair times, i.e. as the standard fuse. (It should be noted that the application of smart 
fuses was relatively new and that no input data have been available for fault rates and 
repair times at the time of writing this thesis. Due to similarities in construction, the 
fault rates and repair times of smart fuses are assumed to be similar to the standard 
fuses, as given in Tables 5.1 and 5.2). 
The presented analysis and obtained results concern both reliability performance 
(number of long interruptions, LIs, and their duration) and power quality 
performance (number of short interruptions, SIs). Generally, both the actual type of 
the fault and the applied fault-response scheme will define the type of the resulting 
interruption (LI vs SI). While presented analysis still uses separation of faults in only 
permanent and transient faults, it should be noted that the following four general 
types (or stages) of fault development are defined in [43]: 
• Transient fault (irregular voltage dip that typically does not cause fuse 
operation) 
• Intermittent fault (causes irregular fuse operations) 
• Continuous fault (causes repetitive fuse operations) 
• Permanent fault (activate/blow the fuse) 
From the power quality point of view, transient, intermittent and continuous faults 
are categorized as short interruptions, and permanent faults as long interruptions. 
Although the intermittent and continuous faults are categorized as short interruption 
faults, if they results in the activation of the fuse, and if the fuse is replaced 
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manually, this will take more than 3 minutes, resulting in a long interruption. 
Therefore, by changing the protection devices (from a fuse to a CB), intermittent and 
continuous faults will be still categorized/grouped as short interruptions (by 
assuming that the CB will open faster than the fuse and will be able to reclose in case 
of temporary faults, i.e. short interruptions).  
The results for all three cases and all four generic types of LV networks from Figs. 
4.1-4.8 are presented in Table 6.9. 
Table 6.9:  The results for calculated reliability indices (mean values) for the three 
selected cases and all generic networks. 
Case Network Type SAIFI MAIFI SAIDI CAIDI ENS 
1 
HU 0.0192 0.0210 0.1239 6.4442 0.1618 
U 0.0238 0.0305 0.3039 12.7544 0.3966 
SU 0.0292 0.0657 0.3721 12.7292 0.4587 
R 0.0288 0.0911 0.4543 15.7756 0.5929 
2 
HU 0.0208 0.0222 0.1883 9.0676 0.2457 
U 0.0254 0.0232 0.3734 14.7206 0.4873 
SU 0.0311 0.0694 0.4772 15.3245 0.6229 
R 0.0314 0.0986 0.5858 18.6304 0.7646 
3 
HU 0.0175 0.0235 0.1223 6.9990 0.1596 
U 0.0222 0.0333 0.3008 13.5558 0.3926 
SU 0.0269 0.0675 0.3719 13.7983 0.4854 
R 0.0263 0.0947 0.4445 16.8783 0.5802 
In Case 1, the fuses within the network are the only protection devices for isolating 
the faulted part from the healthy network. This case is referred to as the base case, in 
order to quantify the possible improvements of reliability performance by replacing 
fuses with more sophisticated (and more expensive) protection devices. In Case 2, 
when some of the fuses are replaced with CBs, the reliability performance did not 
improve, as the fault rates and repair times of CBs are higher than that of the fuses, 
cancelling effects of more efficient handling of temporary faults. In Case 3, when 
fuses are replaced with smart fuses, an improvement of reliability performance of 
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around 12.5% for SAIFI and a bit lower improvement of SAIDI is achieved (but not 
for CAIDI, as CAIDI=SAIDI/SAIFI). 
6.2.1 Penalty/Compensation Risks for Average Customer 
As previously discussed, the GSP requires DNOs to restore interrupted supply within 
a specified period of time or, otherwise, DNOs must pay compensations directly to 
the affected customers. Here, the use of the probabilistic (MCS) reliability 
approaches allows to directly assess the penalty risks, as the output distributions of, 
e.g. mean repair times (i.e. average duration of LIs), explicitly give the probabilities 
of LI events with durations longer than the specified GSP time limits. In the case of 
the UK GSP, the time limits for compensation payments are 12 hours (2015 edition, 
Table 6.3) and 18 hours (2010 edition, Table 6.2). The results in this section refer to 
“average customer”, i.e. to the mean values calculated for the total number of served 
customers, while the next section provides the results for the actual worst- and best-
served customers from all generic networks. 
Table 6.10 presents the results for the estimated penalty risks for the four generic 
networks and Cases 1 to 3. Higher repair times of CBs contributed to the increased 
values of SAIDI, CAIDI and ENS indices. The presented results also indicate how 
the recent change of maximum restoration time from 18 hours to 12 hours is placing 
an increased stress on the DNOs, as the risks of paying penalties are in some cases 
increasing three times. It is also indicative that the change of protection devices from 
fuses to CBs and then to smart fuses is actually not reducing the penalty risks, but it 
is opposite – the risk is increasing, except in SU and R networks, where percentage 
of temporary faults is higher, therefore justifying the installation of CBs and smart 
fuses for the supply restoration time limit of 18 hours, but not for the new restoration 
time limit of 12 hours. This is an important result, which additionally justifies the use 
of probabilistic reliability assessment approaches, as the improvement in mean 
values in Table 6.9 could be misleading with respect to the (expected) reduction of 
penalty risks. From the “average customer point of view”, the GSP-related reduction 
of the maximum restoration time from 18 hours to 12 hours is certainly reflecting an 
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improved reliability performance, but from the DNOs’ perspective, this might 
present too high operational and investment requirements in satisfying the target 
limits set by the Regulator. 
Table 6.10:  The results for calculated/estimated penalty risks for the duration of LIs 
for three selected cases and all generic networks (% of LIs with durations longer than 
12 hours or 18 hours). 
GSP limit Network Area HU U SU R 
18 hours 
Case 1 4.34 13.92 12.73 21.15 
Case 2 7.00 15.78 18.42 27.99 
Case 3 5.80 12.72 14.99 20.21 
12 hours 
Case 1 15.18 21.52 22.08 28.85 
Case 2 16.96 25.33 26.38 37.11 
Case 3 15.00 21.91 24.16 32.98 
The results in Table 6.10 are obtained from the probability distributions (PDFs) 
CAIDI curves in Fig. 6.1, where 12 hours and 18 hours LI duration limits from the 
UK GSP are plotted as vertical lines and used for calculating risk of paying 
compensation. 
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b) Case 2 
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c) Case 3 
Figure 6.1:  Probability distributions of CAIDI for assessing risks of penalty 
(average customer) 
6.2.2 Penalty Risks for Best and Worst-Served Customers 
The annual reports that the DNOs send to the Regulator specify their network 
reliability performance in terms of “system-average” indices: SAIFI (or CI), MAIFI, 
SAIDI (or CML), CAIDI, etc. It is generally accepted that the reporting of these 
values is sufficient to represent the overall network performance, regardless of the 
fact that a number of customers will experience both lower and higher reliability 
performance levels than those reported by the average system indices. Effectively, 
these values represent a fictitious “average customer” and do not provide any 
information regarding the actual customers, e.g. the best-served and the worst-served 
customers. Therefore, it is also important for the DNOs to evaluate the ranges of 
variations of reliability performance levels of their customers and locate parts of the 
networks (typically supplying the worst-served customers) where reliability should 
be improved. This is discussed next, using Fig. 6.2 as an illustration. 
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Figure 6.2:  Example network for illustrating representation of best, average and 
worst served customers 
The reliability performances of the best- and the worst-served customers should be 
quantified separately for the frequency of supply interruptions and for the duration of 
supply interruptions, as in the general case the same customer might not be exposed 
to the most frequent and the longest LIs. It is also possible to quantify the total 
duration of all interruptions for every served customer, i.e. to multiply frequency and 
average duration of LIs for every customer, in order to find conditions for 
simultaneous duration-frequency best/worst-served customer, but this is not done in 
this thesis.  
For the calculation of the frequency and duration of LIs of individual customers in 
the example network from Fig. 6.2, the equations (5.5-5.17) from Chapter 5 are used 
and adjusted for the protection system operating without fuse-saving scheme: 
The equivalent fault rates for the three indicated load points are: 
𝜆𝐿𝑃𝑆1 = 𝜆𝑆 + 𝜆𝑆𝑆𝑆 + 𝜆𝑀𝑆1 + 𝜆𝑆𝑆1 + 𝜆𝐿𝑆1            (6.1) 
𝜆𝐿𝑃𝑆2 = 𝜆𝑆 + 𝜆𝑆𝑆𝑆 + 𝜆𝑀𝑆1+𝜆𝑆𝑆𝑀 + 𝜆𝑀𝑆2 + 𝜆𝑆𝑆2 + 𝜆𝐿𝑆2         (6.2) 
𝜆𝐿𝑃𝑆3 = 𝜆𝑆 + 𝜆𝑆𝑆𝑆 + 𝜆𝑀𝑆1+𝜆𝑆𝑆𝑀 + 𝜆𝑀𝑆2+𝜆𝑆𝑆𝑆 + 𝜆𝑀𝑆3 + 𝜆𝑆𝑆3 + 𝜆𝐿𝑆3 (6.3) 




           (6.4) 
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          (6.6) 
The above equations for the fault rates and repair times of individual load points 
allow to identify the best- and the worst-served customers for each of these two 
conditions. In terms of the fault rates, load point LPY1 is the best-served customer, 
as it has the minimum value of the equivalent fault rate, while LPY3 is the worst-
served customer, with the maximum value of the equivalent fault rate. For the LI 
frequency condition, it is rather easy to identify the load points for the best- and the 
worst-served customers, as the values of the equivalent fault rates increase 
proportionally with the number of components between the load point and main 
network supply system.  
For the LI duration condition, however, the situation is opposite. The main reasons 
for that are: a) the increased equivalent fault rate (SAIFI) values for the load points 
farther away from the main supply system are in the denominator of CAIDI, equation 
(2.12), which effectively results in the lower CAIDI values, and b) mean repair times 
of components farther away from the main supply system are shorter (e.g. fuses) than 
the repair times of the components nearer the main supply system (e.g. circuit 
breakers), which results in the lower equivalent repair time (SAIDI) values in the 
numerator of CAIDI, same equation (2.12). Accordingly, the best-served customer in 
the example network in terms of average duration of LIs (CAIDI) is LPY3 (worst-
served for LI frequency), whereas the worst-served customer is LPY1 (best-served 
for LI frequency). 
The results for the worst/best-served customer analysis in Tables 6.11 and 6.12 again 
use the same input data, network models and parameters as in the previous section. 
Table 6.11 illustrates that the worst-served customers have higher average duration 
Reliability Assessment of Distribution Networks Incorporating Regulator 
Requirements, Generic Network Equivalents and Smart Grid Functionalities 
 
Reliability Analysis with Regulator Requirements, 
Penalty Risks and DG/ES Technologies 177 
of LIs, resulting in an increase of penalty/compensation risk in Table 6.12. The 
actual probability distributions of CAIDI values for all three considered cases (from 
which risks of penalty are estimated) are given in Fig. 6.3. 
Table 6.11:  Average duration of LIs for the best-, average- and the worst-served 
customers. 
Customer  Case HU U SU R 
Best 
1 6.0959  10.8666   11.4457  15.0884  
2 6.3034  13.5543  13.5835  17.5862  
3 6.0596  11.1391  12.4456  16.0592  
Worst 
1 6.6956  15.8120  14.8511  16.6177  
2 10.7743  17.3813  18.1652  19.6176  
3 9.0147  15.7104  16.4493  17.6697  
Average 
1 6.4442 12.7544 12.7292 15.7756 
2 9.0676 14.7206 15.3245 18.6304 
3 6.9990 13.5558 13.7983 16.8783 
 
Table 6.12:  Penalty risks for 18 hours and 12 hours LI duration limits (in 
percentages) for the best-, average- and the worst-served customers. 
Customer GSP limit Network Area HU U SU R 
Best 
18 hours 
Case 1 3.57 6.09 7.34 10.93 
Case 2 5.85 8.56 10.46 15.17 
Case 3 4.49 7.56 7.26 10.19 
12 hours 
Case 1 12.16 16.04 16.34 20.11 
Case 2 14.60 19.22 20.40 26.95 
Case 3 12.58 18.08 17.92 21.80 
Worst 
18 hours 
Case 1 6.67 22.49 17.79 24.34 
Case 2 15.86 25.64 27.43 29.11 
Case 3 12.29 21.12 21.35 22.59 
12 hours 
Case 1 17.14 31.36 26.44 32.70 
Case 2 23.79 35.39 35.02 40.07 
Case 3 20.11 31.06 29.17 35.16 
Average 
18 hours 
Case 1 4.34 13.92 12.73 21.15 
Case 2 7.00 15.78 18.42 27.99 
Case 3 5.80 12.72 14.99 20.21 
12 hours 
Case 1 15.18 21.52 22.08 28.85 
Case 2 16.96 25.33 26.38 37.11 
Case 3 15.00 21.91 24.16 32.98 
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b) Case 2 
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c) Case 3 
Figure 6.3:  Average duration of LIs (CAIDI) for the best-served customers 
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c) Case 3 
Figure 6.4:  Average duration of LIs (CAIDI) for the worst-served customers 
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6.3 Impact of Distributed Generation and Energy 
Storage on Distribution Network Reliability 
This section introduces distributed generation (DG) and energy storage (ES) in the 
analysis of reliability performance of generic LV distribution networks, where again 
best-, average- and worst-served customers are identified and assessed. There are two 
general types of DG with respect to input energy resources: a) renewable-based, such 
as solar, i.e. photovoltaic (PV), or wind, and b) fossil fuel-based, such as natural gas 
or diesel-fired. Although ES systems have merits on their own, e.g. for grid-charging 
when electricity cost is low (during the night) and discharging when the cost is high 
(during peak demand hours), this thesis analyses only dedicated ES, which is 
assumed to operate together with renewable-based micro and small-scale DG in LV 
distribution networks. The primary function of such ES systems is to balance 
variations in the outputs of typically PV and wind DG, which are the most common 
types of renewable DG in the majority of European countries, including the UK, but 
also elsewhere.  
The presented analysis is divided in parts representing operation of DG without ES, 
as well as operation of both DG and dedicated ES for various target applications. It 
should be noted that the analysis does not include optimal sizing of ES for specific 
level of DG penetration, but it simply assumes that ES can take as much as the whole 
daily output of a variable renewable DG unit, store it and then discharge it at a 
suitable time (e.g. during the peak demand hours, or when a fault occurs in the 
network). In that way, the impact of DG with/without ES on the network reliability 
performance is analysed and illustrated with the obtained results. 
As a part of the efforts in reducing overall CO2 emission from energy generation 
sector and meeting the target of 80% reduction of CO2 emission by 2050 [2], the UK 
government had introduced the feed-in tariff (FIT) in 2010, as an incentive 
specifically aimed at small-scale renewable DG applications [32]. This initiative has 
been especially successful for PV technologies, as at the end of 2016 more than 
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10GW of small PV systems were installed, mostly in residential households, with an 
average rated power of individual PV systems of around 4 kW.  
Scotland has set an even more ambitious target, that 100% of electricity demands 
will be met from renewable energy resources by 2020. The UK as a whole plans to 
explore great potential for offshore and onshore wind-based generation and it is 
estimated that up to 30 GW of wind installations at all scales could be installed in the 
UK by 2020 [165]. Currently, more than 500MW of small and medium scale wind 
DG is already installed in south of Scotland alone, [166]. Similar trends are present 
in other EU countries, with EU currently trying to establish a target of 400 GW of 
installed PV capacity by 2020 [167]. The above figures and trends clearly indicate 
the importance of analysing the effects of renewable-based generation, including 
micro, small and medium--scale DG in LV and MV distribution networks, which is 
in this thesis addressed through the evaluation of their impact on reliability 
performance. 
The strongest impact of DG with/without ES would be operation in so called 
“islanded mode”, when available generation and storage capacities are coordinated to 
balance load in a part of the network that continues to operate after a fault in the 
upstream network. This mode of operation is particularly challenging in the case of 
DG using renewable energy resources (RER), as their outputs vary based on the 
changes in input RER, therefore making balancing of variable demands of supplied 
customers a very difficult task. Presence of ES can help in reducing variations of 
renewable DG outputs, e.g. to maintain the output of the combined DG-ES system 
around the average RER levels, where higher than average DG outputs are stored in 
ES, which is discharged when DG outputs are lower than the average value. The 
analysis described and illustrated in this section evaluates possible improvements of 
reliability performance due to the DG with and without dedicated ES. 
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Figure 6.5:  Generic MV urban network from Chapter 4. 
The test network used to illustrate the reliability analysis with DG and ES is the same 
generic UK urban MV distribution network (Fig. 4.11 in Chapter 4), supplying LV 
residential customers, as illustrated in Figs. 6.5 and 6.6. The urban network is 
selected for the analysis as it has high density of demand and high requirements for 
reliability performance. By incorporating DG within the urban network, the thermal 
loading of component will be reduced, as part of the loads will be supplied by DG), 
thus reducing the probability of faults and deferring investments in network 
expansion as the loads/customers increase in the future. Due to restriction of 
available space, main types of DG that can be employed in urban network are PV, 
micro-CHP and micro-wind. 
The urban MV network is meshed, but it is normally operated radially (CBs between 
two radial feeders enable change between meshed and radial configurations), Fig. 
6.5. This MV network is also supported by an alternative supply point at 11kV at the 
end of radial feeders, assumed to provide limited support. Total of 48 MV load 
points (eight per feeder) are connected through 800kVA 11/0.4kV transformers, each 
supplying an identical generic LV radial urban network with 190 individual LV 
customers, Fig. 6.6. This LV network is operated in radial configuration and 
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protected by CBs on both sides of a secondary 11/0.4 kV distribution transformer. 
This is an underground cable network, with each lateral spur/feeder connected to LV 
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Figure 6.6:  Generic LV urban network from Chapter 4 with DG connections. 
In the event of a permanent fault, the faulted part of the network will be disconnected 
from the healthy part by the corresponding protection devices. The DNO would then 
take corrective action, either by manual or automatic reconfiguration and/or 
reconnection to alternative supply point, in order to maintain supply to most of the 
customers, if not all of them. However, this is not always possible due to the design 
limitations, as MV distribution networks are generally not designed with ‘N-1’ 
security criteria. As a result, part of the previously normally supplied load would be 
disconnected, in order to maintain supply to the healthy part of the network and to 
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prevent overloading of network components, typically resulting in long interruption 
of the affected residential customers. In such cases, DG outputs will reduce the load 
in the distribution network, which means that more loads/customers will be supplied 
if the alternative supply point can provide only limited support.  
As discussed, application of ES will reduce variations of DG outputs, which then 
might be able to help to provide continuous supply to a substantially higher number 
of customers. Although the amount of actually provided DG/ES support will depend 
on several factors (e.g. loading conditions, (average) outputs of DG, energy stored in 
ES, etc.), the impact will always be positive and will help to improve the reliability 
performance of the network. 
Furthermore, DG connected at some network locations will have higher impact than 
the same DG connected at the other network locations. This opens the question of the 
“optimal placement of DG”, but it should be noted that the DNOs have little to no 
impact on DG placement, as DG units are owned, installed and operated by 
individual customers/users, based on, e.g. their investment plans, availability of land, 
access to RER, etc. However, DNOs can incentivise or subsidise certain network 
locations to DG developers, and therefore, at least to some extent, influence the 
selection of the locations of DG systems in their networks. 
Regardless whether it is optimally located or not, DG and ES can help to 
(significantly) improve network voltage regulation (particularly in weak networks), 
to reduce system losses (unless there are excessive reversed power flows) and to 
improve overall network performance, including system reliability levels. A number 
of previous studies have developed different methodologies for optimal placement of 
DG, which is usually in the weakest parts of the distribution networks. Most of the 
related literature implements voltage sensitivity, loss sensitivity [168] or 2/3 of the 
maximum load rule [169] as the main factors in deciding on (optimal) placing and 
sizing of DG. Although most of existing literature states or documents that selection 
of DG based on these criteria (voltage, loss or 2/3 of maximum load rule) will 
improve network reliability performance, this was actually a secondary effect of 
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some other main criteria used for the DG placement. Accordingly, a very few studies 
have previously concentrated on the problem of (optimal) placement and operation of 
DG and ES systems with primary function to improve reliability performance of the 
network, e.g. [5, 113, 170]. In order to fill this gap, the analysis in this section applies 
improvement of reliability performance as one of the criteria for studying impact of 
DG location and tries to identify these load points where connected DG will have the 
most beneficial impact. 
The first set of results is calculated using the MCS approach, showing the frequency 
and duration of LIs at selected load points in the considered urban generic MV 
network for the base case (without any DG in LV network), in order to determine the 
locations of the load points in the MV network where reliability indices (SAIFI and 
SAIDI/CAIDI) are the lowest/highest. This basically corresponds to the previous 
analysis of the best- and worst-served customers, but now for MV load points. For 
instance, Figures 6.7 and 6.8 show the probability distributions of LIs for the best- 
and worst-served customers (i.e. corresponding best/worst MV load points) in terms 
of frequency and duration of LI, respectively. As expected, the customers/load points 
located farther away from the MV substation (as illustrated Fig. 6.5, where load 
points are marked from “Customer 1” to “Customer 8”) will experience both higher 
frequencies and longer durations of LIs. 
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Figure 6.7:  PDF for frequency of LIs for the best-served (Customer 1) and the 
worst-served (Customer 8) load points in generic urban MV network in Fig. 6.5. 






















 Duration customer 1 (MCS mean=0.8016)
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Figure 6.8:  PDF for duration of LIs for the best-served (Customer 1) and the worst-
served (Customer 8) load points in generic urban MV network in Fig. 6.5. 
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The results in Figs. 6.7 and 6.8 clearly show that the DG (and possible dedicated ES) 
located at the LV load point “Customer 8” (see Fig. 6.5) would be more beneficial 
than anywhere else in the considered generic MV network, as the reliability 
performance indicators are there 5-6 times worse than at LV load point “Customer 
1”. This will be particularly true if “islanded operation” is enabled at this load point, 
but even if this is not the case, the combined DG-ES system will help to reduce the 
loading of the network and network components, which is also location-based 
impact. 
Further attempts are made to provide a more realistic analysis of the impact of DG on 
overall distribution network and customer reliability. Instead of using uniform fault 
rates and maximum load demand, the analysis presented next also includes load 
profiles (of residential customers) from Section 4.6.1, daily probabilities of fault 
rates, as discussed in Section 3.4.2 and DG power outputs [171]. With these inputs, 
different results will be obtained, as, for example, if one of the 33/11kV transformers 
in the primary distribution substation fails when the demand is lower than the power 
rating of the remaining 33/11kV transformer (i.e. 2/3 of the peak load), most, or even 
all of the customers might still be supplied (even after demand increase) if 
appropriate corrective action is taken by the DNOs (e.g. if they perform a prompt 
repair of the faulted transformer, before the demand increases over the rated power 
of the remaining transformer). 
In this context, the coordination of the connected DG with a dedicated ES system 
could overcome problems with variable outputs of renewable DG and provide full 
support, as loads can be supplied from ES even if there is no RER (e.g. during the 
night in case of PV-based DG systems). Two different general schemes with ES are 
analysed: a) when the DG outputs are stored and used for reducing peak load demand 
(so called “peak load shaving application”), and b) when the DG outputs are stored 
and used for reducing demand during the hours of the day when the probability of 
fault/interruption is higher. The analysis is done for the DG penetration levels of: 
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20%, 30% and 50% of the peak demand and the three following cases besides the 
base Case 1 (no DG and no ES): 
• Uncontrolled DG (Case 2) – daily DG outputs are estimated based on the 
variability of input RER and these outputs were injected into the grid (no 
energy storage is available). 
• Energy Storage: Peak (Case 3) – daily DG outputs during the day are stored 
in the dedicated ES system and used (i.e. discharged into the grid) to reduce 
evening peak load (between 16:00-22:00 hours, Fig. 4.14). 
• Energy Storage: Reliability (Case 4) – daily DG outputs during the day are 
stored in the dedicated ES system and used (i.e. discharged into the grid) 
during the hours of the day when there is a higher probability of fault 
(between 08:00-14:00 hours, Fig. 3.3) in order to reduce demand specifically 
for reliability improvement purposes. 
With the above four cases, the benefits of using only DG (Case 2), using both DG 
and ES in a typical peak demand shaving applications (Case 3) and using both DG 
and ES in a specific reliability improvement application (Case 4) can be quantified in 
terms of the improvement in calculated reliability indices.  
Table 6.13 shows the results of the corresponding MCS analysis, with fault rates and 
repair times modelled using the exponential distribution function [48, 49, 50] for the 
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Table 6.13:  Calculated Reliability Indices (mean values) 
Case DG % SAIFI MAIFI SAIDI CAIDI ENS 
1 0 0.0885 0.1120 2.7467 31.0374 3.8820 
2 
20 0.0727 0.0846 2.3079 28.5506 3.2619 
30 0.0621 0.0722 1.8808 27.8293 2.6583 
50 0.0491 0.0562 1.5019 26.7083 2.1228 
3 
20 0.0672 0.0780 2.1421 28.1420 3.0276 
30 0.0582 0.0673 1.8439 27.5183 2.6060 
50 0.0479 0.0555 1.3792 26.5919 1.9493 
4 
20 0.0648 0.0750 2.0723 28.0955 2.9289 
30 0.0562 0.0650 1.7460 27.4689 2.4677 
50 0.0383 0.0441 1.0655 25.7744 1.5059 
Based on the results in Table 6.13, it can be see that connection of DG helps to 
improve all reliability indices and that the improvement is stronger with the 
increased amount of DG connected. The main reason for this improvement is that the 
increasing DG penetration levels reduce the loading of the upstream network by 
locally supplying the neighbouring customers in the downstream network, which 
therefore do not depend on the supply from the grid. Therefore, the effects of the 
upstream network faults result in a reduced stress of the healthy part of the network 
and remaining network components, as they effectively supply the lower number of 
customers (e.g. one of the two 33/11kV transformers is now capable of supplying 
lower demand, i.e. only the portion of demand which is not supplied locally by DG 
and/or ES).  
Different cases (Cases 2, 3 and 4) with the same DG penetration levels (20%, 30% 
and 50% of the peak demand) illustrate additional benefits of using ES and 
coordinating operation of combined DG-ES system with the actual network loading 
conditions (Case 3) and when the network is exposed to a higher probability of fault 
(Case 4). Among all considered cases, Case 4 emerges as the best scenario of 
implementing DG and ES in terms of reliability performance, giving an improvement 
of reliability indices of around 10%-20% in comparison with Case 3. 
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Figs. 6.9 and 6.10 presents PDFs for SAIFI and CAIDI reliability indices. 
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b) 30% DG penetration 
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c) 50% DG penetration 
Figure 6.9:  SAIFI index 
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c) 50% DG penetration 
Figure 6.10:  CAIDI index 
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Table 6.13 provides only results for mean values of reliability indices, while their 
distributions in Figs. 6.9 and 6.10 provide additional information. It can be seen in 
the zoomed-in parts of Fig. 6.9 that DG and ES increase the probability of zero LIs, 
based on the initial PDF values (for zero value on X-axis). Additionally, increased 
penetration levels of DG impact shorter ‘tails’ of the distribution curves, i.e. reduced 
probabilities of a high number of LIs (Fig. 6.9), as well as reduced probabilities of 
excessively long-duration LIs (Fig. 6.10). As previously discussed, situations in 
which more and more customers have their own generation capacity to supply their 
local demands (i.e. the increased DG penetration levels), effectively means that the 
energy not supplied due to the faults is not counted as ENS, as there is no interrupted 
customers (again, using example of two parallel transformers, one of them can 
supply all the loads in case of the fault of another transformer). This effect can be 
seen in Figure 6.10, where the PDF curves for 20%, 30% and 50% DG penetration 
levels are moving to the left, showing lower probabilities of CAIDI values. 
Table 6.14 presents the results for the evaluation of DG benefits regarding the 
regulatory GSP requirements through the calculated risk of paying compensation. 
The risk reduces as the DG is incorporated within the network, thus suggesting that 
DG implementation will bring positive impact on DNOs (less penalty/compenasation 
payments) and improve reliability from customers’ perspective (shorter duration of 
interruptions). The presented analysis did not consider the impact of possible reverse 
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Table 6.14:  Penalty risks for 18 hours and 12 hours LI duration limits (in 
percentages) 
Case DG % 
GSP limit 
18 hours 12 hours 
1 0 50.05 64.47 
2 
20 48.17 62.11 
30 47.82 61.93 
50 46.93 61.23 
3 
20 47.07 61.34 
30 46.97 61.61 
50 46.52 60.96 
4 
20 46.04 60.64 
30 45.94 60.48 
50 45.47 60.06 
 
6.4 Chapter Summary 
The implementation of SoS and GSP requirements during the assessment of the 
DNOs operational/reliability performance is important, as it is directly aimed at 
protecting supplied customers from excessively long and frequent long interruptions 
(there is currently no limits for frequency of SIs). Since Energy Regulators specify 
certain maximum duration of interruption limits for all customers, DNOs are able to 
calculate their risks of paying penalty/compensation based on their network 
performance. Through assessing these risks, the DNOs will be able to identify where 
upgrading and improving of their networks are required, through e.g. installation of 
new/additional protection equipment, or implementation of network automation and 
reconfiguration functionalities. This is even more important, as the Energy 
Regulators actively monitor and revise targets and limits imposed to the DNOs (for 
example, reduction of the maximum allowed duration of interruptions from 18 hours 
to 12 hours in the UK). The analysis in this chapter demonstrated how the risks of 
paying penalties and compensations can be evaluated and how specific “vulnerable” 
customer locations (where additional measures might be required) can be identified. 
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This chapter also presented analysis of the potential improvement of reliability 
performance after the implementation of DG with or without dedicated ES systems 
in LV distribution networks. The management and coordination of DG and ES with 
assumed loading conditions in the network is assessed in the time-sequential MCS 
calculation approach, allowing to specify and quantify benefits through the 
calculated reliability indices. In order to provide a more detailed analysis, two types 
of active DG integration and one type of passive DG integration are considered in 
this chapter. The passive DG integration is when DG is not managed and when no 
energy storage is implemented. The two type of active integration of DG with 
dedicated ES system are considered: a) one for “demand peak shaving” application 
(when DG outputs are stored during the day and discharged during the evening peak 
load), and b) another for “reliability improvement” (when DG outputs are stored 
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Chapter 7 Conclusions and Further Work 
This thesis mainly focused on the formulation of improved methodologies for a more 
detailed and more confident assessment of reliability performance of MV and LV 
distribution networks. The basic approach was to consider and evaluate existing 
approaches and then identify points that can be improved, formulate these 
improvements and implement them in the comprehensive evaluation procedures and 
flexible models for the calculation of reliability indices. The various (typical) 
residential UK/Scottish MV and LV distribution networks were modelled with the 
four generic models, represented with detailed parameters, configurations, 
components, protection systems and typical operating and fault conditions. In 
general, most of the existing literature only present the general information on fault 
rates and repair times without distinguishing between different types of the networks 
and served customers. Therefore, a methodology was presented for segregating the 
fault rates and repair times for each of the four developed generic networks based on 
available statistics, data, DNO reports and further evaluations of network 
functionalities. Here, correct representation of LV networks is required to introduce a 
full three-phase model, in order to acknowledge relevant aspects of operation of real 
distribution networks and assess impact on customers. The analysis also includes 
SoS and GSP requirements, actual load profiles and daily probabilities of faults, 
which are used for the assessment of both system-average indices and network 
performance, but also for best-served and worst-served customers in considered 
networks. The analysis of variations and changes in network reliability performance 
is illustrated on a number of examples, including generic LV and MV network 
models, an offshore wind-based power plant and networks and several scenarios with 
different penetration levels of distributed generation with and without dedicated 
energy storage. The primary target “users” of the presented methodologies and 
models are DNOs, but the other parties and subjects (e.g. developers and supplied 
customers) could also use them for reliability assessment at both network planning 
and operation stages. 
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7.1 Reliability Assessment Methodologies 
This thesis implemented two general approaches for analysing and quantifying 
reliability performance of all considered networks. The first approach relies on the 
use of analytical and deterministic methodology, which is based on the 
corresponding mathematical interpretations and calculations, and is still used in cases 
where the analysed networks are very complex and large, due to computational 
efficiency and simplicity. However, the analytical methods only provide a single set 
of output values for one set of input of parameters and network configurations, 
typically limited to the mean/average values of reliability indices. Additionally, the 
analytical methods are characterised with a limited ability to take into account 
differences in possible fault-response conditions, mainly due to the used protection 
systems, components and schemes, but also due to different types of faults. Some of 
the examples are operation of circuit breakers and sectionalisers (requiring first 
disconnection of the circuit breaker and then activation of the sectionaliser, which is 
strongly influenced by the actual location and type of fault), as well as possible 
different changes in network configurations, e.g. due to provision of alternative 
supply point with limited supply capabilities. Consequently, analytical methods 
provide limited information for the simplified network representation for restricted 
range of input of parameters. 
The second used approach relied on the implementation of probabilistic methods, 
which in this thesis was Monte-Carlo simulation (MCS) method. The MCS approach 
allows to analyse network reliability performance taking into account time-sequence 
of events, providing a more comprehensive output results than just the mean value of 
reliability indices. However, the MCS approach also requires much longer 
computational times, which could be prohibitive in the case of very large and 
complex networks (or at least limited by the available computational resources). 
Since MCS-based analysis was inherently stochastic (there are no two identical MCS 
runs), it was required to define and implement certain accuracy and convergence 
criteria, which are in this thesis evaluated based on the coefficients of error and 
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variation and requirements for the total simulation period based on the values of 
input data. 
An important aspect of the analysis of modern power supply systems is an increased 
use of network automation, reconfiguration, remote control and alternative supply 
functionalities, which all essentially impact that faults which previously resulted in 
long supply interruptions (LIs) of customers are effectively resulting in short 
interruptions (SIs) of customers, therefore improving network reliability 
performance, but deteriorating power quality performance. This part of the analysis 
requires implement complex algorithms with careful evaluation of component repair 
times, network automation, reconfiguration, control and alternative supply transfer 
capabilities, but also types of implemented protection devices and their settings in 
analysing different types of faults (single, double and three-phase, which also can be 
permanent or transient). In this thesis, this was again done for all the four generic LV 
and MV network models.  
7.2 Modelling of MV and LV Networks 
In determining the typical network configurations and network components, as well 
as characteristics of supplied customers and applied protection systems, it is first 
essential to understand the main design criteria and operational principles of the 
considered networks. Within the specific network, every possible fault location is 
different both in terms of short circuit fault currents and, therefore, conditions to 
which protection devices (but also all other network components) will be exposed 
during the faults. This means that the same type of protection devices installed at 
different network locations will require different settings, while installation of 
different types of protection devices (e.g. fuses vs. circuit breakers) will require full 
re-evaluation of the analysis performed for one type of protection device in case of 
installation of other type(s). This is, perhaps, best illustrated in the thesis using the 
example of the LV networks, where it is shown that the standard single-line-diagram 
network representation (in most, if not all of conventional reliability assessment 
approaches) cannot be used due to the differences in operation of single-pole and 
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three-pole protection devices and typical single-phase connection of residential 
customers in the UK. 
The analysis in this thesis introduced a more detailed and, hopefully, more accurate 
classification of residential customers into four generic load subsectors, depending 
on the type of dwelling, location, size, geographical and circuit dispersion of 
demands. Accordingly, classification into four generic subsectors allowed to specify 
typical network configurations, components and protection systems supplying 
corresponding residential customers, generally denoted as highly-urban (HU), urban 
(U), sub-urban (SU) and rural (R) typical UK/Scottish LV and MV distribution 
networks. Each subsector is different in arrangement, configuration and types/sizes 
of components, as well as in operating conditions. In an urban/city area, where load 
density is high, customers are evenly distributed and loads are highly concentrated, 
shorter feeder lines in the form of underground cables are used due to limited space 
availability, better reliability performance and aesthetic reasons. In rural and sub-
urban areas, however, dispersion of customers is higher, loads are non-evenly 
distributed and longer overhead line feeders are used, mainly due to reduced costs. 
Importantly, the overall exposure to faults and nature/type of experienced faults is 
different, which is, again, reflected in the different characteristics of supplying 
networks and applied protection systems. This required to provide full description 
and characterisation of the actual operating, protection, loading and fault conditions 
in the four generic LV and MV distribution network models, which was not available 
in the existing literature and previous work. Finally, this thesis also provides analysis 
of different sizes of the same-type generic networks, where ratings of the supplying 
primary and secondary distribution transformers are used as the main criteria for 
specifying number of served customers. 
It is important to again highlight that the design, configuration and parameters of the 
networks and applied protection systems are different in MV and LV distribution 
networks, resulting in substantially different impact on reliability of supplied 
customers. For example, some of the differences that should be correctly analysed 
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during the modelling of MV networks and LV networks are not only related to 
different voltage transformation (from 33kV to 11kV, or by the direct transformation 
of 132kV to 11kV in MV network, compared to 11kV to 0.4kV in LV networks), but 
also to redundancy and parallel network connection/operation of transformers in MV 
networks (full or partial N-1 security). Furthermore, most MV networks are designed 
with a meshed configuration, but operated in radial configuration due to available 
network reconfiguration capabilities and provision of alternative supply points. 
An important contribution of this thesis is formulation of more detailed and more 
accurate reliability equivalent models of (generic) LV networks, specifically aimed at 
analysis of MV and HV networks, taking into account all abovementioned factors 
and parameters for the assessment of reliability performance. This allows to reduce 
computational times of MV/HV networks with the correct representation of LV 
network through the corresponding reliability equivalent models. This is illustrated 
using both analytical and probabilistic results for the calculated reliability indices and 
indicators (equivalent fault rates, SAIFI, equivalent repair times, CAIDI, etc.). DNOs 
or developers may use the generic LV and MV network models as base or reference 
models and cases for the reliability analysis, which may require further adjustment of 
network parameters and components, extension or reduction of network 
configuration, etc, based on the modelled geographical area, availability of 
generation/storage resources and load concentration. 
7.3 Input Parameters for Reliability Assessment 
Two basic input data for reliability assessment are mean fault rates and mean repair 
times (and their assumed or known distributions). These basic input parameters are in 
existing literature (and other sources, e.g. reports on network performance levels) 
almost always presented without the distinction between different network types and 
supplied areas. Therefore, this thesis presented a methodology for segregating fault 
rates and repair times into four considered generic residential load subsectors. This 
methodology starts from the analysis of available DNO reports and statistics, to 
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evaluate coefficients for recalculating input data for the considered load subsector 
and incorporate them in the subsequent reliability assessment procedures. 
Another important aspect (i.e. input data) of the presented reliability analysis is 
quantification of permanent and temporary faults for different generic LV and MV 
networks, as their proportions (and fault-response schemes) determine the numbers 
of LIs and SIs of supplied customers. Additionally, this analysis also took into 
account daily load curves of customers (which are typically represented by only the 
maximum demand in conventional approaches), and correlated these with daily fault 
probabilities, as determined after detailed analysis of fault statistics from the Scottish 
DNO. Again, the motivation was to reduce possible overestimations or 
underestimations of reliability performance indicators, i.e. to provide a more 
confident analysis of the possible ranges of variations of calculated output results. 
7.4 Energy Regulator Requirements 
In order to protect residential and small to medium size non-residential customers 
from excessively long and frequent supply interruptions, the Regulators usually 
define two main continuity of supplies requirements: guaranteed standard of 
performance, GSP, and security of supply, SoS. The GSP requirements are generally 
aimed at ensuring that every customer receives at least the minimum level of 
continuity of supply from the DNOs, e.g. specifying allowed limits for the maximum 
restoration time for up to 5,000 customers (12 hours) and more than 5,000 customers 
(24 hours), where the corresponding compensations are paid directly to the 
customers (not to the Regulator). The SoS requirements specify the maximum times 
for restoring supply to at least a minimum group demands of the interrupted 
customers, classified in six groups/classes, again based on the amount of interruptes 
demands (i.e. number of customers). This thesis not only incorporates these 
requirements in the analysis (e.g. by re-evaluating some of the reported mean fault 
rates and, particularly, mean repair times for the assessment of LIs), but also 
proposes a methodology for calculating risks of paying penalty or compensation for 
various scenarios with the considered generic LV and MV networks. 
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7.5 Evaluation of Average, Best and Worst Served 
Customers 
DNOs usually report SAIFI (or CI), MAIFI (or SI), SAIDI (or CML), CAIDI and 
few other reliability indices expressing performance of an “average customer”, as 
these indices are calculated as single average (mean) values taking into account all 
served customers in a given network. From a system-based point of view, these 
values are sufficient for representing and reporting the DNOs’ network performance. 
However, the corresponding “average customer” is generally fictitious, as the actual 
supplied customers will have both better and worse performance. Accordingly, this 
thesis presented analysis in which best-served and worst-served actual customers are 
identified for the considered generic LV and MV networks (in terms of both the 
numbers of interruptions and durations of interruptions) and for which risks of 
penalty/compensation are calculated. 
7.6 Integration of DG and ES 
The analysis presented in this PhD thesis considered some aspects of the operation of 
modern electricity networks which are generally denoted as “smart grid” 
functionalities, e.g. increased reconfiguration flexibility, automation, remote control 
and provision of alternative supply. Particular attention is given to the analysis of 
increasing penetration levels of variable renewable-based distributed generation 
(DG) technologies, with or without dedicated energy storage (ES) systems. This part 
of the analysis showed that DG and ES, especially when coordinated, might have 
strong impact on system reliability performance, even if they do not allow operation 
in the “islanded mode”. 
Several considered scenarios for management and coordinated control of DG and ES 
are quantified in terms of the calculated reliability indices for the considered LV 
generic networks, showing that the best location for DG and ES is at the points 
where the total duration of supply interruptions is the longest/worst. This analysis 
implemented the MCS approach, allowing to implement time-varying daily fault 
rates and estimate when exactly outputs of DG should be stored and when stored 
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energy should be discharged. Accordingly, it is shown that the most beneficial 
impact of DG and ES would be when demands are reduced during the times of the 
day when the probability of fault is high.  
7.7 Research Limitations 
The main limitations of the research, analysis and methodologies presented in this 
thesis can be summarised as follows. 
1. Implementation of MCS-based approaches results in inherently stochastic 
output results, requiring to define (and evaluate) both accuracy requirements 
and sufficient duration of the total simulation period. As previously 
discussed, the MCS approaches require longer simulation times than the 
analytical approaches. The simulation times can be reduced by increasing the 
time step of the simulation, which in this thesis was selected as 15 or 30 
minutes. However, a 1-minute time-step (or better) is required for simulations 
to provide fully confident discrimination of LIs from SIs, while for a short 
circuit analysis time-step of one second (or better) is required to make clear 
distinction between permanent, temporary, transient, developing and 
intermittent faults. For example, an attempt was made to increase the 
accuracy by reducing the time-step of simulation in this thesis, using one 
minute and even one second step, but it was found that will require months of 
simulations with a massive sets of output simulation data, requiring 
prohibitively high computational and data-processing resources. Therefore, 
the best trade-off option between accuracy and simulation times was found 
when the time simulation steps between 15 and 30 minutes are used (if there 
was an interruption within one time-step, it was considered to be SI, while an 
interruption in more than one successive simulation time-steps was 
considered to be LI). Comparison of mean values with the analytical methods 
confirmed that relatively large time-steps used in this thesis did not affect 
much the accuracy of the calculated reliability indices results. 
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2. Accurate/Confident calculation of reliability indices requires comprehensive 
and detailed input data, which strongly depend on the available information 
from past statistics and historical records of fault rates and repair times of 
network components. As discussed in the thesis, available literature and 
reports do not provide complete or at least sufficient information, which 
generally should distinguish between different voltage levels, types of the 
networks, sizes and types of the components and other relevant factors (e.g. 
age of components in operation). For example, various sources for mean fault 
rates of DG did not provide information on exact voltage levels, but only 
general indication of HV, MV and LV, while DNOs generally do not provide 
information on SAIFI and MAIFI indices separately for MV or LV level, but 
only on “distribution networks”, which consists of both MV and LV parts. 
Consequently, this thesis used the same proportions of SI and LI in both MV 
and LV networks, which is generally not the case in the real networks. 
3. The modelling of MV and LV networks with detailed configurations, 
parameters and types/sizes/settings of network components required the 
specification of significant amount of information. Although there were some 
sources for specifying required input data, most of them do not divide general 
distribution networks into (highly) urban, rural or sub-urban types/areas. 
Therefore, some of the network models are changed/adjusted, in order to 
correctly represent the changes in the networks supplying different customers 
at different locations. For example, the LV urban network configuration was 
available from [39], but no (clear and detailed) information was available for 
the configuration of LV highly-urban network, which was in this thesis 
developed as a logical and technical extension of urban network. Statistically, 
the populations and numbers of customers in highly-urban areas/networks are 
higher than in urban areas/networks, and similar configurations and principles 
of operations are applied with increased numbers of service connection 
feeders in highly-urban areas and a few other modifications (e.g. use of direct 
transformation). 
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4. The output of the calculated reliability analysis should be validated in some 
suitable ways (e.g. by comparing calculated and reported indices in case of 
modelling actual networks), but this generally require a large number of 
measurements performed on specific areas of distribution networks. Since the 
generic networks analysed, modelled and simulated in this thesis are 
relatively small and it was not clear how available information on system 
reliability performance can be applied to these networks, it can be generally 
concluded that the validation of generic HU/U/SU/R LV and MV networks 
and corresponding network models (including reliability equivalents) was not 
as robust and as detailed as would be desirable. This was done to the extent 
which was possible within the available time for this research, with, for 
example, validation of the specific stages of the modelling process, in order 
to provide confidence in the final results. For this purpose, another reliability 
indicator based on load sector [152] can be used to evaluate the trends in fault 
rates and repair times. This information was considered sufficient for the 
validation, as the analysed generic networks followed the past performance 
trends in different load subsectors. 
7.8 Recommendations for Further Work 
Some aspects of the presented methodologies, modelling approaches and 
simulation/calculation procedures could be further improved (or updated), including: 
1. Within the presented MCS approaches, the same load profiles are used for all 
four residential load sub-sectors, assuming that changes between them are not 
large. However, demands and load profiles are different in different load 
sectors, and estimated reliability performance will be improved if simulations 
include more than one load profile. Furthermore, this thesis correlated daily 
probability fault rates with the daily load profiles, where an average daily 
probability fault rate is used to model occurrence of faults in all load 
subsectors. However, different networks with different network components 
will ultimately result in different daily probability fault rates, e.g. depending 
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on the electrical insulation/stress levels, exposure to elements and external 
factors. etc. Therefore, it is expected that further improvements could be 
achieved if more detailed daily load profiles and daily fault probabilities are 
combined in the presented MCS approaches. Although statistical reliability 
data and databases by DNOs generally allow to extract information on faults 
and repair times of HU, U, SU and R networks (e.g. by suitable querying of 
databases), which will then directly validate some of the presented results, 
accessing these data was not possible during this PhD research. 
2. The LV distribution network models were presented with detailed 
configurations and parameters, which is unprecedented in existing literature 
on reliability performance assessment. Although most of the network models 
are in this thesis developed and presented as the “complete models”, at least 
in terms of their implementation for reliability analysis, LV networks are 
simulated as typical UK single-phase residential networks, where protection 
and control are based on single-pole components. For example, in the case of 
a single-phase fault in LV networks, only one phase was affected, while the 
other two phases were “healthy” and still receiving continuous power supply. 
However, most of the customers in Europe are three-phase connected and, for 
a comparable analysis, the presented methodology should be modified to 
allow for the implementation of the three-pole protection and control 
equipment in the modelling of generic LV distribution networks. 
3. Finally, the next step of the work could concentrate on obtaining output 
results with the higher resolution. This is already discussed as one of the 
limitations of the presented research, where the MCS approach could be 
simulated with a shorter time-step, in order to not increase the accuracy of the 
results in terms of more confident evaluation of LIs and SIs. The higher 
computational requirements for shorter simulation time-steps could be 
resolved if parallel high-speed computing resources are used in suitably 
formulated algorithms, which was out of the scope of this thesis, but is 
another possible direction of further research. 
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% Variables to define: 













% most components percentage of SI and LI ratio 








    li_seq(h)=li; 





% if there any irregular ratio of SI and LI from most components 
li_r=0; % in per unit 
si_r=1-li_r; 
  




    r=pc_irregular(q); 
     
    li_seq(r)=li_r; 










  226 
years=10000;    % number of years of simulation 
multiplier=1; % down to days scale 
step=1;  % no of steps in one hour 
hours=1*step;   % 24 hours times with 2 step = 48 step of 30 minutes 
days=years*multiplier*hours; 
  
lambda=lambda1/(multiplier*hours);   % failure/hours 




% fault rates daily probabilities 
lambda_probabilities=zeros(hours,1); 
lambda2=1; 
for o=1:hours; % probabilities of fault rates in one day 
    if (o>=1 && o<=(5*step)); 
        lambda_probabilities(o,:)=lambda2*0.375; 
         
    elseif (o>(5*step) && o<=(10*step)); 
        lambda_probabilities(o,:)=lambda2*((0.225*((o/step)-1))-
0.525); 
         
    elseif (o>(10*step) && o<=(18*step)); 
        lambda_probabilities(o,:)=lambda2*1.5; 
         
    elseif (o>(18*step) && o<=(24*step)); 
        lambda_probabilities(o,:)=lambda2*((237/56)-
((9/56)*((o/step)-1))); 
         
    end 






    lambda_1(p+j-1:q+j-1,1)=lambda_probabilities; % fault rates 
extend in days*years 
     
    p=p+hours-1; 











    if (lambda1(i)>=0.1)    %lambda 2% miu 2% 
        u_lambda_accuracy(i)=1.02; 
        l_lambda_accuracy(i)=0.98; 
        u_miu_accuracy(i)=1.02; 
        l_miu_accuracy(i)=0.98; 
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    elseif (lambda1(i)>=0.01 && lambda1(i)<0.1)  %lambda 5% miu 3% 
        u_lambda_accuracy(i)=1.05; 
        l_lambda_accuracy(i)=0.95; 
        u_miu_accuracy(i)=1.02; 
        l_miu_accuracy(i)=0.98; 
         
    elseif (lambda1(i)>=0.001 && lambda1(i)<0.01) %lambda 10% miu 5% 
        u_lambda_accuracy(i)=1.1; 
        l_lambda_accuracy(i)=0.9; 
        u_miu_accuracy(i)=1.05; 
        l_miu_accuracy(i)=0.95; 
         
    elseif (lambda1(i)>=0.0002 && lambda1(i)<0.001) %lambda 20% miu 
5% 
        u_lambda_accuracy(i)=1.2; 
        l_lambda_accuracy(i)=0.8; 
        u_miu_accuracy(i)=1.05; 
        l_miu_accuracy(i)=0.95; 
         
    elseif (lambda1(i)<0.0002)  %lambda & miu 100% 
        u_lambda_accuracy(i)=2; 
        l_lambda_accuracy(i)=0; 
        u_miu_accuracy(i)=2; 
        l_miu_accuracy(i)=0; 
         
    else 
    end 
end 
  










% inverse transformation of TTF (fault rates) 
TTF=zeros(days,length(lambda)); 
  
%Weibull Distribution Family 





    U1=rand(days,1); 
    for k=1:days 
        TTF(k,z)=(-1/(lambda_1*lambda(z)))*log(U1(k,1));  % Inverse 
Exponential CDF for Fault Rates  
    end 
    TTF=round(TTF); 
    A1=find(TTF(:,z)==1); 
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    A2=length(A1)/years; 
  
    % check and re-calculate if output not within accuracy limit 
    while (A2<=lower_lambda(z) || A2>=upper_lambda(z)); 
        U1=rand(days,1); 
        for k=1:days 
            TTF(k,z)=(-1/(lambda_1*lambda(z)))*log(U1(k,1));  % 
Inverse Exponential CDF for Fault Rates   
        end 
        TTF=round(TTF); 
        A1=find(TTF(:,z)==1); 
        A2=length(A1)/years; 
     
        if (A2>=lower_lambda(z) && A2<=upper_lambda(z)); 
            break 
        end 
         
    end 









    A=find(TTF(:,j)==1); % find the number of occurance of fault for 
each power component 
    B(1,j)=length(A);   % array of number of occurance of fault for 
each power component 
    F(1,j)=length(A)/years; % mean of lambda after 









    B2(p)=B(p)*li_seq(p); 
     
    upper_B2(p)=B2(p)*u_lambda_accuracy(p)*1.1; 
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     SI_LI=randsrc(B(1,l),1,[0 2;si_seq(l) li_seq(l)]);% 0=SI,2=LI 
     LI=find(SI_LI);  
     SI=find(SI_LI<2);   
  
     G=find(TTF(:,l)==1); 
     f_LI=G(LI); % location of fault for LI 
     D=length(f_LI); 
     
    % check accuracy of LI/SI ratio 
    while (D<=lower_B2(l) || D>=upper_B2(l));     
        SI_LI=randsrc(B(1,l),1,[0 2;si_seq(l) li_seq(l)]);%0=SI,2=LI 
        LI=find(SI_LI);  
        SI=find(SI_LI<2);   
  
        G=find(TTF(:,l)==1); 
        f_LI=G(LI); % location of fault for LI 
        D=length(f_LI); 
         
        if (D>=lower_B2(l) && D<=upper_B2(l)); 
            break 
        end 
    end 
     
    f_SI=G(SI); % location of fault for SI 
    E=length(f_SI); 
     
    f_LI_1(1:D,l)=f_LI; 
    f_SI_1(1:E,l)=f_SI; 
     
    % inverse transformation of TTR (mean time to repair) 
    U2=rand(D,1); 
    TTR=zeros(C,1); 
    for m=1:D; 
        TTR(m,1)=G3(l)*(-log(U2(m)))^(1/b3);    % Inverse Weibull 
(Exponential) CDF for each power component depending on how many 
interruption per power component in order to get mean values for 
each power component      
    end 
     
    B1=find(TTR>0); 
    mean_TTR=mean(TTR(B1)); 
     
    % check and re-calculate if output not within accuracy limit 
    while (mean_TTR<=lower_miu(l) || mean_TTR>=upper_miu(l)); 
        U2=rand(D,1); 
        for m=1:D; 
            TTR(m,1)=G3(l)*(-log(U2(m)))^(1/b3);    % Inverse 
Weibull (Exponential) CDF for each power component depending on how 
many interruption per power component in order to get mean values 
for each power component      
        end 
         
        B1=find(TTR>0); 
        mean_TTR=mean(TTR(B1)); 
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        if (mean_TTR>=lower_miu(l) && mean_TTR<=upper_miu(l)); 
            break 
        end 
         
    end 
  
    mean_TTR_2(1,l)=mean_TTR;   % to check mean MTTR 









    for b=1:C; 
        if (f_LI_1(b,a)>0); 
            f_LI_2(b,a)=f_LI_1(b,a)+(days*c); 
        else 
            f_LI_2(b,a)=f_LI_1(b,a); 
        end 
    end 
    c=c+1; 
end 
  




    for g=1:C; 
        if (f_SI_1(g,e)>0); 
            f_SI_2(g,e)=f_SI_1(g,e)+(days*d); 
        else 
            f_SI_2(g,e)=f_SI_1(g,e); 
        end 
    end 










    f1=find(TTR1(:,n)>0); 
    mean_lambda_46(:,n)=length(f1)/years;   %mean of lambda after LI 
ratio 
     
    TTR2=TTR1(f1,n); 






  231 
for zz=1:length(lambda); 
    f1_12=find(f_SI_2(:,zz)>0); 
    mean_si(:,zz)=length(f1_12)/years;   %mean of lambda after LI 
ratio 





% for input of simulation 
f2=find(TTR1>0); 
TTR3=TTR1(f2);  %final value of LI without rounding 
TTR4=round(TTR3);   %final value of LI with rounding 
  
f3=find(f_LI_2>0);   
f_li=f_LI_2(f3);    %final location of LI     
  
f4=find(f_SI_2>0); 
f_si=f_SI_2(f4);    %final location of SI 
  
dir2=[dir '/' int2str(folder)]; 
cd(dir2) 
  
save -v7.3 f_li f_li 
save -v7.3 f_si f_si 
save -v7.3 TTR4 TTR4 
  
save -v7.3 pc_start pc_start 
save -v7.3 pc_end pc_end 
save -v7.3 pc_size pc_size 
save -v7.3 years years 
save -v7.3 multiplier multiplier 
save -v7.3 hours hours 
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Appendix B: Python code for PSS/E Simulation 
# read load profile data 
h=open(r"""C:\Users\Mohd Ikhwan\Desktop\urban\simulation\analytical\lp_avg.txt""", 'r') 
i = 0 
while i < 1: 
        temp=float(h.readline()) 
        LOAD.extend([temp]) 




# read power factor data 
PF=[] 
h=open(r"""C:\Users\Mohd Ikhwan\Desktop\urban\simulation\analytical\pf_avg.txt""", 'r') 
i = 0 
while i < 1: 
        temp = float(h.readline()) 
        PF.extend([temp]) 








while p < 10001: 
 
        path1="S:/Documents/LVHU3phasefuseCB_v2/Input_text/%d" %(p) 
 




        psspy.case(r"""S:\Documents\LVHU3phasefuseCB_v2\ignacio\LVHU3phaseCB.sav""") 
 
        # suppress outputs in the PSSE display 
        psspy.report_output(6,"",[0,0])   
        psspy.progress_output(6,"",[0,0]) 
        psspy.alert_output(6,"",[0,0]) 
 
        # initialise load status arrays (0=interrupted / not 0 = normal operation) 
        l_1=[] 
        l_2=[] 
        l_3=[] 
        l_4=[] 
        l_5=[] 
        l_6=[] 
        l_7=[] 
        l_8=[] 
        l_9=[] 
        l_10=[] 
        l_11=[] 
        l_12=[] 
        l_13=[] 
        l_14=[] 
        l_15=[] 
        l_16=[] 
        l_17=[] 
        l_18=[] 
        l_19=[] 
 
 
        # read 17520 x 30min status (0-open or 1-closed) coefficients 
        NPCs=545 # declare number of power components     (+ 2 Backups =146 PCs) 
        PC=[0]*NPCs #declare empty array of loads 
 
        npc=0 
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        while npc<NPCs: 
                 
                PCtemp=[] 
                exec "f=open('PC%d.txt', "r")" % (npc+1) 
                i = 0 
                while i < 2880:                     ### 17520 steps (1year in 30min) 
                        temp=float(f.readline()) 
                        PCtemp.extend([temp]) 
                        i = i + 1 
                f.close() 
                PC[npc]=PCtemp 
                npc=npc+1 
 
 
        N=0 
 
        while N<2880: 
             
                psspy.case(r"""S:\Documents\LVHU3phasefuseCB_v2\ignacio\LVHU3phaseCB.sav""") 
 
        #------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        # Create subsystem with 19 loads (Residential) 
                
psspy.bsys(2,0,[0.0,0.0],0,[],19,[1016,1017,1023,1032,2012,2022,3013,3026,3027,3029,3034,3035,3049,30410,30411,3053,30
63,4015,4016],0,[],0,[]) #buses IDs 
 
 
        # Change Load Profile 
        # Residential         
                psspy.scal(2,0,1,[0,0,0,0],[0.0,0.0,0.0,0.0,0.0,0.0,0.0]) 
                psspy.scal(2,0,2,[2,0,1,0],[LOAD[N],0.0,0.0,0.0,0.0,0.0,0.0]) 
 
 
        # change PF 
        # Residential  
                psspy.scal(2,0,1,[0,0,0,0],[0.0,0.0,0.0,0.0,0.0,0.0,0.0]) 
                psspy.scal(2,0,2,[2,0,4,0],[ 0.0,0.0,0.0,0.0,0.0,0.0,PF[N]]) 
 
 
        #------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        # Change status (on/off) for all Power Components: 
        # cable 0.2kV                 
                if PC[0][N]==0: psspy.branch_chng(7,201,r"""1""",[0,_i,_i,_i,_i,_i],[_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f]) 
                if PC[1][N]==0: psspy.branch_chng(7,202,r"""1""",[0,_i,_i,_i,_i,_i],[_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f]) 
                if PC[2][N]==0: psspy.branch_chng(7,203,r"""1""",[0,_i,_i,_i,_i,_i],[_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f]) 
                if PC[3][N]==0: psspy.branch_chng(7,204,r"""1""",[0,_i,_i,_i,_i,_i],[_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f]) 
                if PC[4][N]==0: psspy.branch_chng(7,205,r"""1""",[0,_i,_i,_i,_i,_i],[_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f]) 
                if PC[5][N]==0: psspy.branch_chng(7,206,r"""1""",[0,_i,_i,_i,_i,_i],[_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f]) 
                if PC[6][N]==0: psspy.branch_chng(7,207,r"""1""",[0,_i,_i,_i,_i,_i],[_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f]) 
                 
                if PC[7][N]==0: psspy.branch_chng(9,208,r"""1""",[0,_i,_i,_i,_i,_i],[_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f]) 
                if PC[8][N]==0: psspy.branch_chng(9,209,r"""1""",[0,_i,_i,_i,_i,_i],[_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f]) 
                if PC[9][N]==0: psspy.branch_chng(9,210,r"""1""",[0,_i,_i,_i,_i,_i],[_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f]) 
                if PC[10][N]==0: psspy.branch_chng(9,211,r"""1""",[0,_i,_i,_i,_i,_i],[_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f]) 
                if PC[11][N]==0: psspy.branch_chng(9,212,r"""1""",[0,_i,_i,_i,_i,_i],[_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f]) 
                if PC[12][N]==0: psspy.branch_chng(9,213,r"""1""",[0,_i,_i,_i,_i,_i],[_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f]) 
                if PC[13][N]==0: psspy.branch_chng(9,214,r"""1""",[0,_i,_i,_i,_i,_i],[_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f]) 
                 
               
        # fuse 0.4kV 
                if PC[380][N]==0: psspy.branch_chng(5,6,r"""*1""",[0,_i,_i,_i,_i,_i],[_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f]) 
                if PC[381][N]==0: psspy.branch_chng(5,8,r"""*1""",[0,_i,_i,_i,_i,_i],[_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f]) 
                if PC[382][N]==0: psspy.branch_chng(10,11,r"""*1""",[0,_i,_i,_i,_i,_i],[_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f]) 
                if PC[383][N]==0: psspy.branch_chng(10,13,r"""*1""",[0,_i,_i,_i,_i,_i],[_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f]) 
                 
                if PC[384][N]==0: psspy.branch_chng(55,56,r"""*1""",[0,_i,_i,_i,_i,_i],[_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f]) 
                if PC[385][N]==0: psspy.branch_chng(58,59,r"""*1""",[0,_i,_i,_i,_i,_i],[_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f]) 
                if PC[386][N]==0: psspy.branch_chng(60,61,r"""*1""",[0,_i,_i,_i,_i,_i],[_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f]) 
                if PC[387][N]==0: psspy.branch_chng(60,63,r"""*1""",[0,_i,_i,_i,_i,_i],[_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f]) 
                if PC[388][N]==0: psspy.branch_chng(65,66,r"""*1""",[0,_i,_i,_i,_i,_i],[_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f]) 
                if PC[389][N]==0: psspy.branch_chng(65,67,r"""*1""",[0,_i,_i,_i,_i,_i],[_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f]) 
                if PC[390][N]==0: psspy.branch_chng(70,71,r"""*1""",[0,_i,_i,_i,_i,_i],[_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f]) 
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                if PC[391][N]==0: psspy.branch_chng(73,74,r"""*1""",[0,_i,_i,_i,_i,_i],[_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f]) 
                if PC[392][N]==0: psspy.branch_chng(73,76,r"""*1""",[0,_i,_i,_i,_i,_i],[_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f]) 
                if PC[393][N]==0: psspy.branch_chng(78,79,r"""*1""",[0,_i,_i,_i,_i,_i],[_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f]) 
                if PC[394][N]==0: psspy.branch_chng(78,81,r"""*1""",[0,_i,_i,_i,_i,_i],[_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f]) 
                 
 
        # circuit breaker 0.4kV 
                if PC[428][N]==0: psspy.branch_chng(2,3,r"""@1""",[0,_i,_i,_i,_i,_i],[_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f]) 
                
                if PC[429][N]==0: psspy.branch_chng(2,39,r"""@1""",[0,_i,_i,_i,_i,_i],[_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f]) 
                if PC[430][N]==0: psspy.branch_chng(40,41,r"""@1""",[0,_i,_i,_i,_i,_i],[_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f]) 
                if PC[431][N]==0: psspy.branch_chng(40,42,r"""@1""",[0,_i,_i,_i,_i,_i],[_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f]) 
                 
                if PC[432][N]==0: psspy.branch_chng(2,54,r"""@1""",[0,_i,_i,_i,_i,_i],[_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f]) 
                 
 
        # cable 0.4kV 
                if PC[449][N]==0: psspy.branch_chng(3,4,r"""1""",[0,_i,_i,_i,_i,_i],[_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f]) 
                if PC[450][N]==0: psspy.branch_chng(4,5,r"""1""",[0,_i,_i,_i,_i,_i],[_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f]) 
                if PC[451][N]==0: psspy.branch_chng(6,7,r"""1""",[0,_i,_i,_i,_i,_i],[_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f]) 
                if PC[452][N]==0: psspy.branch_chng(8,9,r"""1""",[0,_i,_i,_i,_i,_i],[_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f]) 
                if PC[453][N]==0: psspy.branch_chng(10,162,r"""1""",[0,_i,_i,_i,_i,_i],[_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f]) 
                if PC[454][N]==0: psspy.branch_chng(11,12,r"""1""",[0,_i,_i,_i,_i,_i],[_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f]) 
                if PC[455][N]==0: psspy.branch_chng(13,14,r"""1""",[0,_i,_i,_i,_i,_i],[_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f]) 
                 
                if PC[456][N]==0: psspy.branch_chng(39,40,r"""1""",[0,_i,_i,_i,_i,_i],[_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f]) 
                if PC[457][N]==0: psspy.branch_chng(42,43,r"""1""",[0,_i,_i,_i,_i,_i],[_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f]) 
                 
 
        #Additional circuit breaker 0.4KV 
                if PC[539][N]==0: psspy.branch_chng(4,162,r"""@1""",[0,_i,_i,_i,_i,_i],[_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f]) 
                if PC[540][N]==0: psspy.branch_chng(16,163,r"""@1""",[0,_i,_i,_i,_i,_i],[_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f]) 
                if PC[541][N]==0: psspy.branch_chng(28,164,r"""@1""",[0,_i,_i,_i,_i,_i],[_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f]) 
                 
                if PC[542][N]==0: psspy.branch_chng(65,165,r"""@1""",[0,_i,_i,_i,_i,_i],[_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f])                 
                if PC[543][N]==0: psspy.branch_chng(95,166,r"""@1""",[0,_i,_i,_i,_i,_i],[_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f]) 
                if PC[544][N]==0: psspy.branch_chng(125,167,r"""@1""",[0,_i,_i,_i,_i,_i],[_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f]) 
 
 
        # Additional function of circuit breaker that trip another component that within it's control       
        # cb 2-3 
                if PC[449][N]==0 or PC[450][N]==0: 
psspy.branch_chng(2,3,r"""@1""",[0,_i,_i,_i,_i,_i],[_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f]) 
 
        # cb 4-162 
                if PC[453][N]==0: psspy.branch_chng(4,162,r"""@1""",[0,_i,_i,_i,_i,_i],[_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f]) 
                 
 
        # cb 2-15 
                if PC[479][N]==0 or PC[480][N]==0: 
psspy.branch_chng(2,15,r"""@1""",[0,_i,_i,_i,_i,_i],[_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f]) 
 
        # cb 16-163 
                if PC[483][N]==0: psspy.branch_chng(16,163,r"""@1""",[0,_i,_i,_i,_i,_i],[_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f]) 
 
 
        # cb 2-27 
                if PC[509][N]==0 or PC[510][N]==0: 
psspy.branch_chng(2,27,r"""@1""",[0,_i,_i,_i,_i,_i],[_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f]) 
 
        # cb 28-164 
                if PC[513][N]==0: psspy.branch_chng(28,164,r"""@1""",[0,_i,_i,_i,_i,_i],[_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f]) 
            
 
        # cb 2-54 
                if PC[458][N]==0 or PC[460][N]==0 or PC[461][N]==0 or PC[464][N]==0: 
psspy.branch_chng(2,54,r"""@1""",[0,_i,_i,_i,_i,_i],[_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f]) 
 
        # cb 65-165 
 
        # Additional function of fuse that trip another component that within it's control       
        # fuse 5-6 
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                if PC[0][N]==0 or PC[1][N]==0 or PC[2][N]==0 or PC[3][N]==0 or PC[4][N]==0 or PC[5][N]==0 or PC[6][N]==0: 
psspy.branch_chng(5,6,r"""*1""",[0,_i,_i,_i,_i,_i],[_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f]) 
 
        # fuse 5-8 
                if PC[7][N]==0 or PC[8][N]==0 or PC[9][N]==0 or PC[10][N]==0 or PC[11][N]==0 or PC[12][N]==0 or 
PC[13][N]==0: psspy.branch_chng(5,8,r"""*1""",[0,_i,_i,_i,_i,_i],[_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f]) 
 
        # fuse 10-11 
                if PC[14][N]==0 or PC[15][N]==0 or PC[16][N]==0 or PC[17][N]==0 or PC[18][N]==0 or PC[19][N]==0: 
psspy.branch_chng(10,11,r"""*1""",[0,_i,_i,_i,_i,_i],[_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f])         
 
        # fuse 10-13 
                if PC[20][N]==0 or PC[21][N]==0 or PC[22][N]==0 or PC[23][N]==0 or PC[24][N]==0 or PC[25][N]==0: 
psspy.branch_chng(10,13,r"""*1""",[0,_i,_i,_i,_i,_i],[_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f,_f]) 
 
        # fuse 17-18 




                    
# Check for Bus Islands - component which is not connected with swing bus 
                psspy.tree(1,0) 
                psspy.tree(2,1) 
                psspy.tree(2,1) 
                psspy.tree(2,1) 
                psspy.tree(2,1) 
                psspy.tree(2,1) 
 
# Solve Newton-Raphson 
                psspy.fdns([1,0,0,1,1,0,99,0]) 
         
# Get Output Files                       
                ierr,l1=psspy.brnmsc(7,201,'1','PCTCPA') 
                l_1.extend([l1]) 
                ierr,l2=psspy.brnmsc(9,208,'1','PCTCPA') 
                l_2.extend([l2]) 
                ierr,l3=psspy.brnmsc(12,215,'1','PCTCPA') 
                l_3.extend([l3]) 
                ierr,l4=psspy.brnmsc(14,221,'1','PCTCPA') 
                l_4.extend([l4]) 
                ierr,l5=psspy.brnmsc(19,227,'1','PCTCPA') 
                l_5.extend([l5]) 
                ierr,l6=psspy.brnmsc(21,234,'1','PCTCPA') 
                l_6.extend([l6]) 
                ierr,l7=psspy.brnmsc(24,241,'1','PCTCPA') 
                l_7.extend([l7]) 
                ierr,l8=psspy.brnmsc(26,246,'1','PCTCPA') 
                l_8.extend([l8]) 
                ierr,l9=psspy.brnmsc(31,253,'1','PCTCPA') 
                l_9.extend([l9]) 
                ierr,l10=psspy.brnmsc(33,260,'1','PCTCPA') 
                l_10.extend([l10]) 
                ierr,l11=psspy.brnmsc(36,267,'1','PCTCPA') 
                l_11.extend([l11]) 
                ierr,l12=psspy.brnmsc(38,272,'1','PCTCPA') 
                l_12.extend([l12]) 
                 
                                                 
                N=N+1 
 
        path2="S:/RDS/New MV LV/LV3phase_fuseCB/HU_v2/Raw_output/%d" %(p) 
 
        os.chdir(path2) 
 
# print output in text files                 
        l_1 = str(l_1)[1 : -1]; 
        sys.stdout=open('L1.txt','a') 
        print l_1 
        l_2 = str(l_2)[1 : -1]; 
        sys.stdout=open('L2.txt','a') 
        print l_2 
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        l_3 = str(l_3)[1 : -1]; 
        sys.stdout=open('L3.txt','a') 
        print l_3 
        l_4 = str(l_4)[1 : -1]; 
        sys.stdout=open('L4.txt','a') 
        print l_4 
        l_5 = str(l_5)[1 : -1]; 
        sys.stdout=open('L5.txt','a') 
        print l_5 
        l_6 = str(l_6)[1 : -1]; 
        sys.stdout=open('L6.txt','a') 
        print l_6 
        l_7 = str(l_7)[1 : -1]; 
        sys.stdout=open('L7.txt','a') 
        print l_7 
        l_8 = str(l_8)[1 : -1]; 
        sys.stdout=open('L8.txt','a') 
        print l_8 
        l_9 = str(l_9)[1 : -1]; 
        sys.stdout=open('L9.txt','a') 
        print l_9 
        l_10 = str(l_10)[1 : -1]; 
        sys.stdout=open('L10.txt','a') 
        print l_10 
        l_11 = str(l_11)[1 : -1]; 
        sys.stdout=open('L11.txt','a') 
        print l_11 
        l_12 = str(l_12)[1 : -1]; 
        sys.stdout=open('L12.txt','a') 
        print l_12 
        sys.stdout=open('L12.txt','a') 
        print ''         
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Abstract—This paper is part one of a two-part series discussing 
how Regulator requirements for continuity of supply could be 
incorporated in the reliability analysis of existing electricity 
networks and future “smart grids”. The paper uses examples of 
overall and guaranteed standards of performance from the UK 
and Italy, specifying requirements that network operators 
should satisfy with respect to excessively long and/or too fre-
quent supply interruptions. Besides the relevant Regulator re-
quirements, this paper presents input data, parametrs and 
models required for comprehensive reliability assessment, while 
Part 2 paper presents scenarios and results for test network 
based on both analytical and probabilistic reliability procedures. 
Index Terms-- Power system modelling, power system reliability, 
security and quality of supply. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
System Reliability Performance is one of the most im-
portant aspects of both existing electricity networks and future 
“smart grids”. Distribution network operators (DNOs) have to 
carefully elaborate their operation, maintenance and planning 
strategies, in order to ensure that frequency and duration of 
supply interruptions experienced by their customers are within 
reliability targets and limits imposed by Energy Regulators, 
which are typically specified as the overall and guaranteed 
standards of performance (e.g. [1]-[3] in the UK, or [4]-[5] in 
Italy). This is one of main DNOs’ priorities, as they will be 
penalized, rewarded or liable for compensation based on the 
actually achieved reliability performance. 
This paper, which is a part one of a two-part serie, pre-
sents input data, parameters and models required fo a c m-
prehensive reliability assessment of both existing electricity 
networks and future “smart grids”, which could take into ac-
count Regulator requirements for continuity and quality of 
supply. This is illustrated in the paper using the examples of 
the overall and guaranteed standards of performance from the 
UK and Italy, specifying requirements that DNOs should sat-
isfy with respect to excessively long and/or too frequent sup-
ply interruptions. Part 2 paper, [6], presents scenarios and re-
sults of both analytical and probabilistic procedures for relia-
bility performance assessment of a typical urban distribution 
network. 
Assessment of system reliability performance is not a sim-
ple task, as it requires time-consuming studies and significant 
amount of data and information about power components a d 
network characteristics, Table I. Regarding the power compo-
nents, basic input data are mean fault rates and mean repair 
times, as well as the components’ types of faults, which are 
discussed in Section II of this paper. Section II also gives an 
overview of typical protection settings and loading conditions 
used for the analysis. Section III lists Regulator requirements 
for continuity and quality of supply in the UK and Italy, while 
Section IV describes test network. All that is used in Part 2 
paper [6], which presents results for analytical and probabilis-
tic assessment of reliability of test network for several scenar-
ios, including some “smart grid” functionalities. 
TABLE I 
RELEVANT INPUT DATA/PARAMETERS FOR NETWORK RELIABILITY ASSESSMENT. 
Power Components Network Characteristics (including types and settings of protection systems, Section II.A) 
Fault  Rates Repair Times Fault Types Configuration Switching Back-up Supply 
LV Network 
representation Loading Conditions 
Mean values (Section II.B) 









Variable values (Sections II.C-D) 
(and assumed distributions) 









Variable (Section II.F) 
(e.g. actual load profiles) 
 
II. INPUT DATA AND PARAMETERS 
A. Protection Settings 
The fault clearance times are determined by the settings of 
the protection system. Table II lists protection settings used in 
this paper (typical for the UK DNOs, [7]-[8]). 
TABLE II 



















Circuit breaker with 
auto-reclosing 
up to 3 
33 




11/0.4 Fuse repair time 
33/11 




0.4 Fuse repair time 
11 Circuit breaker 0.15 
33 Circuit breaker 0.15 
B. Mean Fault Rates and Mean Repair Times 
Mean fault rates and mean repair times are two basic in-
puts of practically all procedures for system reliabi ty as-
sessment. In available literature, reported values of these two 
input data vary in wide ranges (based on the characteristics 
and locations of networks, types and characteristics of com-
ponents, as well as their operating conditions). Table III pre-
sents statistics of mean fault rates and mean repair times from 
two main sources: UK-related values reported in [9] and from 
other sources, [10]-[17]. 
TABLE III 







Mean fault rate 
λmean (faults/year) 
Mean repair time 
µmean (hours/fault) 
[9] [10]-[17] [9] [10]-[17] 
Overhead 
Lines 
<11 0.168 0.21 5.7 - 
11 0.091 0.1 9.5 - 
33 0.034 0.1 20.5 55 
Cables 
<11 0.159 0.19 6.9 85 
11 0.051 0.05 56.2 48 
33 0.034 0.05 201.6 128 
Trans- 
formers 
11/0.4 0.002 0.014 75 120 
33/0.4 0.01 0.014 205.5 120 
33/11 0.01 0.009 205.5 125 
Buses 
0.4 - 0.005 - 24 
11 - 0.005 - 120 
>11 - 0.08 - 140 
Circuit 
Breakers 
0.4 - 0.005 - 36 
11 0.0033 0.005 120.9 48 
33 0.0041 - 140 52 
Fuses 0.4 & 11 0.0004 - 35.3 - 
 
C. Daily Variations in Fault Rate Values 
Based on the analysis presented in [18], this paper us s a 
realistic interruption probability model derived from the two-
year recordings of short and long interruptions (SIs and LIs) 
from two European DNOs, Fig. 1. Daily probability profiles of 
both SIs and LIs are first represented with the theoretical inter-
ruption probability model, dashed red line in Fig. 1 described 
with (1), and then used to estimate daily variations in reported 
mean fault rate values (λmean) of power components from Ta-
ble III, shown in Fig. 2 and expressed by (2). This allows to 
include a more accurate analysis of SIs and Lis in reliability 



















LI profile SI profile theoretical curve
Zone I Zone II Zone III Zone IV
 
























tf     (1) 
 
where t is hour of the day and four coefficients for linear 
parts are: m1=0.009, m2=-0.00643, n1=-0.021 and n2 = 0.1693. 
 
Figure 2.  Estimated daily variations in fault rates. 
Based on Table III and Figs. 1 and 2, daily variations in 
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where t is hour of the day. 
D. Daily Variations in Repair Time Values 
Similarly to the daily variations in fault rates, mean repair 
times from Table III (µmean) are estimated to vary in a range 
between the maximum value (µmax, corresponding to night-
time, when availability of repair crew is lower) and minimum 
value (µmin, corresponding to day-time, when availability of 
repair crew is higher), Fig. 3 and (3). 
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where t is hour of the day. 
E. Fault Types 
The classification of customer interruptions into SIs and 
LIs is not possible without, for instance, modelling the ap-
plied protection systems. A simple way to make clear distinc-
tion between short and long supply interruptions of customers 
is to define a uniform distribution and link it to he system 
reliability assessment procedure. For that purpose, past re-
cordings collected from 14-UK DNOs between 2005 and 
2009 [19] were analysed, identifying that 54% of supply in-
terruption events were caused by temporary faults (i.e. SIs), 
and 46 % were due to permanent faults (i.e. LIs). 
F. Loading Conditions 
Typical residential load profile used for the reliability 
analysis is shown in Fig. 4. The inclusion of actual lo d pro-
files in the reliability analysis is important, as it may strongly 
impact the assessed system reliability performance. 
 
Figure 4.  Typical residential load profile (day of maximum demand). 
III.  CONTINUITY OF SUPPLY REQUIREMENTS 
Regulators usually define two main continuity of supply 
requirements: guaranteed standards of performance and over-
all standards of performance. The former should ensure that 
any single customer receive at least the minimum level of con-
tinuity of supply from the DNOs (protection of worst-served 
customers through the compensations for multiple and/or ex-
cessively long supply interruptions). The latter monit rs 
DNO’s performance at system level and is used as a basis for 
reward/penalties schemes regarding set targets for (system 
average) number of supply interruptions per year and per cus-
tomer served (SAIFI), as well as (system average) duration of 
supply interruptions per year and per customer served 
(SAIDI). Additional links are maintained between the perfor-
mance standards and DNOs’ revenues and/or tariffs. As DNOs 
have to ensure that their networks are operated with respect to 
“standards performance” requirements, analysis present d in 
Part 2 paper [6] shows how these requirements could be in-
corporated in the reliability assessment procedures. 
A. Regulator Requirements in the UK  
The UK Security and Quality of Supply (SQS-UK) re-
quirements [1] specify maximum times (i.e. maximum dura-
tions of LIs) allowed for restoring supply to at least a mini-
mum group demand of the interrupted customers. Six group 
demand classes are defined based on the group deman rang-
es, for which maximum allowed durations of long interrup-
tions and minimum demand that has to be restored within that 
time are specified in Table IV. 
TABLE IV 
SECURITY AND QUALITY OF SUPPLY REQUIREMENTS IN THE UK, SQS-UK [1]. 
Class 
Corresponding  
Group Demand (GD) 
Required supply restoration 
times & minimum demands to 
be met after first circuit outage 
A GD ≤ 1 MW In repair time: GD 
B 1 MW < GD ≤ 12 MW 
a) Within 3 h: GD-1MW 
b) In repair time: GD 
C 12 MW < GD ≤ 60 MW 
a) Within 15 min: 
min{GD-12MW; 2/3 GD} 
b) Within 3 h: GD 
D 60 MW < GD ≤ 300 MW 
a) Immediately: 
GD-up to 20 MW 
b) Within 3 h: GD 
E 300 MW < GD ≤ 1500 MW Immediately: GD 
F GD > 1500 MW 
According to transmission li-
cense security standard 
Further to the requirements in Table IV, and in order to 
protect domestic (i.e. residential) and non-domestic customers 
from excessively long interruption events (i.e. those categories 
of customers that have no special contract or agreement with 
the DNOs regarding long interruptions), the UK Regulator 
specifies additional requirements for the duration and number 
of long interruptions. References [2] and [3] are main UK 
statutory instrument, specifying the allowed supply restoration 
times for up to 5,000 customers, more than 5,000 customers 
and in severe weather conditions. This is illustrated in Table V 
(only for normal system operating conditions) together with 
the corresponding compensations DNOs will pay directly to 
the customers (not to the Regulator), if supply is not restored 
within the specified time, [2] and [3].  
TABLE V 
THE UK GUARANTEED STANDARDS OF PERFORMANCE, GSP-UK, [2]-[3]. 












18 h £54 £108 
After each succeeding 12h £27 
≥ 5,000* 
24 h £54 £108 
After each succeeding 12h £27 
Maximum £216 
Multiple Interruptions **  Compensation (all customers) 
Four or more interruptions (≥ 4),  
each lasting at least three hours (≥ 3 h) 
£54 
* This paper assumes that 5,000 customers correspond to about 12 MW of 
residential load demand. 
** In any single year (12-month period) starting on the 1st of April. 
B. Regulator Requirements in Italy 
Similarly to the Regulator requirements in the UK, Ta-
bles VI and VII list Italian Supply Quality Standar (SQS-I) 
and Guaranteed Standards of Performance (GSP-I), [4] [5]. 
TABLE VI 





(I > 50,000)* 
Medium Concentra-
tion 
(5,000 < I ≤ 50,000)* 
Low Concen-
tration 








4 h 6 h 8 h 
Average number 
of interruptions 
1 int/customer 2 int/customer 4 int/customer 
Average duration 
of interruptions 
25 min/customer 40 min/customer 
60 
min/customer 
* I - number of inhabitants; this paper assumes that 5,000 inhabitants corre-
spond to about 2,000 residential customers and around 5 MW of residential 
load demand. 
TABLE VII 
GUARANTEED STANDARDS OF PERFORMANCE IN ITALY , GSP-I, [5]. 
Customers in-
terrupted 
Criteria for compensation Compensation 
Domestic 
If longer than SQS-I duration limit €30 
For each succeeding 4h €15 
Maximum €300 
LV & MV 
Non-domestic 
Non-public 
≤ 100 kW 
If longer than SQS-I duration limit €150 





> 100 kW 
If longer than SQS-I duration limit €2/kW 




> 100 kW 
If longer than SQS-I duration limit €1.5/kW 
For each succeeding 2h €0.75/kW 
Maximum €6,000 
LV & MV 
With license    
for generation* 
If longer than SQS-I duration limit €0.15/kW 
For each succeeding 4h €0.075/kW 
Maximum €3,000 
* It is assumed that for prosumers (producers-consumers) the maximum 
compensation between producers and consumers is appl ed 
IV. GENERIC TEST NETWORK MODEL 
Test network used to illustrate reliability analysis in Part 2 
paper [6] is a generic urban UK MV distribution network con-
figuration, Fig. 5, supplying only low voltage (LV) domestic 
customers, Fig. 6 (for more detail see [20]-[21]). 
A. Urban MV Network 
The urban MV network in Fig. 5 presents a meshed con-
figuration, but, in normal conditions, the urban network con-
figuration operates radially and becomes meshed if the switch, 
normally open between two radial feeders, is closed. The net-
work also has an alternative supply point at 11kV at the end of 
the radial feeders (providing unrestricted support). 
 
Figure 5.  Test MV Urban Network [20]-[21]. 
B. Urban LV Network 
Each of the 6 x 8 = 48 LV bulk load supply points con-
nected through a 500kVA 11/0.4kV transformer in Fig. 5 sup-
plies an identical LV urban network with 190 individual LV 
customers, Fig. 6. 
 
Figure 6.  Test LV Urban Network [20]-[21]. 
Generic urban LV distribution network in Fig. 6 is operat-
ed in radial configuration and supplied from the infeeding 
11/0.4 kV substation/transformer (secondary side is fuse pro-
tected), with a number of LV feeders supplying one r more 
lateral spurs and service connections (3-phase or 1-phase). 
Although the connection of multiple single-phase customers 
in practice makes the LV networks inherently unbalanced, 
loading conditions at each LV network node in Fig. 6 are 
modelled as symmetrical and in accordance with Fig. 4. 
In urban areas, load density is high and line lengths are 
shorter (usually less than 10km) and underground cables are 
typically used to improve reliability of supply and for aesthet-
ical reasons. As mentioned, detailed and updated spcifica-
tions for all LV and MV network components and configura-
tions are modelled based on data collected from the UK and 
European DNOs and manufacturers of power equipment, 
with more detail provided in [20] and [21]. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper, which is part one of a two-part series, presents 
input data, parameters and models required for a comprehen-
sive reliability assessment of both existing electricity networks 
and future “smart grids”, which could take into account Regu-
lator requirements for continuity and quality of supply. This is 
illustrated using the examples of the overall and guaranteed 
standards of performance from the UK and Italy, specifying 
requirements that DNOs should satisfy with respect to exces-
sively long and/or too frequent supply interruptions. The anal-
ysis continues in Part 2 paper, [6], which presents scenarios 
and results of both analytical and probabilistic procedures for 
assessing reliability performance of modelled generic u ban 
distribution network. 
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Abstract—This is the second paper in a two-part series 
discussing how Regulator requirements for continuity of supply 
could be incorporated in the reliability analysis of existing 
electricity networks and future “smart grids”. Part  1 paper 
presents input data, parameters and models required for a 
comprehensive assessment of system reliability perfo mance, 
including an overview of the overall and guaranteed standards 
of performance in the UK and Italy. This paper presents 
scenarios and results of both analytical and probabilistic 
reliability assessment procedures for the test network 
introduced in Part 1 paper. 
Index Terms-- Power system modelling, power system reliability, 
security and quality of supply. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Distribution network operators (DNOs) have to carefully 
elaborate operation, maintenance and planning strategies of 
their networks, in order to ensure that both frequency and 
duration of supply interruptions experienced by their 
customers are within the reliability targets and limits imposed 
by Energy Regulators. After presenting overall and guaranteed 
standards of performance from the UK and Italy ([1]-[5]), as 
well as input data, parameters and models in Part 1 paper, [6], 
this paper presents scenarios and results of both analytical and 
probabilistic methodologies for a comprehensive reliability 
assessment of existing electricity networks and future “smart 
grids”. Particular attention is paid to the assessment of the 
DNO’s risks of not satisfying the corresponding Regulator 
requirements.  
Presented analysis considers several scenarios, in rder to 
take into account various Regulator-imposed requirements for 
the number and/or duration of supply interruptions, i clusion 
of actual load profiles, daily variations in probabilities of 
components’ faults and their repair times, as well as the 
various options for DNO’s response to supply interruptions 
through network reconfiguration, provision of alternative 
supply and implementation of manual or automatic switching. 
II. RELIABILITY ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGIES 
Over the last decades, the concept of reliability assessment 
evolved into the comprehensive approaches for evaluating 
various engineering strategies, typically linked to system 
planning, operation and maintenance studies. The meaning of 
reliability, which was initially expressed as the ability of a 
component to operate without faults during its lifetime and as 
specified by the manufacturer, has been generalized and now 
receives different connotations in engineering applications. 
This change is emphasized by the context in which reliability 
analysis of modern electricity networks is not directly 
assigned to individual components in terms of frequency and 
duration of their failures, but is extended and typically refers 
to the performance assessment of a whole system, subsystem, 
or part of a system supplying electricity customers. 
Recent statistics indicate that the reliability asses ment 
methods used by the DNOs are not always successfully 
implemented, even though DNOs may be confident with the 
methods they use. For example, more than 14% of DNOs have 
recently been penalized in the UK for not achieving 
Regulator-specified limits for customer interruptions, while 
50% of them have not been able to meet imposed targets for 
duration of supply interruptions [7]. Although several factors 
have been suggested as possible reasons for such 
underperformance, one of the main issues is related to the 
methods DNOs use to estimate the frequency and duration of 
customer interruptions, as well as the corresponding risks of 
penalties for not satisfying Regulator-imposed targets. 
Linear regression methods, which rely on extrapolation or 
interpolation of past reliability statistics for a given network, 
may not provide correct reliability assessment, because 
network configuration has changed, or simply because the 
experienced interruption events occur randomly, so some 
events, or combinations of events, did not occur previously. 
Two general approaches are considered as feasible and 
practical alternatives to linear regression methods: analytical 
and probabilistic reliability assessment methodologies. 
A. Analytical Reliability Assessment Approaches 
Among the several techniques developed over the past 
years for the assessment of reliability performance, analytical 
approaches are often used for network planning or system 
security studies (e.g. “n-1 or n-2 security criteria”), as well as 
for evaluating network contingencies and system 
capacity/reserve requirements. It is generally assumed, 
however, that analytical reliability assessment approaches 
cannot directly or fully model inherently stochastic nature of 
system faults, or significant variations in fault repair times, or 
equally wide range of changes in system loading conditi s. 
Analytical reliability assessment approaches are based on 
mathematical models, which characterize analysed network in 
terms of the specified input data, typically limiting outputs to 
one set of results, e.g. mean values of reliability ndices, 
corresponding to specified input mean data. In that w y, 
analytical approaches offer only a general “snapshot” 
characterization of the analysed system, as they will always 
provide the same set of output results for the same set of input 
data, parameters and models. This is significant difference 
from probabilistic methods, which enable to perform a more 
comprehensive evaluation of system reliability with output 
reliability indices expressed as probability distribut ons 
(showing the ranges of their variations), rather than one set of 
output values and results (typically mean values). 
B. Probabilistic (Monte Carlo) Reliability Approaches 
Probabilistic reliability assessment procedures are widely 
recognized as more suitable for the analysis of system 
reliability performance, particularly in terms of their ability to 
model stochastic and inherently unpredictable variations of 
input parameters and data (e.g. fault rates and repair times) 
with their assumed probability distributions. Furthermore, 
probabilistic reliability assessment approaches allow to model 
a wide range of variations of practically all input parameters 
and data in one or few simulation/calculation set-ups, without 
the need to repeat calculation after a change in input data. 
Although probabilistic reliability assessment procedures 
are more difficult for implementation (particularly in complex 
large-scale systems), they provide more accurate results than 
linear regression methods and more detailed results than 
analytical approaches. The most frequently used probabilistic 
reliability assessment approach is the inverse transform 
method, also known as Monte Carlo Simulation (MCS, [8]). 
Besides network modelling, conventional MCS analysis 
requires statistical information on fault rates and repair times 
of faulted power components as input data. Network models 
and fault rates of power components are used to establish 
which customers will be interrupted (and how frequently), 
whereas repair times of faulted components and network 
protection, reconfiguration, switching and alternative supply 
functionalities are used to estimate durations of corresponding 
supply interruptions. The outputs of the MCS analysis are 
reliability indices, which are typically presented as probability 
distributions with the corresponding mean values. 
C. Considered Scenarios 
Table I provides descriptions of different scenarios used 
for reliability analysis of test network from Part 1 paper [6]. 
TABLE I 
DESCRIPTIONS OF ANALYSED SCENARIOS. 
Description of Scenarios 
SCENARIO SC-1: Times for transferring to alternative supply and for 
reconfiguration switching are in accordance with the UK Security of 
Supply requirements (SQS-UK, Table IV in Part 1 paper, [6]) 
SC-1A: MV network only (no representation of LV network) 
SC-1B: MV & LV network (LV represented with equivalent values) 
SCENARIO SC-2: All long interruptions (including transfer to 
alternative supply and reconfiguration) last exactly 18 hours (in 
accordance with the UK Guaranteed Standards Performance, GSP-UK 
for maximum duration of interruptions, Table V in Part 1 paper, [6]) 
SC-2A: MV network only (no representation of LV network) 
SC-2B: MV & LV network (LV represented with equivalent values) 
SCENARIO SC-3: All long supply interruptions (including transfer to
alternative supply and reconfiguration switching) last exactly 12 hours 
(in accordance with Italian Guaranteed Standards Performance, GSP-I, 
Table VII in Part 1 paper, [6]) 
SC-3A: MV network only (no representation of LV network) 
SC-3B: MV & LV network (LV represented with equivalent values) 
SCENARIO SC-4: Worst served customer has exactly four supply 
interruptions, of which three are exactly 18 hours and one is 3 hours (in 
accordance with the UK Guaranteed Standards Performance, GSP-UK 
for both maximum number and duration of supply interruptions, Table V 
in Part 1 paper, [6]) 
SC-4A: MV network only (no representation of LV network) 
SC-4B: MV & LV network (LV represented with equivalent values) 
SCENARIO SC-5: SAIFI=2 int/cust/year and SAIDI=40min/cust/year 
benchmark targets are in accordance with Italian Supply Quality 
Standard, SQS-I, Table VI in Part 1 paper, [6] 
SC-5A: MV network only (no representation of LV network) 
SC-5B: MV & LV network (LV represented with equivalent values) 
SCENARIO SC-6: Times for transfer to alternative supply and for 
reconfiguration switching are exactly 3 minutes ( “smart grid” switching 
functionality, changing some of long interruptions i to the short ones) 
SC-6A: MV network only (no representation of LV network) 
SC-6B: MV & LV network (LV represented with equivalent values) 
 
In Table I, Scenarios SC-1A and SC-1B represent existing 
MV and LV network configurations and functionalities, which 
are in accordance with security of supply requirements (the 
UK-based are applied, but Italian are similar). This means that 
MV network should have switching functionalities for 
transferring to alternative supply and for reconfiguration, as 
otherwise large numbers of customers will be exposed to 
excessively long supply interruptions (determined by mean 
repair times of network components). Scenarios 2A/2B to 
5A/5B represent various guaranteed standards of performance 
and supply quality requirements, which will be used for 
analytical approach and formulation of corresponding l mits 
and thresholds against which risk of penalty will be assessed 
after probabilistic results are obtained. Finally, Scenarios SC-
6A and SC-6B represent “smart grid” scenario in which 
automatic remote-controlled switching is implemented in MV 
network (LV network is still protected only by the fuses). 
III.  LV  NETWORK REPRESENTATION 
Typically, reliability analysis is performed with respect to 
supply interruptions of connected customers, which are 
usually expressed and quantified in terms of the continuity of 
supply at bulk load supply points (typically at MV level). The 
main reason for neglecting LV networks (and LV customers) 
is that their inclusion will result in a substantial increase of 
complexity and excessive computational requirements in case 
of probabilistic reliability assessment procedures. For 
example, reliability assessment of test MV network shown in 
Fig. 5 in Part 1 paper, [6] is related to 48 LV load points, 
while the whole analysed network, including LV parts (shown 
in Fig. 6 in Part 1 paper, [6]), consists of 48 x 190 = 9,120 LV 
load points/customers. Additional problem is that all supplied 
customers are LV-connected and results of analysis of only 
MV network should be carefully interpreted, as they otherwise 
might not be directly applicable to LV customers. 
Representation of LV networks/customers for reliabity 
analysis of MV and HV networks is discussed in detail in [9] 
and [10], where equivalent reliability models are based on 
analytical approach from [11], providing failure rate, λeq, and 
repair time, µeq, for equivalented LV network Fig. 6, [6]: 
 













1 µµ  .          (2) 
 
where: N-total number of components in the equivalented 
part of the system, each with mean failure rate, λi, and mean 
repair time, µi. 
Values calculated with (1) and (2) are compared with the 
results of the probabilistic MCS approach, where mean fault 
rates and mean repair times of LV network components from 
Table III in Part 1 paper, [6] are modelled using exponential 
and Rayleigh distributions and simulated for the total 
duration of 10,000 years, Table II and Figs. 1-3. 
 
Figure 1.  Probabilistic calculation of LV network equivalent data (10,000 
years of simulations, exponential distribution for input mean fault rates). 
 
Figure 2.  Probabilistic calculation of LV network equivalent data (10,000 
years of simulations, exponential distribution for input mean repair times). 
 
Figure 3.  Probabilistic calculation of LV network equivalent data (10,000 
years of simulations, Rayleigh distribution for input mean repair times). 
TABLE II 
COMPARISON OF LV  NETWORK EQUIVALENT FAULT RATES AND REPAIR 









fault rate, λeq 
2.373 2.357 / 
Equivalent 
repair time, µeq 
15.933 15.766 15.754 
 
IV. ANALYTICAL RELIABILITY ASSESSMENT 
In order to assess the ranges of variations of output 
reliability indices, analytical approach should be implemented 
a number of times, where variations in each input da a, 
resulting in a single set of output values, should be modelled 
and calculated as a succession of selected cases. 
TABLE III 
ANALYTICAL APPROACH, SCENARIOS SC-1A TO SC-6A (MV  NETWORK 










Mean Load. Conditions Max. Load. Conditions 














0.0644 0.1716 0.2574 0.0997 0.2658 0.3987 SC-2A 
SC-3A 
SC-4A 2.8942 3.2086 
SC-5A 2.0 2.0 
SC-6A 0.0405 0.1080 0.1620 0.0758 0.2022 0.3033 
SAIDI 
SC-1A 0.9364 1.5366 1.1524 1.1086 1.8192 1.3644 
SC-2A 1.1584 3.089 4.6334 1.7943 4.7847 7.1771 
SC-3A 0.7722 2.0593 3.089 1.1962 3.1898 4.7847 
SC-4A 48.15 52.619 
SC-5A 0.6667 0.6667 
SC-6A 2.6521 4.3522 3.2641 4.1039 6.7346 5.0509 
MAIFI 
SC-1A 
0.0756 0.2015 0.3022 0.117 0.3121 0.4681 SC-2A 
SC-3A 
SC-4A 3.3976 3.7666 
SC-5A 2.3478 2.3478 
SC-6A 0.0994 0.2651 0.3976 0.1409 0.3756 0.5635 
CAIDI 
SC-1A 14.55 8.9539 4.477 11.1212 6.8438 3.4219 
SC-2A 18.0 18.0 18.0 18.0 18.0 18.0 
SC-3A 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 
SC-4A 16.6367 16.3995 
SC-5A 0.3333 0.3333 
SC-6A 65.479 40.295 20.148 54.119 33.304 16.652 
Tables III and IV show values for most common reliabi ty 
indices (SAIDI, SAIFI, MAIFI and CAIDI) calculated using 
analytical approach for test network, for mean and maximum 
loading conditions and pairs of correlated minimum, mean and 
maximum fault rates/repair times (Figs. 2-6, Part 1 paper [6]). 
TABLE IV 
ANALYTICAL APPROACH , SCENARIOS SC-1B TO SC-6B (MV  &  LV  










Mean Load. Conditions Max. Load. Conditions 














0.0025 0.0066 0.0099 0.0027 0.0071 0.0107 SC-2B 
SC-3B 
SC-4B 0.0200 0.0201 
SC-5B 2.0 2.0 
SC-6B 0.0024 0.0063 0.0095 0.0025 0.0068 0.0102 
SAIDI 
SC-1B 0.0594 0.0975 0.0732 0.0603 0.099 0.0743 
SC-2B 0.0447 0.1192 0.1787 0.048 0.1281 0.1921 
SC-3B 0.0298 0.0794 0.1192 0.032 0.0854 0.1281 
SC-4B 0.2969 0.2971 
SC-5B 0.6667 0.6667 
SC-6B 0.1516 0.2488 0.1866 0.1354 0.2222 0.1666 
MAIFI 
SC-1B 
0.0029 0.0078 0.0117 0.0031 0.0084 0.0125 SC-2B 
SC-3B 
SC-4B 0.0235 0.0236 
SC-5B 2.3478 2.3478 
SC-6B 0.0030 0.0081 0.0121 0.0033 0.0087 0.0130 
CAIDI 
SC-1B 23.94 14.732 7.3662 22.6116 13.9148 6.9574 
SC-2B 18.0 18.0 18.0 18.0 18.0 18.0 
SC-3B 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 
SC-4B 14.835 14.794 
SC-5B 0.3333 0.3333 
SC-6B 64.168 39.488 19.744 53.110 32.683 16.342 
Following similar analytical approach, Figs. 4 and 5 show 
in more detail daily variations in SAIFI and SAIDI index 
values (for estimated variations of fault rates andrepair times 
and loading conditions shown in Figs. 2-4 in Part 1 paper [6]). 
 
Figure 4.  Daily variations in analytically calculated SAIFI values, SC-1A 
(mean and variable fault rates for actual load profile, MV network only). 
As previously discussed, the most prominent feature of 
analytical reliability assessment approaches is that t ey will 
provide one single set of output values for a given or specified 
set of input data and parameters. Exactly that featur  is used in 
this paper for a simple and straightforward inclusion of 
Regulator continuity of supply requirements (see Section III in 
Part 1 paper, [6]) in the reliability assessment procedures. 
 
Figure 5.  Daily variations in analytically calculated SAIDI values, SC-1A 
(mean and variable fault rates for actual load progile, MV network only). 
To incorporate selected Regulator requirements, analytical 
approach should use as input data actual limits for continuity 
of supply exactly as specified by Regulator. For example, to 
assess reliability of MV and LV networks from Figs. 5 and 6 
in Part 1 paper, [6], with respect to GSP-UK, which requires 
DNOs to pay compensation to all customers exposed to supply 
interruptions longer than 18 hours (Table V in Part 1 paper, 
[6]), it is assumed in Scenarios SC-2A and SC-2B that every 
faulted component will have repair time of exactly 18 hours, 
with same duration applied for transfer to alternative supply 
and time required for network reconfiguration. In that way, the 
worst possible network reliability performance for which there 
will still be no penalty incurred due to supply interruptions 
longer than 18 hours will be calculated. This is illustrated in 
Tables III and IV, where for Scenarios SC-2A and SC-2B 
CAIDI is exactly 18 hours. Afterwards, these and other 
analytically calculated reliability indices are used as 
“benchmark limits” against which corresponding risks of 
penalty are directly assessed probabilistic reliability 
assessment (analytically calculated for pairs of values λmean-
µmean and mean loading conditions are assumed to correspond 
to the mean values of the probabilistic/MCS results). 
V. PROBABILISTIC RELIABILITY ASSESSMENT 
Probabilistic approach is applied only for Scenarios SC-1A 
and SC-1B (representing existing MV and LV network 
configurations and functionalities) and for Scenarios SC-6A 
and SC-6B (representing “smart grid” functionalities applied 
to MV network). MCS-calculated SAIFI, SAIDI and CAIDI 
values for considered scenarios are shown in Figs. 6-8,
together with all applicable limits calculated using analytical 
approach for the corresponding Regulator requirements from 
Scenarios SC-2A and SC-2B to Scenarios SC-5A/5B). 
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a) MV network only (no LV network representation) 
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b) MV and LV networks (LV equivalent included) 
Figure 6.  Comparison of SAIFI values with indicated Regulator limits. 








UK (GSP-UK) limit SC-2A:
Risk=19.2% (SC-1A)
Italian (SQS-I) limit SC-5A (40min):
Risk=47.6% (for SC-1A)
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UK (GSP-UK) limit SC-4B:
Risk~0% (SC-1B & SC-6B)
UK (GSP-UK) limit SC-2B:
Risk=8.1% (SC-6B)
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b) MV and LV networks (LV equivalent included) 
Figure 7.  Comparison of SAIDI values with indicated Regulator limits. 
 















Italian (GSP-I) limit SC-3A/3B:
Risk=7.6%   (SC-1A)
Risk=96.3% (SC-1B)
Risk=96.8% (SC-6B)
UK (GSP-UK) limit SC-4A:
Risk=7.3% (SC-1A)
UK (GSP-UK) limit SC-4B:
Risk~70% (SC-1B)
Risk~89% (SC-6B)
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Figure 8.  Comparison of CAIDI values with indicated Regulator limits. 
VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Results for SAIFI suggest that the only risk of violating 
considered Regulator requirements for the number of long 
interruptions is with respect to Italian GSP-I limit of 
2 int/cust/year (SC-5A, Fig. 6a, Risk=0.2%). However, if LV 
network is correctly represented (Fig. 6b), it is clear that this is 
no further the case (calculated SAIFI values are much lower). 
Similarly, results in Fig. 7a for Scenario SC-1A indicate 
high risks of penalties regarding several Regulator limits, but 
results in Fig. 7b for Scenario SC-1B (with LV network 
modelled properly), suggest only 5% risk regarding Italian 
GSP-I of 12hrs. However, significant increase of SAIDI value 
is indicated in Fig. 7 for Scenario SC-6B, when “smart grid“ 
automatic switching is applied. This is illustrated further in 
Fig. 8, which clearly shows that CAIDI values (i.e. average 
durations of long interruptions) increase after all f ults that are 
previously cleared after 15min or 3hrs are now short 
interruptions due to <3min automatic switching. In other 
words, shorter duration long interruptions are no longer 
contributing to the average values, which are now around 
16hrs (resulting in much higher risk of penalty regarding 
Italian SC-3A/3B limit of 12hrs and lower, but still notable 
risk regarding UK SC-2A/2B limit of 18hrs). The last results 
should be carefully interpreted, as the “smart grid” switching 
reduced number of long interruptions (Fig. 6), which now on 
average last longer. This also suggests that “smart grid” 
functionalities should be also implemented in LV network, in 
order to further reduce duration/number of long interruptions. 
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COMPARISON OF ANALYTICAL AND PROBABILISTIC RELIABILITY 
ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGIES FOR OFFSHORE RENEWABLE 
GENERATION PLANTS AND NETWORKS 
 




Improving the reliability and availability of offshore generating plants and networks (i.e. reducing their 
revenue losses) requires correct assessment of the reliability of both the individual components and the 
complete offshore generation system. This paper presents the results of the reliability analysis of offshore 
generating plants and interconnecting MV/HV networks. Both analytical and probabilistic reliability 
calculation methods are implemented and compared during the assessment, in order to obtain a more 
confident estimation of the reliability performance. Besides the standard reliability indices (related to 
frequency and duration of faults/interruptions), other energy-related reliability indicators are presented 
and compared, in order to identify the best combinatio  of network configurations, network 
interconnections and generation technologies. The benefits of each case (reduction of interrupted or 
curtailed energy outputs) are assessed against the ac ual cost. 
 
1.   INTRODUCTION 
Continuity of power supply, expressed and 
assessed as the ability of a power system, or any of 
its component, to perform their functions as 
intended (i.e. to operate normally), is known as the 
reliability. System faults, and malfunctions of 
system components occur in inherently stochastic 
and unpredictable ways, which require use of 
probability and statistical theory during the 
reliability analysis, where both continuous and 
discrete variables and parameters should be used 
as the inputs for the analysis. Amongst the 
different indices and indicators that can be used 
for the system reliability performance analysis, of 
particular values are those that can be applied to 
both individual network/system components (e.g. 
a generator, or a transformer) and to the whole 
system, allowing to quantify impact of the 
particular components on the whole system 
reliability. In this context, concepts of reliability 
and availability of network components and of the 
whole offshore renewable generating system 
(ORGS) are analysed in this paper, which 
quantifies and compares ORGS reliability 
performance using the “Estimated Energy Not 
Supplied” (EENS) index. This approach allows for 
a straightforward assessment of the impact of 
different reliability and power quality events and 
disturbances, as it translates frequency and 
duration of downtime ORGS conditions into the 
electrical energy (MWh), which is either not 
produced or cannot be exported to the onshore 
grid. The presented analysis uses average value of 
the capacity factor of generating plants in ORGS 
of 40%, in order to produce conservative 
estimations.  
2.   RELIABILITY ANALYSIS: INPUT DATA 
The reliability of ORGS can be assessed with 
confidence only if the relevant data for the 
analysis are presented as the statistically 
significant datasets, which are typically available 
after many years of operation. Although it can be 
generally concluded that currently available 
reliability data and information do not allow 
performing an in-depth analysis of the ORGS, an 
extensive review of available reports and other 
literature was performed in this paper in order to 
estimate main input parameters required for the 
reliability analysis of ORGS. For example, the 
results of several field studies from Reliawind 
project, representing in total 35,000 downtime 
events involving 350 wind turbines are compiled 
and processed in [1], indicating that power module 
(converter and associated switchgear and 
transformer) and wind turbines’ pitch control 
system are the most frequent causes of faults and 
downtimes. Power cables (inter-array and export 
cabling installations) were responsible for around 
1%-5% of faults/downtimes. Reliability statistics 
is typically collected from 10-min average turbine 
and substation SCADA databases, fault logs per 
turbine and substation and monthly operational 
reports compiled by the wind farm operators 
and/or manufacturers. Tables 1 and 2 show 
reported values of main reliability analysis 
parameter, also giving minimum, maximum and 
average values of fault rates and mean repair times, 
which are used specifically for the analysis of the
reliability performance of a typical medium size 
wind-based ORGS in this paper. 
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Mean Repair Times (hours/fault) 
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Min Avg Max 
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3.   TYPICAL ORGS CONFIGURATIONS 
A number of published reports and references, as 
well as the actual ORGS’ is reviewed and 
investigated, in order to identify the typical 
network layouts, configurations and components. 
These are illustrated in Figs. 1-7. 
 
Fig. 1. Electrical system for ac connection of a 
200 M…….,kkkkkW wind farm from [16]. 
 
Fig. 2. Barrow offshore wind farm, [17]. 
 
Fig. 3. Proposed optimal layout of the Barrow offshore 
wind farm, [17]. 
 
Fig. 4. Network layout, configuration and components 





Fig. 5. Horns Rev (a) and North Hoyle layouts (b), [15]. 
 
Fig. 6. Electrical system for ac connection of a 100 MW 





Fig. 7. Typical ORGS layouts and configurations: a) radial, 
b) single-sided ring, c) double-sided ring, and d) star, [18]. 
 
Fig. 8. Typical medium size ORGS configuration 
selected for the analysis ([3], [6]-[7], [15], [17]-[18]). 
3.1   ANALYSED MEDIUM SIZE ORGS 
Amongst the different ORGS configurations, 
Fig. 8 shows the one selected for the analysis in 
this paper, for which network and component 
parameters are listed in Table 3. The assessment 
compared the performance with and without 
normally open switches at the ends of the wind 
turbine radial strings (inter-array cables).  
 
Table 3. Parameters of the typical medium size 
ORGS selected for the analysis, [19]-[23]. 
Component 
R X 
(p.u. on 100 MVA) 
33kV Submarine 
Cable  (300 mm
2
) 
0.0073 per km 0.0104 per km 
33kV Submarine 
Cable  (120 mm
2
) 
0.0184 per km 0.0118 per km 
132kV Submarine 
Cable  (400 mm
2
) 









4.   RELIABILITY ASSESSMENT: RESULTS 
 
Over the last decades, the concept of reliability 
assessment evolved into the comprehensive 
approaches for evaluating various engineering 
strategies, typically linked to system planning, 
operation and maintenance studies. The meaning 
of reliability, which was initially expressed as the 
ability of a component to operate without faults 
during its lifetime and as specified by the 
manufacturer, has been generalized and now 
receives different connotations in engineering 
applications. This change is emphasized by the 
context in which reliability analysis of modern 
electricity networks, including ORGS, is not 
directly assigned to individual components in 
terms of the frequency and duration of their 
failures, but is extended and typically refers to the
performance assessment of a whole system, 
subsystem, or part of a system which is of interest 
during the analysis. However, and as mentioned 
before, reliability performance of the whole 
system is indeed determined by the performance 
of its individual components. The reliability 
assessment in this paper was done using both 
analytical (i.e. deterministic) and probabilistic (.e. 
Monte Carlo) approaches.  
4.1   ANALYTICAL APPROACHES 
Among the several techniques developed over the 
past years for the assessment of reliability 
performance, analytical approaches are often used 
for network planning or system security studies 
(e.g. “n-1 or n-2 security criteria”), as well as for 
evaluating network contingencies and system 
capacity/reserve requirements. It is generally 
assumed, however, that analytical reliability 
assessment approaches cannot directly or fully 
model inherently stochastic nature of system faults, 
or significant variations in fault repair times, or
equally wide range of changes in system loading 
conditions. 
Analytical reliability assessment approaches are 
based on mathematical models, which characterize 
analysed network in terms of the specified input 
data, typically limiting outputs to one set of result , 
e.g. mean values of reliability indices, 
corresponding to specified input mean data (e.g. 
average values given in Tables 1 and 2). In that 
way, analytical approaches offer only a general 
“snapshot” characterization of the analysed system, 
as they will always provide the same set of output 
results for the same set of input data, parameters 
and models. This is significant difference from 
probabilistic methods, which enable to perform a 
more comprehensive evaluation of system 
reliability with output reliability indices expressed 
as probability distributions (showing the ranges of 
their variations), rather than one set of output 
values and results (typically mean or average 
values). 
 
4.2   PROBABILISTIC APPROACHES 
 
Probabilistic reliability assessment procedures are 
widely recognized as more suitable for the 
analysis of system reliability performance, 
particularly in terms of their ability to model 
stochastic and inherently unpredictable variations 
of input parameters and data (e.g. fault rates and 
repair times) with their assumed probability 
distributions. Furthermore, probabilistic reliability 
assessment approaches allow to model a wider 
range of variations of practically all input 
parameters and data in one or few 
simulation/calculation set-ups, without the need to 
repeat calculation after a change in input data. 
Although probabilistic reliability assessment 
procedures are more difficult for implementation 
(particularly in complex large-scale systems), they 
provide more accurate and more detailed results 
than analytical approaches. The most frequently 
used probabilistic reliability assessment approach 
is the inverse transform method, also known as 
Monte Carlo Simulation (MCS, [24]). Besides 
network modelling, conventional MCS analysis 
requires statistical information on fault rates and 
repair times of faulted power components as input 
data. Network models and fault rates of power 
components are used to establish which system 
components will be faulted (and how frequently), 
whereas repair times of faulted components and 
network protection, reconfiguration, switching and 
alternative supply functionalities are used to 
stimate durations of corresponding supply 
interruptions. The outputs of the MCS analysis are 
reliability indices, which are typically presented as 
probability distributions with the corresponding 
mean values. 
 
4.3   ANALYTICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE 
ORGS RELIABILITY PERFORMANCE 
 
As mentioned, the output of the analytical 
reliability performance assessment methods is one 
set of calculated indices and parameters, which are 
in this paper obtained using minimum, maximum 
and average values of fault rates and mean repair 
times from Tables 1 and 2, applied for the analysis 
of selected wind-based ORGS shown in Fig. 8. 
The assumed average capacity factor during the 
downtime was 40% (i.e. 40% of the rated power of 
all wind turbines which are not able to operate or 
export produced energy due to a fault or failure 
within the ORGS was assumed to be lost for the 
whole duration of the downtime event). 
Table 4. Analytical reliability assessment of EENS 
(Expected Energy Not Supplied) index for selected 
















switches at the 
ends of radial 
strings 
Minimum 308.824 43,235.36 
Average 33,176.501 4,644,710.14 
Maximum 136,605.506 19,124,770.84 
With switches 
at the ends of 
radial strings 
Minimum 244.408 34,217.12 
Average 31,167.430 4,363,440.20 
Maximum 129,414.100 18,117,974.00 
 
The results from Table 4 show that somewhat 
better reliability performance is obtained if ORGS 
is designed with normally open switches at the 
ends of the radial strings of wind turbines, which 
will close after a fault in any of the strings is 
cleared and in that way provide connection of 
remaining wind turbines in a faulted string 
(downstream the fault location) to stay connected 
and export generated electricity. 
In order to assess the range of possible losses in 
profit and income due to the downtimes of wind 
turbines for any related fault within the ORGS, 
average cost of £140/MWh is assumed in the 
further analysis, [25]. If average values of fault 
rates and mean repair times are used, the estimated 
lost profit is about 10.5% of the total generated 
power outputs (£44,150,400) when no switches 
allowing connection at the end of the radial strings 
are installed, while this is reduced to about 9.9% if 
switches are installed. 
 
4.4   PROBABILISTIC ASSESSMENT OF THE 
ORGS RELIABILITY PERFORMANCE 
 
The results for the probabilistic reliability 
performance assessment (Monte Carlo approach, 
with 1,000 years of simulations) provide not just 
mean/average values for calculated indices and 
parameters (which closely match those calculated 
with analytical approach), but also provide their 
distributions. This is illustrated in Table 5 (mean 
values of EENS index for both analysed cases) 
and in Fig. 9 (distribution of EENS index values 
for both analysed cases), with again assumed 
average capacity factor during the downtime of 
wind turbines of 40%. 
 
Table 5. Probabilistic reliability assessment of 
EENS (Expected Energy Not Supplied) index for 
















switches at the 
ends of radial 
strings 
Minimum 292.80 40,992.00 
Average 31,237.06 4,373,188.40 
Maximum 111,491.34 15,608,787.60 
With switches 
at the ends of 
radial strings 
Minimum 217.736 30,483.04 
Average 29,457.7 4,124,078.00 
Maximum 106,945.01 14,972,301.40 
 
a) without switches at the ends of radial strings 
 
b) with switches at the ends of radial strings 
Fig. 9. Distribution of EENS values (probability density 
function, PDF) for average input fault rates and mean 
repair times modelled with exponential distributions. 
 
The results in Fig. 9 are in accordance with the 
data from Tables 1 and 2, which suggest that there 
is around 33-34 faults per year, most of which (but 
not all) results in a few/several wind turbines not
being able to generate/export power, with average 
duration of repair times of about 390 hours, which 
gives the peak values of the PDF around few tens 
of thousands of MWh of EENS per fault event. 
It is interesting to note that if the selected medium-
size ORGS is designed with switches at the ends 
of radial strings of wind turbines, the improvement 
in the reliability performance is relatively small 
(~6%), as MV cables are reliable components, and 
also allow for a simple replacement, instead of a 
repair (these cables are modelled with 0.009116 
faults/year and 752 hours of mean repair time, in 
accordance to Tables 1 and 2). In other words, 
investing in these switches may not repay. 
5.   CONCLUSIONS 
 
Improving the reliability and availability of 
offshore generating plants and networks (i.e. 
reducing their revenue losses) requires correct 
assessment of the reliability of both the individual 
components and the complete offshore generation 
system. This paper presents the results of the 
reliability analysis of a typical medium size 
offshore wind generating plants and all 
interconnecting MV/HV networks. 
In paper, both analytical and probabilistic 
approaches for the reliability assessment of 
offshore renewable generating system (ORGS) are 
implemented and compared, in order to obtain a 
more confident estimation of the ORGS reliability 
performance. In addition to the standard reliability 
indices (typically related to the frequency and 
duration of faults/interruptions), the paper 
provides results for energy-related reliability 
indicators (i.e. expected energy not supplied, 
EENS index).  
The presented results compare the reliability 
performance of the selected ORGS for two 
different configurations(with and without switches 
at the ends of radial inter-array strings of wind 
turbines), in order to identify benefits of each 
considered network configuration in terms of the 
reduction of interrupted or curtailed energy 
outputs of ORGS, which are assessed against the 
actual cost. 
Further work will assess risks and uncertainties in 
the reliability performance of ORGS based on the 
contributions of the individual ORGS components. 
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Abstract 
are aimed either at densely-populated urban and highly 
-
populated isolated off-grid areas (e.g. small islands and 
remote mountain regions). Rural areas, which are 
-
in between these two and are to a large extent neglected 
in the anticipated transformation of existing networks 
 (SGs). It is currently not 
clear which of the SG technologies and functionalities 
could be successfully implemented in rural areas and 
how specific characteristics of rural networks will 
impact implementation of SG solutions developed for 
urban and isolated off-grid areas. This paper considers a 
number of options for improving reliability performance 
of rural LV and MV networks, including those that are 
generally denoted as SG functionalities. The considered 
options include: provision of alternative supply points, 
implementation of remote control, automation and 
reconfiguration capabilities, as well as adding redundant 
components and reducing fault response and supply 
restoration times. The results for standard reliability 
indices are calculated using analytical approaches and 
then evaluated in order to identify the best options for 
improving reliability performance of considered 
LV/MV rural networks. 
1 Introduction 
Power supply systems in urban and highly urban (e.g. 
metropolitan) areas are characterized by strong, meshed 
and short-length underground cable networks, featuring 
multiple control, automation and volt-var regulation 
options, as well as the provision of alternative supply 
points to a large number of connected customers, with 
highly concentrated energy demands. In-built flexibility 
and redundancy in the network design, as well as a close 
proximity of repair crews, influence that urban networks 
exhibit both low frequency of long supply interruptions 
and short duration of fault repair and supply restoration 
times, resulting in a very reliable and high quality 
electricity supply.  
On the other hand, isolated off-grid communities are 
fully capable of operating independently from the mains 
grid supply and rely solely on available local resources, 
not on services, functionalities and supply from the grid. 
Furthermore, isolated off-grid communities own and 
operate their LV and MV networks and therefore share 
responsibility for maintaining desired or required 
reliability levels, e.g. through the direct control of non-
essential loads for balancing demand with available 
generation. Due to a number of technical and economic 
factors (related to, e.g., availability of technical support 
and repair crews, limited investment potential, types and 
characteristics of protection systems, etc.), it is not 
unusual for isolated off-grid networks to experience 
very frequent and/or excessively long interruptions of 
supply, resulting in a poor reliability performance. 
Due to the remote locations, highly dispersed customers 
and significantly lower demands, rural areas are 
typically connected to weak radial overhead networks, 
with long line lengths and high exposure to elements 
and harsh weather conditions (strong winds, high snows 
and rains, floods, etc.). Additionally, rural networks 
typically have no redundancy, no alternative supply 
points and feature only some limited automation and 
reconfiguration capabilities, resulting in a much higher 
frequency of both short and long supply interruption, as 
well as in the significantly longer supply restoration 
times. Finally, LV and MV networks in rural areas are 
owned and operated by distribution network operators 
(DNOs), who are ultimately responsible for maintaining 
required reliability and quality of supply performance. 
are aimed either at densely-populated urban and highly 
t sparsely-
populated isolated off-grid areas (e.g. small islands and 
remote mountain regions). Rural areas, which are 
-
than 100 inhabitants per square kilometre), are 
somewhere in between these two and are to a large 
extent neglected in the anticipated transformation of 
 
Accordingly, it is currently not clear which of the SG 
technologies, functionalities and services for improved 
reliability performance could be successfully 
implemented in rural areas, and how specifics of both 
energy supplies and energy demands, as well as 
different characteristics of rural networks (in terms of 
network configurations and components, energy 
densities, etc.), will impact implementation of existing 
SG solutions for urban and isolated off-grid areas, but 
also deployment of genuinely new solutions, tailored for 
the needs and characteristics of the rural networks. 
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Improved reliability performance is often assumed to be 
one 
which should also provide functionalities and services 
for reducing CO2 emissions and other drivers of climate 
change, while maintaining the highest possible levels of 
power quality, sustainability and affordability of 
electricity supply for customers. This is recognised, for 
example, in the latest review of the performance-based 
model that the UK Regulator (Ofgem) applies to all of 
UK DNOs: Revenue=Incentives+Innovation+Outputs  
(RIIO-ED1) [1]. The RIIO-ED1 control and regulation 
came in force in April 2015, encouraging DNOs to not 
only increase the use of low carbon and sustainable 
technologies, but it also set a higher requirements for 
reliability and quality of supply (e.g. duration of long 
interruptions after which customers are entitled to 
compensation reduced from 18 hours to 12 hours, while 
higher compensation schemes and penalties were set for 
implementation). Importantly, customers in Scottish 
(i.e. rural) areas, are now fully 
included in the RIIO-ED1 network reliability regulation. 
To answer some of the above mentioned challenges, this 
paper considers a number of options for improving 
reliability performance of rural LV and MV networks, 
including those that are generally denoted as SG 
functionalities . 
The considered options include: provision of alternative 
supply points, implementation of automation, 
reconfiguration and remote control capabilities, as well 
as adding redundant components and reducing fault 
response and supply restoration times. Presented results 
for standard reliability indices are calculated using 
analytical approaches and then evaluated in order to 
identify the best options for improving reliability 
performance of considered LV/MV rural networks. 
A number of previous studies analysed the effect of SG 
applications on the reliability of distribution networks, 
e.g. [2]-[8]. The existing body of work, however, mostly 
addresses the SG functionalities for improving 
reliability of urban networks, while there is only a very 
limited number of references related to the improvement 
of reliability and quality of supply in rural areas, e.g. 
[9]-[11]. The analysis in this paper divides different SG 
options for improving reliability performance in several 
groups, based on both their costs and technical 
difficulties for their implementation in rural networks. 
Furthermore, typical UK/Scottish LV and MV rural 
network configurations are used for a detailed 
quantitative assessment of the effectiveness of the 
considered options in improving reliability performance, 
in terms of the reduced fault rates and restoration times.  
The main purpose of this paper is to investigate 
applicability of some of SG functionalities in rural 
radial networks and to propose practical (i.e. cost-
effective) solutions, possibly combining several options, 
for improving reliability performance and for meeting 
the regulator requirements for security, reliability and 
quality of supply, as in e.g. [1]-[4]. 
2 Methodology 
2.1 Reliability Indices Used in Analysis  
The set of five commonly used reliability indices is used 
in this paper for the assessment of reliability 
performance of considered LV and MV rural networks:  
1. System average interruption frequency index 
(SAIFI), which calculates annual average number 
of long interruptions (with durations longer than 
3 minutes in the EU, and 1 minute in the USA) for 
all customers in the considered network/system: 
        (1) 
2. Momentary average interruption frequency index 
(MAIFI), where momentary  is defined in the EU 
to be less than 3 minutes (1 minute in the US), 
which calculates annual average number of 
momentary/short interruptions for all customers in 
the considered network/system: 
       (2) 
3. System average interruption duration index 
(SAIDI), which calculates annual average duration 
of long interruptions (in hours, or in minutes) for all 
customers in the considered network/system: 
(3) 
4. Customer average interruption duration index 
(CAIDI), which calculates the average duration of 
long interruptions (in hours, or in minutes), i.e. the 
ratio of (3) over (1): 
(4) 
5. Average energy not supplied (AENS), which 
calculates annual average energy (in kilowatt-hours, 
or in megawatt-hours) not supplied to all customers 
in the considered system/network due to long 
supply interruptions, based on the durations of long 
demands for all faults and for all customers in the 
considered network/system: 
(5) 
The main reason for selecting the above five reliability 
indices is to ensure that every aspect of the reliability 
performance analysis is properly assessed, as, for 
example, the implementation of one specific SG option 
might reduce frequency of long interruptions, but 
increase their duration. 
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2.2 Analytical Reliability Assessment Methods 
Analytical or deterministic reliability assessment is 
based on the evaluation of known or assumed mean 
fault rates and mean repair times of all network 
components in a considered network model. The 
approach consists of evaluating consequences of 
permanent and transient faults of each network 
component in terms of the numbers of interrupted 
customers and corresponding supply restoration times.  
Sum of annual fault rates (i.e. annual probabilities of 
faults) of all components resulting in the long or short 
interruptions of customers will give the total numbers of 
faults contributing to SAIFI in (1), or MAIFI in (2), 
respectively, when divided by the total number of 
served customers. Sum of products of fault rates and 
mean repair times (i.e. average duration required to 
repair the faulted component) of all network 
components that cause long interruptions of customers 
will give the total annual duration of long interruptions 
contributing to SAIDI in (3), again when divided by the 
total number of served customers. CAIDI in (4) is 
calculated by dividing SAIDI by SAIFI, while AENS is 
calculated using SAIFI, SAIDI and assumed or known 
demands of customers during the experienced long 
interruptions of supply.  
The analytical reliability assessment approaches result 
in one set of output results (i.e. estimated frequency and 
duration of long interruptions, as well as frequency of 
short interruptions, from which system reliability 
indices (1) to (5) are calculated) for one set of input 
parameters and data (i.e. network configurations and 
components, corresponding fault rates and repair times, 
numbers and demands of customers, etc.). The 
calculated system reliability indices are represented as 
the mean (or average) annual values, and if any of input 
data or parameter changes, the analytical calculations 
should be repeated with the new set of input data. This 
is illustrated in Section 5, where each of applied options 
for improving reliability performance resulted in a 
new/separate analytical calculation, i.e. in a new set of 
calculated reliability indices (Tables 2 and 3). 
2.3 Protection Systems 
As previously mentioned, electricity customers in rural 
areas are typically supplied by longer-length radial 
overhead LV and MV networks, featuring limited or no 
automation and reconfiguration capabilities, no 
redundancy and no alternative supply points. Primary 
MV distribution substations (33/11 kV in the UK, 
Fig. 1) typically supply few radial 11 kV feeders, with 
aro relatively equally 
distributed loads. MV feeder heads are protected by 
circuit breakers (CBs) with automatic reclosing (AR) 
functionalities, while only one or two main sections will 
have automatic sectionalisers (AS ), or automatic 
reclosers (ARs). Secondary distribution substations 
(11/0.4 kV in the UK, Fig. 2) supply 6-8 LV feeders, 
with a CB (no AR), or a fuse at the head, supplying 3-4 
LV laterals with typically unequally distributed loads. 
As the most common protection component is fuse (at 
all LV laterals and most of MV laterals), the settings of 
protection system will almost always utilise so called 
fuse saving scheme [12]. In this protection scheme, an 
upstream CB/AR will isolate fault before any of the 
fuses located downstream reacts. If the fault is transient 
(or temporary) and CB has AR, subsequent reclosing 
will restore supply, causing only a short/momentary 
interruption to customers and eliminating the need to 
dispatch service crew to replace blown fuse(s).  
3 Input Data, Parameters and Networks 
Models Used for Reliability Assessment 
3.1 Generic Rural LV and MV Networks 
Typical rural LV and MV radial networks are identified 
from the UK/Scottish DNO reports and used 
rural for the analysis in this paper, Figs. 1-2.  
 
Fig. 1 Generic MV rural network used for the analysis 
 
Fig. 2 Generic LV rural network used for the analysis 
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3.2 Mean Fault Rates and Mean Repair Times 
Mean fault rates and mean repair times of network 
components are basic input data for reliability 
assessment. These are typically available from DNOs  
annual reports to the regulator, or from the statistics that 
the DNOs are publishing on the performance of their 
networks, or from existing literature, e.g. [13]-[15]. 
Most of the DNOs, including those in the UK, provide 
only information on the overall reliability performances 
of their networks, with no distinction between different 
areas, or types of the networks. For example, a 
differentiation between the fault rates and repair times 
in urban, sub-urban and rural networks is usually not 
available from the published DNO data.  
Fault rates and repair times used in this paper are taken 
from the UK-based statistics in [16] and additionally 
correlated with published EU-based data in [17], which 
also provides some limited information on transient and 
permanent faults, as well as on different types of the EU 
networks, based on population densities. Accordingly, 
Table 1 presents mean fault rates and mean repair times 
used for the analysis in this paper. The assumed 
percentage contributions of the transient faults and 
permanent faults to the total number of faults in rural 
networks are 76% and 24%, respectively. This 
information is required for the correct calculation of 
short and long supply interruptions (SAIFI and MAIFI).  
Table 1 Mean fault rates and mean repair times used for 








Transformer 33/11 kV 0.01 100 
Transformer 11/0.4 kV 0.01 20 
33 kV Bus  0.001 8 
11 kV Bus 0.003 8 
0.4 kV Bus 0.005 4 
11 kV Overhead Line 
(per km length) 0.091 7 
0.4 kV Overhead line 
(per km length) 0.168 6 
11 kV Circuit Breaker 
or Automatic Recloser  0.0071 72 
11 kV Automatic 
Sectionaliser 0.0071 36 
0.4 kV Circuit Breaker 0.0071 36 
0.4 kV Switch Fuse 
or Fuse 0.0027 3 
3.3 Load Profile of Customers in Rural Networks 
Load profiles of rural domestic (or residential) 
customers will vary based on the geographic location, 
size of the household and use of electrical equipment for 
specific activities, but can be generally represented by 
Fig. 3. The  
per household is 2.34KVA at 0.97 power factor [18]. 
 
Fig. 3 Load profile of LV rural domestic customers 
4 SG Options for Improving Reliability 
Performance of Rural Networks 
This section discusses a number of options for 
improving reliability performance of rural LV and MV 
networks, including those that are generally denoted as 
SG functionalities.  
4.1 On-site Replacement of the Faulty Components, 
Instead of Repairing Them 
The values in Table 1 suggest that relatively long repair 
times are reported for  at 
both LV and MV levels (between one and a half and 
three days). Due to the supply of relatively low demands 
in rural networks, these protection and switching 
components are compact and lightweight (see e.g. [16]), 
i.e. they can be easily transported by repair crew. This 
will then allow to replace faulty components on-site, 
instead of attempting to repair them, which is estimated 
to reduce supply restoration times related to the repairs 
of CBs, AS  and ARs in Table 1 for about 50%. 
4.2 Installation of Additional Lines at the Ends of the 
Feeders, or Provision of Alternative Supply Points 
Radial topology of rural LV and MV networks does not 
allow for an easy and economic implementation of 
network reconfiguration functionalities. However, 
s
connecting open ends of feeders supplied from the same 
primary/secondary substation, or an alternative supply 
point can be provided by connecting to nearby primary 
or secondary substation (supplying another LV/MV 
network). Longer lengths of feeders and larger distances 
from other rural networks will typically (but not always) 
result in high or even prohibitive costs of these options.  
Additional lines for closing open ends of feeders should 
be equipped with protection devices, in order to prevent 
long interruptions of customers due to the faults on 
these additional lines. Coordination of the protection 
and sectionalising of main feeder sections also help to 
preserve supply to a larger number of customers, which 
would be otherwise interrupted. In Fig. 4, solid blue 
lines represent closed open ends, while dashed red lines 
represent alternative supply from a nearby network.  
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Fig. 4 Additional lines and alternative supply point (LV 
rural network) 
 
Fig. 5 Installation of additional components, or 
upgrading of the existing ones (LV rural network) 
4.3 Upgrading of Existing Components or Installation 
of Additional Components 
Installation of the additional redundant components, or 
upgrading of the existing components with those that 
will allow for the increased automation, or enable 
implementation of remote control, could also improve 
reliability performance of rural networks. For example, 
both primary and secondary substations in rural areas 
typically have only one transformer (Figs. 1 and 2), 
which will cause long supply interruptions of all 
customers connected to that substation in case of a 
transformer fault. If an additional transformer is 
installed, there will be two transformers (e.g. each with 
60%-70% rating of the original one), providing 
redundancy and supplying either all, or most of the 
customers in the case of the transformer faults.  
Another example is installation of additional CBs, or 
selective replacing of existing fuses with CBs (with or 
without reclosing and remote control functionalities), 
suitable locations are feeder main sections before/after 
laterals, indicated in Fig. 5, as this will improve network 
fault response through a better isolation of faults. A 
large number of combinations with newly installed CBs 
and with CBs replacing some fuses at various network 
locations is investigated, in order to identify the most 
cost-effective solutions, i.e. to find the optimal number 
of CBs (more expensive than fuses), that could provide 
the biggest improvement of reliability performance.  
5 Results of Reliability Performance 
5.1 LV Rural Network  
Table 2 shows some of the results for the calculated 
reliability performance of generic LV rural network in 
Fig. 2 for a number of different options discussed in the 
previous section. The considered options/cases are: 
 Case 1: Original LV network; 
 Case 2: All faulted CBs are replaced, not repaired; 
 Case 3: All CBs are equipped with AR function; 
 Case 4: Open ends of LV feeders are closed with 
additional lines (LV network is meshed); 
 Case 5: Open ends of LV feeders are connected 
with additional (normally open) lines to a nearby 
LV network, acting as an unrestricted alternative 
supply point; 
 Case 6a: An additional CB is installed after the 
second main feeder section on each LV feeder; 
 Case 6b: No CBs only fuses are installed (at the 
LV feeder head and in each main feeder section; 
 Case 7: The second transformer is installed in the 
supplying substation; 
 Case 8: Combination of the Options 3, 4 and 6a 
(CBs with AR, additional CBs, alternative supply). 
Table 2 Comparison of calculated reliability indices for 
considered options/cases (LV rural network) 
Case SAIFI MAIFI SAIDI CAIDI AENS (kWh) 
1 0.0771 0 0.772 10.0 1.00 





























































5.2 Discussion of Results for LV Rural Network 
The results in Table 2 demonstrate that implementation 
of practically all considered options have a positive 
impact on reliability performance (% reductions are also 
shown). MAIFI values cannot be calculated, as the 
original LV network is assumed to have CBs without 
AR functions, when all temporary faults result in long 
supply interruptions. (Note: Self-extinguishing faults are 
not considered.) Two exceptions are Cases 3 and 8, 
when CBs are equipped with AR functions.  
Case 2: By replacing faulty CBs instead of repairing 
them, the corresponding supply restoration times will be 
reduced for around 50% (no impact on SAIFI), resulting 
in lower values of SAIDI and CAIDI, as well as AENS. 
Case 3: After CBs are equipped with AR and set to 
operate in a fuse-saving scheme, significant number of 
temporary faults that previously resulted in long supply 
interruptions will now cause only short interruptions, 
dramatically reducing SAIFI, but increasing MAIFI.  
Case 4: Forming of a meshed network provides 
alternative supply routes for faults on the main feeder. 
This is effective in reducing long supply interruptions 
caused by CB faults, impacting SAIDI and CAIDI 
values. However, network still has limited ability to 
isolate faults, requiring additional components for the 
further improvement of reliability indices. 
Case 5: Similarly to Case 4, provision of alternative 
supply point effectively prevents supply interruption 
caused by the faults of the transformer, busbar and fuse 
in substation. It is more efficient compared to Case 4. 
Case 6a: Additional CBs help to isolate faults on the 
main feeders, reducing SAIFI, but slightly increasing 
SAIDI and CAIDI values, due to the longer restoration 
times of additional CBs. This suggests that it would be 
effective to combine installing of additional components 
with the lines closing the ends of the feeders to reduce 
the impact of the faults on the main feeder. 
Case 6b: Fuses are installed in every section of the 
main feeder, increasing fault isolation capability and 
reducing SAIFI (compare with Case 6a), but an increase 
in system fault rates due to the installed new fuses 
negates the effect of the better fault isolation.  
Case 7: Additional transformer provides redundancy in 
case of a single transformer fault, but it is less effective 
than Case 5.  
Case 8: This case demonstrates the effects of combining 
several options. Provision of an alternative supply point, 
or closing of the open feeder ends in meshed network 
configuration, with the implementation of additional 
CBs with AR functionalities, significantly increases 
isolate faults and limit their impact 
in terms of frequency and duration of supply 
interruptions, as well as the number of interrupted 
customers (last row in Table 2). 
Despite their positive effects on improving reliability 
performance, the implementation of some of the 
considered options might incur very large costs, or 
might not be possible at all. Although this will in 
principle depend on the actual characteristics of the 
considered rural LV and MV networks (e.g. network 
configuration, number of loads and their distribution), it 
is possible to perform a general (pre)evaluation of the 
costs and benefits of multiple options.  
This is illustrated in Fig. -
benefit flow , where different options should be 
selected for further evaluation and implementation 
starting from the upper-left corner (low cost and high 
impact) and then progressing to the right. If an option is 
not economically viable, selection proceeds by going 
vertically down (e.g. from the provision of alternative 
supply point, to the realisation of the meshed network 
configuration, to the installation of the additional 
transformer). This approach also allows for combining 
different options to maximise their effects on improving 
reliability performance of rural LV and MV networks. 
 
Fig. 6 Cost-benefit evaluation flow chart of different 
options for improving reliability of rural networks 
5.3 MV Rural Network  
Configurations of rural MV networks are similar to rural 
LV networks (Figs. 1 and 2), which basically means that 
same options for reliability performance of LV network 
from Sub-sections 5.1 and 5.2 could be evaluated and 
implemented for the rural MV network. With reference 
to Table 3, the following cases are considered: 
 Case 1: Original MV network; 
 Case 2: All circuit CBs are equipped with ARs and 
an unrestricted alternative point of supply is 
provided form a nearby MV network; 
 Case 3: All circuit CBs are equipped with ARs, an 
additional transformer is installed in substation and 
additional lines to connect open ends of main 
feeders are installed to form a meshed network; 
 Case 4: All CBs are equipped with ARs and instead 
of repairing the faulted components, they are 
replaced on the site. 
The results for the same system reliability performance 
indices considered before in case of generic rural MV 
network from Fig. 1 are listed in Table 3. 
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Table 3 Comparison of calculated reliability indices for 
considered options/cases (MV rural network)
Case SAIFI MAIFI SAIDI CAIDI AENS 
1 0.316 0.321 4.24 13.4 3.59 



























5.4 Discussion of Results for MV Rural Network 
As the considered generic MV network in Fig. 1 already 
, adding more of these 
components will have only a minor impact on the 
improvement of reliability performance. Therefore, 
these cases are not considered.  
The results for the three considered cases generally 
follow the chart in Fig. 6. As previously discussed for 
rural LV networks, the results for Case 2 (indicating 
options in the top row of the chart in Fig. 6) represent 
the biggest improvement of reliability performance. 
Cases 3 and 4 correspond to the options from the bottom 
and central parts of the chart, which are less effective, 
but still result in significantly better reliability 
performance than that of the original network. It should 
be noted that the calculated increase of CAIDI values 
for Cases 3 and 4 are result of the corresponding relative 
changes (i.e. disproportionate reductions) of SAIFI and 
SAIDI values. In other words, Cases 3 and 4 are not 
, or less reliable than the original network 
(Case 1), as the implemented options have different 
effects on reducing frequency and duration of long 
interruption with respect to the initial values of Case 1. 
6 Conclusions 
Stricter regulation (i.e. higher penalties/compensations) 
forces DNOs to improve reliability of supply to all 
customers, including those in rural areas. Although 
improved reliability performance is one of the very 
most of the 
ongoing and planned  activities are aimed 
either at urban areas, or at isolated off-grid areas. Rural 
areas are somewhere in between these two and are to a 
large extent neglected in the anticipated 
transformation of existing networks. This paper 
investigates applicability of a number of (
options for rural networks and evaluates practical cost-
effective solutions for improving their reliability. 
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